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김일성 항일무장투쟁의 신화화 연구

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The contents of this book are the personal views of the author and do not contradict the official opinions of this researcher.

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Chapter

Introduction

I. Introduction

The military-first politics, which is being used as North Korea's new governing ideology, is anti-Japanese

It is looking for the roots of its legitimacy in the armed struggle. By insisting that military-first politics inherits the tradition of the armed struggle against Japan, North Korea [1] is saying that military-first politics is not simply a martial law politics created as a makeshift in the face of a systemic crisis, but is based on a tradition handed down from the era of the anti-Japanese armed struggle and the Kim Il-sung era.

As such, the anti-Japanese armed struggle has been the most in North Korea since the beginning of the regime until now.

It functions as an important governing ideology. The anti-Japanese armed struggle was the subject of the ruling ideology most used by the Kim Il Sung regime. As the slogan "Ideology, Teaching, Humidity, Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Style" implies, it was used as the basis for the most important worldview and values in the daily lives of the North Korean people, and it was used as the basis for most of North Korea's culture and art as well as in their daily lives. From the beginning of the regime until now, the North Korean people have been living in the myth of the anti-Japanese armed struggle, and the "Reminiscences of the Participants in the Anti-Japanese Armed

[1] Kim In-ok, 「General Kim Jong Il's Theory of Military-First Politics 」} (Seoul: Pyongyang Publishing House, 2003).

Struggle" has been read like the Bible. For every 100 North Korean defectors, 100 of them testify that they came to South Korea from the North Korean system, but they have a sense of worship that cannot be erased from their minds for the rest of their lives. The reason why Kim Il-sung was judged to be so great is that he believed that Kim Il-sung liberated Korea from Japanese imperialism through the armed struggle against Japan. It is true that Kim Il-sung waged an armed struggle against Japan, but it is a historical theory that Kim Il-sung liberated Korea because Japan surrendered unconditionally to the United States and the Soviet Union in World War II and Japan retreated following the occupation of the Korean peninsula by the Soviet Union and the United States, and that Kim Il-sung had taken refuge in the Soviet Union since October 1940 and returned home through the port of Wonsan in late September 1945 aboard the Soviet fleet after the liberation of Korea. The history of Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese struggle that the North Korean people believe is too much distorted. Exaggerated and distorted history was exaggerated and used in North Korea's domestic politics.

Much research has been done on the anti-Japanese armed struggle. So far, much research has been done on Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against Japan by historians in Korea, China, especially in the Yanbian region, and Japan. The facts have been drawn in relative detail and accurately known. The works of Seo Dae-sook, Kim Jun-yup, Lee Chang-soon, Haruki Wada, and Shin Ju-baek are representative.[2] In particular, Suh Dae-sook's research is the most pioneering, and Shin

Ju-baek's research that has been conducted until recently is the most comprehensively analyzed study based on the most data. There was a period of debate in our academic circles about whether Kim Il-sung's history of armed struggle against Japan was real or fake, but such a debate has long since ended.

For example, Haruki Wada criticized North Korea for mythologizing Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against Japan and argued that it was necessary to analyze the facts as facts.[3] However, it has been evaluated as a very objective study.

---

[2] Seo Dae-sook, Translated by the Society for the Study of Contemporary History, 「History of the Korean Communist Movement 」} (Seoul: Hwada Sinseo, 1985); Original text: *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918~1948,* (Princeton Univ. Press, 1967); Kim Jun-yup and Kim Chang-soon, The History of the Korean Communist Movement Vol. 5 (Seoul: Cheonggye Research Institute, 1986); Haruki Wada, translated by Lee Jong-suk, 「Kim Il-sung and the Anti-Japanese Manchurian Struggle 」} (Seoul: History of Creation and Criticism, 1992); Haruki Wada, Seo-dong-man-Namjeong, North Korea: From a guerrilla state to a regular military state 」 (Seoul: Stone Pillow, 1998); Shin Ju-baek, 「History of the Korean National Movement in Manchuria 1920~1945」} (Seoul: Asia Cultural History, 1999); Shin Jubaek, 「History of National Movements in China in the 1920s~30s」」}(Seoul: Sunin, 2005).

Haruki Wada's research also focused on Kim Il-sung's Manchurian faction and Kim Il-sung's deeds, which ultimately contributed to the mythologization of Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against Japan.

New research methods are needed. In fact, existing studies have not been able to analyze exactly how the North Korean librarians distorted it. Now, it is necessary to turn attention to how North

Korea distorts Kim Il-sung's history of armed struggle against Japan and uses it as a state ideology. The history of the Korean dragon army that fought against the Japanese in China's Central Plains is a history that has been erased from the history of North Korea. Even after Kim Il-sung's 6th Army of the 2nd Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army was almost destroyed and fled to the Soviet Union, the Korean Volunteer Army continued the armed struggle against Japan and continued the struggle until the time of liberation. Their achievements in the armed struggle against Japan are no less significant than in Manchuria, where Kim Il-sung was active. After liberation, it entered North Korea and formed an elite group called the Coastal Faction, which became the main force in the establishment of the Korean People's Army and participated as the main force in the June 25 invasion of the South. In addition, the history of nationalism in the 1920s~1930s does not exist in the history of North Korea. In North Korea's history, the role of the numerous Korean armed forces and guerrilla bases that operated in Manchuria does not exist in history, but is recorded in the history of Kim Il-sung alone. It is necessary to accurately analyze the reality of the distortion of North Korea's history. Here's why. First, excessive distortion is having a bad effect on South Korea. The distorted history in North Korea has had a great negative impact on our society and has served as a key point in the alienation between South Korea and North Korea. In our academia, there is a disagreement about Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese movement.

[3] Haruki Wada, 「Kim Il-sung and the Manchurian Anti-Japanese War 」} (Seoul: History of Creation and Criticism, 1992).

Although the results were quite objective, and the whole picture was revealed, the North Korean studies community and the North Korean authorities did not properly evaluate the distortion, manipulation, and fabrication of history. As a result, even the objective analysis conducted by our academic circles has become a source of suspicion as to whether North Korea's claim is correct. It has not only influenced the controversy over the legitimacy of the state in our society but also influenced the political rift and is also acting as a factor in amplifying the confusion and conflict in our society. It will also be a problem for social integration between North and South Korea after reunification. For example, there was a recent case in which assistant teachers at a school in Busan copied a distorted North Korean history book almost verbatim and used it as a textbook for unification education.

Second, it is necessary to change today's North Korea, and in the future of reunification,

A correct understanding of history is necessary for the social integration of North and South Korea. Without a correct appreciation of history, it is difficult to integrate the present. Analyzing what and how North Korea's history books have distorted can be the first step toward North-South reunification.

This study differs from previous historiographical analyses in that it is a study of South Korea, Central and

This course compares the analysis of Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against Japan by Korean and Japanese historians with the analysis of the anti-Japanese armed struggle by North Korean historiography. We should objectively analyze the activities of Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese armed struggle, but correct and restore the distorted and erased history. To this end, we will approach it by comparing not only the Manchurians, which North Korean historians have defined as the only anti-Japanese armed struggle, but also the performance of the Korean volunteer army, which was wiped out in the history of North Korea's anti-Japanese armed struggle because it was a rival group of Kim Il-sung, and the performance of the nationalist anti-Japanese armed struggle that lasted for the longest period from the 1910s to the late 1930s. In addition, the contribution of the Koreans in the guerrilla bases, who did not fight directly on the battlefield but supplied food and clothing to the guerrilla fighters, is also highlighted as an achievement that cannot be overlooked.

This study was conducted in a region different from the anti-Japanese Mutu in Manchuria, and

It also attempts to give a legitimate meaning to the independence movement carried out in a way. Because armed struggle is not the only means of independence. Diplomacy in the international community is also a very important tool. It was important for us to be able to gain independence from Japan because we showed our will to resist through armed struggle, but also because of diplomatic efforts that influenced the great powers' decision to make Korea

independent from Japan in the process of dealing with the post-war process of World War II.

In addition, this article analyzes Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese armed struggle.

It attempts to make a new argument on the issue of Kim Il-sung's self-help revolution vs. Sovietization, which has become a controversial issue in historical scholarship. Since the distortion of history about Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against Japan extends to the part about the process of the retreat of the Japanese imperialists and the liberation, it is also a debate about the process of Kim Il-sung's seizure of power after liberation. In other words, it is a controversy about the link between the anti-Japanese armed struggle and the North Korean regime. As an extension of the anti-Japanese armed struggle, there is a perception that Kim Il-sung established the North Korean regime by gaining independence from the Japanese imperialists (self-help revolution view), and there is a perception that the Soviet Union created the North Korean system (Sovietization view). The self-help revolution view may be a perception that comes from ignoring the reality of the anti-Japanese war of independence of the coastal faction or the nationalist line. This is an argument that does not know how great the power and prestige of the Korean dragon army was at that time.

This article provides an in-depth analysis of the role played by the Soryon in the development of the anti-Japanese armed struggle into a ruling ideology. This course provides an in-depth analysis of how

the Soviet Union established Kim Il-sung as the supreme leader of North Korea, cultivated Kim Il-sung's partisans as a mainstream elite group, and used the anti-Japanese armed struggle to justify it.[2]

Finally, this article argues that the anti-Japanese armed struggle is simply an object of historical analysis.

Rather, it emphasizes that it is a governing ideological aspect. Haruki Wada called North Korea a guerrilla state. Since the founding of the country in 1948, the system that was formed in the second phase from 1967 to 1972 was called a guerrilla state.[5] It now claims that the Kim Jong Il regime is transitioning to a regular military state.It [3] 's getting inconsistent. Traces of the anti-Japanese armed struggle

[2] Without the Soviet Union's behind-the-scenes manipulation, Kim Il-sung would not have been able to overtake the domestic faction and the coastal faction and monopolize power. The controversy is hovering at the origin because the process by which the North Korean regime was established and the anti-Japanese armed struggle was adopted as the national ideology and the process by which the anti-Japanese armed struggle was mythologized have not been properly understood. This article answers this issue by focusing on the role played by the Soviet Union in the process of ideologizing the governance of the anti-Japanese armed struggle. The Soviet military government created a justification for Kim Il-sung to be the supreme leader by insisting that the leader should be the one who fought against Japan with a gun in order to provide Kim Il-sung with a stable power base as the supreme leader. The partisans, who were Kim Il-sung's inner circle, also overtook other factions for the same cause and nurtured them into the core of power. The Soviets held the number two positions in the ministries and held the highest positions mainly partisans. As a result, North Korea has become a guerrilla state, as Professor Haruki Wada has claimed. [5] Haruki Wada, 「Kim Il-sung and the Manchurian Anti-Japanese War 」} (Seoul: History of Creation and Criticism, 1992).

[3] Haruki Wada, North Korea: From a Guerrilla State to a Regular Military State (Seoul: Dol Pillow, 2002).

still exist. This is due to Haruki Wada's emphasis on the power elite aspect. The ruling ideological aspect of the anti-Japanese armed struggle was overlooked. This report seeks to characterize the North Korean system as the ideology of Kim Il-sung's excessive rule in the armed struggle against Japan. North Korea turned Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese war in Manchuria into a myth of Kim Il-sung's personality cult. This myth has become so absolutized that it has become impossible to break it. For example, Because of the myth of the anti-Japanese armed struggle, diplomatic relations with Japan have not yet taken place. Sixty years after the establishment of North Korea, colonial rule and war have long since ended, and neither reconciliation nor diplomatic relations with democratized Japan have been achieved. It is also abandoning economic cooperation with Japan, an economically advanced country. This can be attributed to a considerable extent to the excessive ruling ideology in the history of the anti-Japanese armed struggle.

This study is part of a multi-faceted approach to the North Korean system.

It's also part of understanding the present through history. I would like to explore the reasons why the current military-first politics is working in North Korea. How is the history of the anti-Japanese armed struggle understood, so that the slogan of military rule in the 21st century can be raised today, and are there people who accept it?

The main purpose of this study is not to study the history of the anti-Japanese armed struggle, but to compare and analyze how North Korea distorted the anti-Japanese armed struggle based on the results of the existing historiography of the anti-Japanese armed struggle. Since many articles on the anti-Japanese armed struggle have already been written by Chinese scholars of the Korean ethnic group, Japanese scholars, and Korean scholars, this course analyzes how North Korean historical scholars and authorities mythologized the anti-Japanese armed struggle and developed it into an ideology of state governance.

In order to clarify the facts about the anti-Japanese armed struggle, this study

With the exception of some oral interview materials 7 that I have developed, I have made an effort to summarize the results of the anti-Japanese armed struggle from the results of the research that have already been carried out and objectively position the status of Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese armed struggle from a holistic perspective. Based on this analysis of facts, we analyzed the contents of North Korea's historical books and analyzed how the distortion of history developed.

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7 A large number of materials collected during the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) project "Collection of Literature and Oral Data on the Formation and Development of the North Korean System" were used in this study.

C. Analyze the 1949 "History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle," the 1958 "History of the Korean Liberation Struggle," the

1958 "History of the Korean Liberation Struggle," the 1961 and 1978 books, the "Korean Warriors" since 1979, "With the Century," and the 2002 edition of "The History of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle."

Chapter

1905ye～1930Tohoku Region The anti-Japanese struggle along the

One of the great characteristics of the anti-Japanese movement during the Japanese period is the breadth of the area of struggle, and the other is the various methods of struggle. Another feature is that it took place over a long period of time, from the end of the 19th century until liberation in August 1945. The anti-Japanese movement was carried out extensively and for a long time in Korea, Manchuria, China, the Old Age, Japan, and the Americas.

The genealogy of the anti-Japanese armed struggle in the 1930s can be divided into three main categories. There is the Korean Revolutionary Army in the south and the Korean German Army in the north as nationalists in Manchuria, the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army as a communist group, and the Korean Volunteer Army in China (North China). What is unusual is that only Kim Il-sung's unit (2nd Army, 6th Company) in the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army did not use the name of the Korean People's Army.
C. Because they were organized and operated as part of the Chinese army. In order to view Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese armed struggle in the context of the anti-Japanese movement of the Korean nation as a whole, we will give an overview of the anti-Japanese movement centered on these three genealogies.

1. Cultural Enlightenment Movement 1905~1919

Northeast China is adjacent to South Korea, and the two countries have a very long national race. From the end of the 17th century, the Korean people began to enter the Northeast region one by one, and the mass arrival of the Korean people into the Northeast took place in two phases. First, in 1869 (the 8th year of the Qing Dynasty), the most serious natural disaster in history occurred in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula, and many Koreans began to settle within the borders of China, and in the years that followed, many Koreans entered China.

Second, after the annexation of Korea and Japan in 1910, many Koreans migrated to the northeastern provinces to escape the brutal rule of the Japanese imperialists, and many anti-Japanese governors and soldiers moved to the northeastern provinces of China under pressure, and the Manchurian region became the center of the independence movement. Until the September 18th Incident in China in 1931, at least Koreans living in the Northeast

It reached 1.3 million ~ 2 million people.[4]Koreans in the Northeast began to participate in the Korean independence movement.

[4] Jin Ga et al., "The Korean Independence Movement and the Korean People in Northeast China", ed.-Kim Seung-il, The Anti-Japanese War and the Korean Independence Movement, (Seoul: Window of the Times, 2005), p. 89.

In fact, it began with the acceptance of anti-Japanese governors and participation in anti-Japanese nationalist groups or anti-Japanese armed forces organized by anti-Japanese governors.

The early anti-Japanese struggle of the Korean nation began in the form of a cultural enlightenment movement. Externally, Korea was destroyed by Japan because of Japan's aggression, but internally it was due to feudal rule and Confucian ideology, and he believed that Korea could gain independence only by reforming it, and he launched a movement for modern cultural thought. The establishment of the first private school for Koreans, Ryongjeong Seojeonseosuk, established in August 1906, was the beginning of the Mongi Movement in the cultural world. From then on, the Korean people established modern private schools and military schools in many places, and trained students to become anti-Japanese militants by giving them anti-Japanese education and military education. Believing that if one school and one church were built in each village, Korea could become independent, a movement for private schools was developed. Myeongdong School, Changdong School, and Gildong School were established at this time.[5]

After 1912, various schools began to be established in the provinces of Yanbian, and by 1916 there were 158 Korean schools in Yanbian, with 3,879 students. In Namman, according to the 1922 census, there were 165 Korean schools with 1,715 students. In

[5] Interview with Professor Chang Wook Park, Yanbian University (June 2006).

North Bay, 22 schools have been established. According to 1931 statistics, there were about 280 schools in the entire Northeast District that were run by anti-Japanese governors and private citizens, with 7,070 students. There were 103 religious schools with 6,433 students.

Combined, these two types of schools had 388 schools and 13,503 students. This is a double increase from 1916. Yanbian District was the most active district in the education industry among the ethnic Koreans in the eastern district.[6]

During this period, many national leaders emigrated to Manchuria and engaged in anti-Japanese activities. After Japan occupied Korea, Lee Sang-yong crossed the border and went to the gathering place of Koreans in the southeastern part of the country, where he founded the Korean Citizen's Association and was appointed as its leader, while Lee Dong-nyeong established the Seodang in Yongjeong Village, a gathering place for Koreans in the northeastern Yanji area, and conducted ethnic education for Korean Koreans and their children to train independent talents. Lee Si-young established a new military academy in Tonghua to train cadres for the anti-Japanese independence army, and Cho So-ang and others worked for the Korean independence movement in the gathering places of Koreans in the northeast during this period.

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[6] Hwang Yong-kuk et al., The History of the Revolutionary Struggle of the Korean People (Shenyang: Liaoning Provincial People's Publishing House, 1988), pp. 175～177.

Anti-Japanese fighters organized anti-Japanese groups, Hong Beom-do, Kim Jwa-jin, Lee Cheong-chun, Seo

He participated in various anti-Japanese militia units led by Il, Liu Lin-shek, and the Independence Army and fought against the Japanese imperialists. On the occasion of the March 13 Movement, which took place immediately after the March 1st Movement in 1919, the ethnic Koreans in various parts of the Northeast staged 93 anti-Japanese rallies and demonstration marches in 15 prefectures from March 6 to May 1, and carried out a massive anti-Japanese struggle in which more than 10,000 people took part. This is the first escalation of the longest-time, most-partisan, and widest-running anti-Japanese patriotic struggle in the Northeast region.[7]

2. The Armed Struggle of the 1920s

The March 1st Movement in Korea was a turning point in the anti-Japanese movement of the Korean people in the Northeast region.

It worked. On March 13, 1919, a large-scale anti-Japanese demonstration took place in the region. There was a strong response from all the regions of Jilin, Bongcheon, Heilonggang, etc., where

[7] □History of the Joseon Clans:□□} (Yanbian: Yanbian People's Publishing House), p. 63; Kang Ki-joo, A Study on the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the Korean Nation in China} (Reprinted from Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1998, pp. 9~10.

Koreans live. Later, national liberation independence movement groups such as the Shinmin Association, the Korean People's Association, the Korean Independence Group, the Seoro Military Council, and the Northern Military Association of the Republic of Korea were established in each province. Hong Beom-do, a former medical general, organized the Korean Independence Army in the Yanji area. As soon as this army was established, it launched domestic operations and won a number of victories. Although it was brutally retaliated against and suppressed by the Japanese army, the activities of the Korean Independence Army attracted the attention of world public opinion.

Received.[8]

Prior to the March 1st Movement, there had been a line conflict between the Sugu faction and the Gaehwa faction in the East Bay area over how to agree to the anti-Japanese movement, but when the March 1st Movement was suppressed, a new awakening took place. It turned to the direction of the anti-Japanese movement to develop the armed struggle. There was a conscious awakening to establish an anti-Japanese group and equip themselves with arms, and the Sugu factions changed their previous line that armed struggle was premature and turned to armed struggle. Young people educated in

[8] Jin Ga et al., "The Korean Independence Movement and the Korean People in Northeast China," ~~ed.~~ Kim Seung-il, ed. The Chinese Anti-Japanese War and the Korean Independence Movement, p. 90.

Korean language schools rose up in each school, and numerous armed groups were organized, and armed struggles were carried out as represented by the Battle of Bong-o-dong and the Battle of Cheongsan-ni. According to Japanese statistics, in 1920 there were 1,651 cases and 4,643 German troops advancing into the country.[9]

> The Japanese imperialists said that Manchuria became the base of the anti-Japanese national movement.

Seeing that it could not be allowed to destabilize domestic security, it launched a revolt in early October 1920 and mobilized 18,000~20,000 troops, including the 19th Division in Korea, for two months until the end of November to commit atrocities against civilians in the East Bay region. At this time, 3,500 people were killed, 2,500 private houses were burned, 28 schools were burned, and 5,400 seats of food were burned down in Yanbian and Dongbyon provinces, making it difficult to survive the winter.[10]This is an event known as the New Year's Campaign, and part of the battle against it is the Battle of Qingshan-ri.

The surviving troops ~~made efforts to lead the Korean~~ nation's anti-Japanese independence consciousness, which had been heightened during the March 1st Movement and the anti-Japanese armed struggle of the early 1920s, to a long-term and tenacious anti-

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[9] Vice-Governor-General of Korea, Summary of the Journal of the Korean Police(1925), pp. 123～124; Shin Ju-baek, Reprinted in The History of the Korean National Movement in Manchu, 1920~1945 (Seoul: Asian Cultural History, 1999), p. 55.

[10] Interview with Prof. Chang Wook Park, (June 2006).

Japanese armed struggle by reorganizing and reorganizing the ranks. The most important task was the issue of unity and integration of each group.

Around 1922, there were at least a few dozen large and small independent corps in Northeast China. The unification campaign against armed groups in the South Gulf region was the first to bear fruit.

In the spring of 1922, the Korean Unification Department was formed and expanded and developed into the Ministry of Korean Unification. The Ministry of Unification of Korea had a volunteer army under its umbrella, which numbered about 700 troops. The formation of the Ministry of Unification of Korea was the fulfillment of a long-cherished desire for unification, but it was divided into the Ministry of Counselors and the Ministry of Justice. In northeastern Manchuria, a regional integration movement began in August 1922, and the New People's Ministry was established in 1925.

In this way, the independence armies and independence movement groups of the three northeastern provinces were established in March 1925 as the Ministry of Councilors, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of New People. In the meantime, numerous independent corps and organizations scattered throughout the world have been absorbed and integrated into their respective three divisions. The total strength of the Third Division was about 1,600 men. The reorganization of the third division was a

major step forward in the history of the independence movement and created the conditions for a renewed armed struggle against Japan with united force. At that time, the jurisdiction of the city's Councillors was Fengchuan Province, the Ministry of Justice was Jilin Province, and the New People's Department was Yong'an County.

Since the Third Division was not only a military organization but also an organization of ethnic Koreans with the character of an autonomous government to some extent, it not only devoted itself to the armed struggle against Japan, but also made efforts to promote industry, cultural enlightenment, education, and the promotion of civil rights among the Korean people. Almost all of the organizational bodies were established in accordance with the principle of separation of the three powers of legislative, executive and judicial powers, and the charter corresponding to the Basic Law was enacted and implemented, and the departments of civil, legal, military, education, business, and transportation were established as working bodies.[15]

> During this period, the third part of the anti-Japanese armed struggle attacked the Japanese military, police, and government institutions.

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[15] Kang Ki-joo, 「A Study on the History of the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the Korean Nation in China, (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1998), pp. 87~93.

and killed the Japanese invaders, paralyzed the government's functions, and purged the Japanese imperialists' cronies, agents, and

traitors. They operated not only in the northeastern region, but also across the Yalu and Tumen rivers and advanced deep into the territory of Korea. Although he did not have a clear record, he fought a tenacious and bloody battle.[11]

In the late 1920s, the Third Division attempted to launch a national one-party movement, but was defeated and split into two factions: the People's Ministry and the Revolutionary Congress. In the 1930s, the Revolutionary Assembly formed the General Association of Han Chinese with Kim Chao-jin as its head, the Korean Independence Party (KPK) headed by Hong Jin and Yi Cheong-chun, and the Korean Independence Army was founded, mainly in the northern part of the Northeast.

The Ministry of the People supports the Korean Revolutionary Party headed by Hyon Jung-kyung and Hyon Ik-chol

He founded the Korean Revolutionary Army, which was active mainly in the southern part of the country.

3. The Nationalist Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle in the 1930s

After the Manbosan Incident in July 1931 and the September 18 Incident, the independence movement underwent a new

[11] Ibid., p. 93.

transformation. From this time on, the Korean people in the northeast joined forces with the people of each ethnic group in the northeast of China to launch an anti-Japanese movement.[12]In 1931, the Japanese imperialists launched the September 18 Incident, occupied more than 20 cities including Shenyang and Changchun the next day, and within four months, they strategized the three northeastern provinces as their colonies. Under these circumstances, the imperialist peoples of the Northeast began an all-out anti-Japanese struggle under the appeal and leadership of the Communist Party of China. The three-part unification movement failed, but the Korean Independence Army was established in the North Bay and the Korean Revolutionary Army in the West in the South Manchuria. In North Manchuria, the Korean Independence Party established the Korean Independence Army in November 1931, immediately after the September 18, 1931 Manchurian Incident, with Lee Chung-cheon as commander-in-chief and Nam Dae-kwan as vice-commander. At that time, the number of troops was 500~600. After more than two years of anti-Japanese struggle, it also made inroads into Korea. The perception of the situation in which the Korean Independence Party is engaged

[12] Jin Ga et al., "The Korean Independence Movement and the Korean People in Northeast China," edited by the Administration of the Old Government of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea~~, translated by~~ Kim Seung-il, The Chinese Anti-Japanese War and the Korean Independence Movement (陳可畏), 91.

in the armed struggle against Japan in Manchuria is as follows. In other words, it was precisely believed that the enemy's invasion of Manchuria would not only invade Manchuria, but would also invade mainland China and other regions within the Shanhai Pavilion in the future. In that case, they could conduct joint operations with the Chinese Central Army to obtain weapons and ammunition and supplies, and even more so, they could participate as a belligerent group of the global coalition forces and win independence in the post-war peace conference.[13] As such, the Korean Independence Party was well aware of the international nature of the Manchurian Incident and intended to seize the opportunity to gain independence by taking advantage of the explosion of international contradictions in the form of war.

They were also involved in the 1920s nationalist movement-affiliated military activities and the Korean Revolution.

Like the military, it was based on the theory of using the external situation. However, unlike the Korean Revolutionary Army, which tried to win independence on its own, the Korean Independence Army aimed to acquire the status of a belligerent organization in the course of its own anti-Japanese struggle.

[13] 趙擎韓 (Leader of the Korean Independence Army), Memoirs of Baekgang (Seoul: Korean Council of Religions, 1979), p. 94; Shin Ju-baek, The History of the Korean National Movement in Manchuria 1920~1045} (Seoul: Asia Cultural History, 1999), pp. Requoted from 324~325.

The Korean Independence Army is one of China's anti-Japanese armed forces, including weapons and medicines.

Since they needed a strong backing force to provide, they signed an agreement to move to the East Manchurian region and conduct joint operations with the anti-Japanese forces of the city government. The Korean Independence Army led the Sino-Korean coalition forces to encircle and attack Seolan County on January 29, 1932, killing more than 150 enemy soldiers, which was the first victory of the Sino-Korean coalition. In addition, in the first attack on the fortress in September of the same year, he killed more than 1,000 of the Wiman army and forced the surrender of more than 2,000 of them, and in the second attack on the fortress in November, he destroyed a company of the Japanese garrison and killed many of the Wiman soldiers and forced them to surrender. In particular, in the Great War Victory in June 1933, the combined forces of Korea and China completely defeated two battalions of the Japanese army, which is considered to be the greatest victory in the history of the Korean Independence Army's anti-war war and comparable to the Battle of Bong-o-dong and the Battle of Cheongsan-ri among the anti-Japanese armed struggles by the independence forces.[14]

As a result, disagreements arose between the Korean Independence Army and the Salvation Army of Si Se Yong, and feelings were often hurt in the process of distributing the spoils, and

[14] Kang Ki-joo, 「A Study on the History of the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the Korean Nation in China, p. 105.

there was also a confrontation with the Yonggong line of the Salvation Army of the Salvation Army, which led to the dissolution of the combined forces between the two countries, as the Salvation Army detained dozens of officers of the Korean Independence Army, including Lee Cheong-chun, and armed all of them.[15] In October 1933, the main forces of the Korean Independence Army shifted to the Chinese jurisdiction due to the Japanese imperialists' winter policing operations that began in October 1933 in the Dongbyon Province region.

In South Manchuria, the Ministry of the People established the Korean Revolutionary Army. The People's Department is a nationalist-affiliated organization formed on April 1, 1929 by a former member of the Ministry of Justice. In accordance with the policy of separating independence from self-government, the Korean Revolutionary Party was formed in December 1929. In May 1929, the Ministry of the People established its own armed force, the Joseon Hyuk Myung Army. It was organized into 10 companies of 30 people in 1 company.

C. Around the time of the Manchurian Incident in September 1931, it was reduced to four companies because of the departure of the left wing of the People's Party.

The reason why the left wing of the People's Ministry left the Ministry of the People left was because the Ministry of the People

[15] Ibid., pp. 121～122.

had made its anti-communist stance clear. In September 1929 the first Central Committee meeting was held and all factions of the Social Movement were declared enemies. The nationalist movement was anti-communist because of its partnership with the Chinese Nationalist Party. In opposition to the anti-communist line of the Ministry of the People's Party, the leftists broke away from the Ministry of the People's Movement, formed the Gilgang Command of the Korean Revolutionary Army in September 1930, and in November changed to the Revolutionary Military Headquarters of the Korean Revolutionary Army in Manchuria "under the guise of a national organization" in order to avoid the suppression of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). They are Lee Jong-rak as commander, Ko Pyong-sin as adviser, Kim Kwang-ryul as the military department, Ahn as the general staff, and Jang Chang-myung and Park Jin as the political department. In March 1931, the People's Left formed the Sehwa County Military Administration Committee as a group that aimed to form a "third force." The Sehwa Military Administration Committee engaged in anti-people activities in association with the Communist Party. The organization was renamed the Eastern Revolutionary Army in May 1931. Shin Young-geun, Park Won-won, Choi Chang-geol, Cha Kwang-so, and Kim

Sung-ju (Kim Il-sung), who were from the Ministry of People, were cadres of the Eastern Revolutionary Army.[16]

In January 1932, immediately after the September 180,000 incident, the Ministry of the People organized the Korean Revolutionary Army on a large scale and operated for a long time until 1937. In January 1933, Yang Se-bong was appointed as Commander-in-Chief. Like the Korean Independence Army, due to difficulties in obtaining funds and weapons, it formed a coalition with the Liaoning People's Self-Defense Army and jointly waged an armed struggle against Japan. In October 1933, when the Liaoning People's Self-Defense Army was crushed by the Japanese imperialists' purge, this time, in March 1934, the Chinese Communist Party's First Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army (NPP) was engaged in a solidarity struggle with the independence company of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army (1st) by the decision of the Hongmyo Conference, Xinbin County.[17] It is worth noting that they carried out solidarity activities with socialist-affiliated anti-Japanese armed forces with different ideologies.

Beginning in October 1936, the Japanese imperialists launched a "comprehensive extermination campaign" against the anti-Japanese forces in the northeast region in order to launch a full-scale war of

[16] Shin Ju-baek, 『History of the Korean National Movement in Manchuria 1920~1945』, pp. 201～202.
[17] Ibid., p. 319.

aggression against the Chinese mainland (the Sino-Japanese War of July 7, 1937). Thus the anti-Japanese armed struggle in the northeastern part of the country underwent severe trials, and an internal division of the Korean Revolutionary Army occurred. Some were arrested and surrendered by the Japanese army, some surrendered their weapons and returned to the peasants, some of them, including Kim Hak-kyu, moved to the province and joined the Korean Volunteer Army, and in the early autumn of 1937, about 60 members, including Pak Dae-ho, vice commander of the Korean Revolutionary Army, and Choi Yun-koo, the second commander, joined the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army led by the Chinese Communist Party.[18]

Kim Hak-kyu, who was dispatched to China by the Korean Revolutionary Party, participated in the party's reunification discussions in Nanjing and discussed ways to support the Korean Revolutionary Army in Manchuria. The Korean Revolutionary Party and the New Korean Independence Party formed the National Revolutionary Party in July 1935 with Kim Doo-bong and Cho So-ang of the German Party of Korea, Kim Won-bong and Yoon Se-wi of the Korean Righteous Brigade, and Kim Gyu-sik of the Great Korean Independence Party in the United States. The National Revolutionary Party is similar to the arguments of the Manchurian

[18] Kang Ki-joo, ⍰A Study on the History of the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the Korean People in China⍰⍰, pp. 122～123.

socialist nationalists, such as the nationalization of land and its distribution to the peasants.

The members of the Korean Revolutionary Party and the Korean Independence Party, who moved to the hall in this way,

It did not combine with the Provisional Government, but formed the National Revolutionary Party in combination with the three forces that had adopted an anti-Provisional Government attitude and tried to unify the national movement groups in the region in the form of a political party. In addition, Kim Hak-kyu, who was dispatched from Manchuria, tried to establish a link with the forces of the national movement in China in order to solve the insufficient human and material resources of the Korean Revolutionary Army and to continue the struggle against the enemy. In the case of a planned move into the Chinese pavilion, it can be said that Kim Hak-kyu's activities are the most certain.[19]

[19] Ibid., p. 332~333.

4. Formation and Activities of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea and the Korean Liberation Army

A. Establishment of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea

After the March 1st Independence Movement, the leaders of the national independence movement, inspired by their efforts to establish a provisional government at home and abroad, were fruitful, and on April 10, 1919, the Provisional Council of Parliaments was formed in Shanghai, the name of the Republic of Korea was enacted, and on April 13, the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was formally proclaimed at home and abroad. With the political system democratized, a democratic provincial government was created that inherited the legitimacy of the Korean Empire, and a cabinet-responsible leadership system with Rhee Seung-man as prime minister was also launched.

In 1932, under the leadership of Kim Koo, the Korean Empire Movement was launched, and after the assassination of Yi Bong-chang and Yun Bong-gil by the Japanese imperialists, the Provisional Government was chased by the Japanese imperialists and left Shanghai, passed through Nanjing, Hangzhou, etc., and settled in Chongqing in 1940.

In addition to military activities, the Provisional Government decided on the policy policies of the eight basic liberation movements, including internal affairs, transportation, foreign affairs, education, culture, finance, and judiciary, and had jurisdiction over the independence movement at home and abroad.[20] In particular, he made great efforts in diplomatic activities. He dispatched Kim Kyu-sik and others to the Paris Peace Conference, which was also a precursor to the First World War, and asked the free world to guarantee Korea's independence with the Paris Commission at the center, but it did not succeed. In November 1921, he dispatched Rhee Seung-man and Seo Jae-pil as representatives of Korea to the Pacific Conference in Washington, U.S., and launched a diplomatic offensive to demand a guarantee of independence, but it did not succeed. He lobbied the parliamentary leaders of the Soviet Union and other countries and powerful opposition politicians. In particular, the publication of the Independent Newspaper, the organ of the Provisional Government, inspired compatriots at home and abroad. Through the efforts of Foreign Minister Cho So-ang and

[20] Lee Hyun-hee, "The Liberation Movement of the Provisional Government of the Korean People," Korean History Research Association, ed., □Purchase of Korean History□□
(Seoul: History of Knowledge Industry, 1987), p. 537.

others, the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Conference resulted in a guarantee of independence. It was done.[21]

B. Establishment of the Liberation Army

The Provisional Government, which arrived in Chongqing in 1940, established the Liberation Army on September 17, 1940, with the support of the Chinese government. The Liberation Army, which became the regular army of the provisional government, was the most concentrated and unified military unit in the military activities, and it organized a general headquarters and three zones, and was active for the next five years.[22]

> The Provisional Government placed the Independence Army in the northwestern province of Gando and Siberia under its umbrella.

While consolidating and seeking a decisive war against the Japanese imperialists, the Western Military Administration of the Northwestern Gando Province, the Western and Northern Military Administrations, and the General Headquarters of the Liberation Army were under the command of the Provisional Government. Above all, the fact that the Liberation Army, the regular army of the Provisional Government, was dispatched to the Indian and Burma fronts to conduct joint operations with the Allied forces, and the

[21] Ibid., p. 538.

[22] See Sungsoo Park and Hyunhee Lee.

military activities that participated in the OSS operation are noteworthy, along with the fact that they showed their determination and faith in the restoration of the mainland by setting up domestic suppression operations.[23]

Another unit that joined the Liberation Army was the Korean Volunteer Corps. Shipbuilding

The battalion was founded by Kim Yak-san, and its members went north to North China from April to June 1941 to join the Chinese Communist Party-led Palo Army, and some joined the Liberation Army of the Provisional Government.

Originally, Kim Yak-san founded the Righteous Brigade in 1919 in Jilin, northeast China.

He was the one who started the resistance movement against Japan's aggression while assassinating and destroying it. However, when the Japanese imperialists issued a wanted order against Kim Yak-san and their activities became difficult, in 1925 they changed the fighting methods of the Righteous Brigade and began to train military cadres. In 1926, he took a large number of soldiers to the Hwangpu Military Academy to train leaders of the anti-Japanese struggle.

Following the September 18, 1931 incident, Kim Yak-san organized the Korean National Revolutionary Party and served as its

[23] Kim Kwang-jae, "Reactions of the Imperial Government and Countries to the Korean Liberation Army's ROK-US Joint Exercises," Journal of History and History, No. 73, (2004), p. 133.

general secretary on November 10, 1932, in accordance with the necessity of uniting Korean independence movement organizations and jointly carrying out the anti-Japanese independence movement.

On July 7, 1937, when Japan launched a full-scale war of aggression against China due to the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese people rose up in an all-out anti-Japanese movement, and on October 10, 1938, the Korean National Front League, which was reorganized from the Korean National Revolutionary Party, organized the Korean Volunteer Corps, with Kim Yak-san (Kim Won-bong) as its commander-in-chief. Kim Yak-san led the entire corps and actively participated in China's anti-Japanese war and played a great role in the liberation of Korean independence. 29

The Korean Volunteer Corps was divided into two factions, Kim Yak-san's Kuomintang and Choe Chang-ik's Communist Party, competing with each other, and eventually the Choe Chang-ik line, which was in the numerical majority, broke away and defected to the Communist Party's Palo Army.

However, Kim Yak-san, the head of the Korean Medical Corps in Chongqing, did not move to the Communist Party because he had historical ties with the Kuomintang Chiang Kai-shek government. The reason why Kim Yak-san was able to develop the Righteous Brigade into a famous party for the Korean national revolution, to send many members to study at military schools in various parts of China, and to establish the Korean Volunteer Corps was because of the great assistance and support of the Chinese Nationalist military

personnel, including Chiang Kai-shek. In addition, although Kim Yak-san is radical in ideology, he ultimately belongs to the scope of nationalism, so he naturally leans toward the three democracy of the Chinese Nationalist Party, not to the Communist Party of China. And in Kim Yakshan's view, the Chinese Nationalist government has orthodox and powerful military capabilities, and has bordering relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, but the Chinese Communist Party is the opposition party, and its military capabilities are weak, so he believes that the Chinese Communist Party is the leader.

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[29] Kim Jung-saeng, The Entry of the Korean Volunteer Army into North Korea and the June 25 War (Seoul: Myongji Publishing House, 2000), p. 40.

He did not make a rash turn to the Eighth Army.[24]

When the majority of the members of the Korean Volunteer Corps defected to the CCP's Eighth Route Army, the General Staff of the Korean Volunteer Corps became empty and its combat power weakened, and moreover, the Chinese Nationalist government in Chongqing expressed its dissatisfaction with the defection of many Korean volunteers to the CCP territory and issued a nominating order to the Korean volunteers participating in the activities of the Eighth Army. On May 15, 1942, the Military Commission of the Chinese Nationalist Government ordered the Korean Volunteer

[24] 楊昭全-李輔溫, 『Korean Volunteer Army Anti-Japanese Warrior 』} (Seoul: Book Publishing Goguryeo, 1995), p. 193.

Corps to be reorganized and incorporated into the Korean Liberation Army, and the 18 Korean Volunteer Corps, including Kim Won-bong, were incorporated into the 1st Zone of the Korean Kwangbok Army in Chongking in May 1942. Kim Yak-san (Kim Won-bong), the captain of the Korean Volunteer Corps, becomes the commander of the 1st Zone and vice commander of the Korean Liberation Army, and the commander-in-chief of the Korean Liberation Army is Lee Cheong-cheon.[25]

C. Activities of the Liberation Army

The Korean Liberation Army was established on September 17, 1940, declared war on Japan on December 9, 1941, and carried out activities such as joint operations with the Allied forces and dispatching saboteurs to Korea. In addition, the Korean Volunteer Corps, which was established on October 10, 1938,

In May 1942, it was incorporated into the 1st Zone of the Liberation Army.[26]

> The Korean Liberation Army is an educational and training institution, and it is the Korean Youth Training Group and the Korean Liberation Army.

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[25] Lee Hyun-hee, "The Liberation Movement of the Provisional Government of the Korean People," Korean History Research Association, ed., Books on Korean History, p. 537.

[26] 楊昭全·李輔溫, ⍰Korean Volunteer Army Anti-Japanese Warrior⍰, p. 201.

Training classes were set up, mainly Korean soldiers who came to China as student soldiers and conscripts by the Japanese imperialists, and escaped soldiers and surrendered soldiers were taken over by the Chinese military authorities, and after a certain amount of education and training, they were incorporated into the Liberation Army. Jang Jun-ha and Kim Jun-hyup were trained here.[27]The propaganda activities of the Liberation Army were also a way to publicize the activities of the Liberation Army at home and abroad and to urge the participation and support of compatriots at home and abroad. In February 1941, the Liberation Army launched "Liberation" as a kind of propaganda magazine for propaganda activities.

The Liberation Army also conducted operations against Japan with the Allied forces. His work with the British on the Indian and Burma fronts is a case in point. The Liberation Army also conducted joint operations with the U.S. military, in cooperation with the Office of Strategic Service (OSS), the U.S. strategic intelligence agency stationed in China.

> The Liberation Army entered the country with the completion of the OSS exercise conducted in Xi'an.

[27] Han Shi-jun, 「A Study of the Korean Liberation Army」, (Seoul: Ilshak, 1993), pp. 246～247.

The operation was carried out. On August 7, 1945, while waiting for the start of the operation, the Japanese Empire surrendered, and the operation to enter the country could not be carried out.[28]

[28] Ibid., p. 309.

Chapter

1930ye～1940Decades
Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army and K
anti-

1. The formation of the socialist line in the national movement in Manchuria in the 1920s and the joining of the Chinese Communist Party

A. Influx of Socialist Ideas into Manchuria

The 1920s was the time when socialist ideas entered the East Manchurian region and spread to the North and South Manchuria, and even to some nationalist circles, seizing the leadership of the national movement

Since the socialist revolution took place in Russia, the first communist revolutionary organization of our Korean nation was born in the territory of the Soviet Union. In June 1918, early communist Li Donghui founded the Korean Socialist Party, a Marxist-Leninist organization, in Khabarovsk, in the Soviet Far East. The following year, in September 1919, Kim Cheol-hoon, who had studied in Japan, founded the All-Russian Korean Communist Party in Irkutsk, Soviet Union. The Korean Communist Party came to Shanghai, China, and was reorganized into the Koryo Communist Party in May 1921 by early communists such as Ri Dong-hui, Park Jin-soon, and Ryeo Woon-hyung, becoming the first communist organization established by the Korean people in China.[29]

[29] In Korea, in April 1925, four communist organizations merged in Seoul to form the Communist Party of Korea: the Bukpung Society, the Hwayo Society,

Some important factors contributed to the rapid spread of socialist thought:

Follows. First, the Korean people living in the northeastern provinces at that time were fascinated by the October Revolution and socialist ideas in Russia because they were living a harsh life, suffering from the double suffering of exploitation by Chinese landlords and Japanese aggression and oppression from outside. Many of the Koreans who had emigrated to Manchuria had already been plundered by the Japanese since the 1910s and had already experienced the revolutionary ideas of the peasants and peasants, as they had been involved in peasant and peasant disputes. They were also critically aware of the flaws of nationalism at the time. For the nationalists, under the influence of the Confucian ideology, tended to look down on the peasantry and regarded them as objects of domination. Thus, the idea of socialist history spread mainly among the youth, students and peasants.

Socialists move from modernization in the 1910s to the workers' and peasants' movement

I wanted to. For them, the perception that the society to come should not be a new one, not a Japanese capitalism, but a new country, a system free from exploitation and oppression. The people have finally come to recognize that the world is led by us.

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the Workers' Party of Korea, and the Proletarians' League. Kang Ki-joo, ⍰A Study on the History of the Korean People's Anti-Japanese Struggle in China⍰⍰, pp. 187～189.

Second, a new generation of intellectuals emerged in the 1920s who benefited from the establishment of private schools and the modern education movement in the Northeast as part of the national independence movement in the Northeast from the 1910s. After 1912, various schools began to be established in the East Bay, or Yanbian, and by 1916 there were 158 Korean schools in Yanbian, with 3,879 students. In South Korea, according to the 1922 census, there were 165 Korean schools with 1,715 students. In North Man, 22 schools were established. According to 1931 statistics, there were about 280 schools in the Northeast region that were run by anti-Japanese governors and private citizens, with 7,070 students. There are 103 schools established by religious groups. The number of students was 6,433. Combined, these two types of schools numbered 388 schools with 13,503 students. This is a double increase from 1916. Yanbian District was the most active in education among the Joseon ethnic settlements in the eastern district.[36] As a result of these educational projects, young and student groups spread socialist ideas.

has emerged as a leading force. It is said that the socialists of the young and student groups went to the countryside to learn songs and propagate Marxism, so even the literate knew socialism. For example, when his mother died at the age of 86, Park Chang-wook, a professor at Yanbyon University, said, "Do you know Marx now, we

know him from childhood?" To that extent, Marxism has penetrated widely.

Third, in a situation where it was judged that there was a limit to the strategy of the independence movement in the direction of the anti-Japanese armed struggle during this period, the unreasonable collection and coercion of independence funds by the independence movement groups in the national camp became a factor of social conflict. In fact, in April 1926, the residents of Axeng County, Jilin Province, issued a statement of withdrawal from the Ministry of Justice in protest against the unreasonable collection of compulsory fees by the Ministry of Justice stating, "Since we have observed that the Ministry of Justice is not an appropriate organ of the people and has no effect on the immediate interests of the proletariat, we declare to the whole world that we withdraw from the Ministry of Justice."[37] Fourth, the Comintern's interest in and support for the anti-imperialist line and Korean independence

Because of the thousand names, socialist ideas were perceived as a means of national liberation. The Japanese imperialists' invasion of Kando, which began in October 1920, dealt a considerable blow to the national camp in Manchuria, and the so-called Washington Conference held in November 1921 did not produce any significant results in the diplomatic efforts of the Provisional Government, and the political position of the national camp was relatively narrow. However, in September 1920, the Comintern held the First Congress of the Oriental Peoples.

[36] Hwang Yong-kuk et al., 『History of the Korean Revolutionary Struggle 』, pp. 175～177.

[37] Hwang Min-ho, 『Trends and National Movements of Korean Society in Manchuria under Japanese Empire 』} (Seoul: Shin Seowon, 2005), pp. 92～93.

and the Far Eastern People's Congress held in Moscow in January 1922 to express active interest and support for Korean independence, and the Comintern emerged as a new target for the Korean people to receive international support for Korean independence. In fact, according to the Japanese analysis of the trends in Korean society at the time, it can be said that the movement for the red-handedness of Cho Seon-in gradually became more and more active after the subjugation of Gando, especially after the Washington Conference.[30]

> For Korean socialists at the time, communism was an idea for national independence.

Was. The October Revolution in Russia was considered to be an anti-imperialist movement and a model for the independence movement of the Korean nation, and Marxism and socialist ideas spread rapidly in the Northeast Asia. For example, Yeo Yong-jun participated in the anti-Japanese revolution in Manchuria in the 1930s as a messenger soldier, and when asked why he participated in the revolution, he replied that he participated in the national independence movement.

[30] Ibid., p. 88.

He said that he did not know what communism was, and that he participated in communism for the sake of national independence.[31]

As a result of the spread of socialist ideas, the class consciousness and national awakening of the working and peasant masses in Manchuria were significantly enhanced, and numerous organizations were formed, such as the Anti-Japanese Association, the Anti-Imperialist League, the Workers' Union, the Peasants' Union, the Youth League, and the Women's League. By October 1930 in Dongmanji alone, a crowd of more than 5,000 ethnic Koreans had joined various anti-Japanese groups, and the number of people under their influence was about 50,000. In this way, the communist movement and the anti-Japanese struggle in the Northeast region gained a broad mass base.[32]

The systematic development of socialist ideas came through the General Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea and the Manchurian General Bureau of the Koryo Communist Youth Association. In May 1926, Cho Bong-am, who had been dispatched from the central government as an "organizational plenipotentiary" of the Cho Son Communist Party, and the Manchurian faction and the Hua Yao faction in Manchuria formed the Manchurian General Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea and the Manchurian

[31] Yeo Young-jun, ⍰ Messengers of the 6th Company of the 2nd Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, (Interview in Yanbian, February 2004).

[32] Kang Ki-joo, ⍰A Study on the History of the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the Korean Nation in China, p. 191.

General Bureau of the Koryo Communist Youth Association at Yonggol Pagoda in Yong'an County. In the autumn of 1926, the Tang Manchurian General Bureau joined forces with the Manchurian Communist Party, which had great influence in East Manchuria and elsewhere. However, in October 1927, after the "First Arrest of the Gando Communist Party," the socialist movement in Manchuria was largely divided into the Huayo faction, the ML faction, and the Shanghai faction. The ML faction also suffered the Second Gando Communist Party Arrest Incident in October 1928.

B. Relationship between Socialism and Nationalism

The period of 1929 and 1930 was the period when the leadership of the Korean national movement in Manchuria changed from the nationalist movement to the socialist movement. The relationship between the people's and socialists' was not antagonistic, but rather cooperative and competitive. From the establishment of the General Bureau of Manchuria until the end of 1928, socialists in Manchuria tried to form a national unity party in alliance with the nationalists, and carried out activities to form an autonomous organization in order to establish the socio-economic stability of the Korean people and a strong base for the national movement. In this way, the socialist line secured the support of the broad intelligentsia, while the ideas of socialism spread to the peasantry. Even within nationalist movements such as the Ministry of Justice and the

Ministry of New People's Affairs, socialist ideology was propagated and there was a phenomenon of differentiation. Until 1929, nationalism and socialism were in a relationship of mutual cooperation and competition. Beginning in April 1927, the two parties held a formal meeting and held consultations for the formation of a national unity party. Until 1929, the two branches of the national movement were more likely to cooperate and compete with each other than in opposition.

There is also a view that the failure of the establishment of the National Unity Party was not due to the ideological differences between the two lines of nationalism and socialism, but rather that it was the beginning of the conflict between the Choksung Association and the Council of the Movement for the Formation of the National Unity Party over the issue of Korean extensionism.[33]

However, on April 1, 1929, the Consultative Party, which had rallied around the National One-Party Organization Alliance, formed the Ministry of the People, which was based on the Ministry of Justice and united the staunch nationalists within the Ministry of Councilors and the New People's Ministry. The Ministry of the People had its headquarters in Heunggyong County and was mainly active in the Tonghua, Heunggyong (Xinbin), and Hwanin areas.[34]

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[33] Xin Jubai, 『History of National Movements in China in the 1920s~30s』pp. 293～297.

[34] Hwang Yong-kuk et al., 『History of the Korean Revolutionary Struggle, p. 118.

Since the Ministry of the People maintained an anti-communist line, conflict with the socialist line became inevitable. In particular, in October 1929, the so-called South Korean Massacre occurred, a fratricidal tragedy in which soldiers of the Ministry of the People killed six cadres of the South Korean Youth League. With the assassination of Kim in January 1930, the socialist and socialist parties were transformed into a completely hostile relationship. The left wing of the people's ministry broke away from the people's ministry and formed the League of Proletariats and the League for the Overthrow of Imperialism, and joined the socialist line in earnest. [35] The nationalist line in the Northeast was gradually extinguished, almost disbanded in the fall of 1933 in the North Bay Area and in the Fall of 1937 in the South Bay District. Some of them joined the Yang Zhengwu unit of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, and some of them were members of the People's Department.

[35] Ibid., p. 119.

Continue the banner of the Revolutionary Army.[36]

C. Background of Socialist Koreans Joining the Communist Party of China

In 1929-30, Korean socialists joined the Chinese Communist Party, which had a great influence on the reorganization of the socialist movement in Korea under Japanese imperialism.[37] The background of the Korean socialist's joining the CCP can be attributed to the internal factors of the Korean people's association and the CCP's policies.

Internal factors included hostile relations with nationalist-affiliated groups and conflicts between various factions and lines within the communist groups, which led to a state of division and bloodshed.

C. On December 7, 1928, the Political Secretariat of the International Communist Party (CPC) issued a "Resolution of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on the Internal Situation of the Communist Party of Korea" in which it ordered the revocation of the recognition of the branches of the Communist Party of Korea in Manchuria and the reconstruction of the Communist Party of Korea

[36] Interview with Professor Hongbin Choi, Yonbyon University, (February 2004).

[37] History of National Movements in China in the 1920s~30s, p. 298~299. Shin Jubaek,

because it had fallen into an extremely fierce intra-party factional struggle (December Theses). On March 20, 1930, in accordance with the Comintern's principle of one country, one party, he declared the dissolution of the Manchurian General Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea and ordered it to be absorbed into the Chinese Communist Party. It adheres to the principle of "one country, one party" and has made a special decision to severely punish those who violate it. Second, there is an important reason why the CCP has allowed Koreans to join the CCP.

As of April 1929, there were only 254 party members in the Manchurian Provincial Committee, among whom

Only 57 were from peasant backgrounds, and the rest lived in the cities. As a Manchurian Provincial Committee, which was trying to shift its activities from the labor movement to the peasant movement and from the cities to the countryside, it turned its attention to the Korean Socialist Movement, which was based on Korean peasants.

Therefore, it is possible that the CCP disbanded the Korean Communist Party and forced them to join the CCP as part of a strategy to attract Korean peasants to the CCP. For example, there is a note that the Manchurian Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party organized the "Red May Struggle" as part of a plan to get Koreans to join the CCP. Hwang Yong-kuk et al. said, "The Manchurian Provincial Committee of the CCP established the 'May 1st Struggle Action Committee' on April 24, 1930, and incited

Korean peasants to participate in the 'Red May Struggle,' which actively attacked Chinese landlords and raised an uprising, in order to get them to join the Communist Party and the Communist Party organization after the ordeal of struggle[38]."

Later, in 1929~1930, the biggest issue of the Korean socialist movement

was a question of joining the Chinese Communist Party. There were discussions and conflicts between the factions, but in the end they decided to join the Chinese Communist Party. Accordingly, Hua Yao, M. Elfa and others adopted a resolution that the Korean Communists in Manchuria should join the Chinese Communist Party and participate in the Chinese revolution. Against this backdrop, it was agreed that the Korean revolutionary movement in Manchuria must become a part of the Chinese revolutionary movement and that the Communist Party of Korea in Manchuria should join the Chinese Communist Party and directly join the Chinese revolution under the unified leadership of the Chinese Communist Party to participate in the Chinese revolution and assist the Korean revolutionary movement.

The entry of Korean socialists into the Communist Party of China means the abandonment and abolition of the previous intention of the Korean Extension State. Korean extensionism refers to the

[38] Hwang Yong-kuk et al., The History of the Revolutionary Struggle of the Korean People, p. 154.
Shin Jubaek, □

position that Manchuria was regarded as a domestic scoop zone from the viewpoint that Manchuria was nothing more than an extension of the country, without paying attention to the discriminatory conditions between Manchuria and the country.
All of them.[39]

One of the reasons for the abandonment of Korean Extensionism was the result of the reflection that the socialist movement had so far focused only on the anti-Japanese movement and failed to pay attention to the objective reality of the situation of the Korean people. The peasants of Joseon were under the dual exploitation of being exploited by the Han Chinese landlords and exploited by the Japanese imperialists. The prevailing position was that there were only 600,000 Zhao hermits in the Northeast, and that this alone could not overthrow Chinese feudalism and Japanese imperialism, so they should unite with the 40 million Chinese in Manchuria. To overthrow Chinese feudalism, you need to unite with the Chinese Communist Party, As long as we live in China, we are a minority, and we had to push for an anti-feudal coalition. From the point of view of the relationship between the Chinese revolution and the Korean revolution, Manchuria was not Korea, but China, and the position was that the Korean revolution could only be carried out in China, that the Korean revolution should be promoted with the victory of the Chinese revolution, and that the Chinese Communist Party

[39] History of the Korean National Movement in Manchuria, 1920~1945, p. 19.

should support the Korean revolution. Secondly, the object of the fight was different. In other words, the domestic anti-Japanese movement had to target only the Japanese imperialists and pro-Japanese forces, but the socialist movement in Manchuria was the subject of a struggle even for Chinese landlords and feudal officials. Until now, however, the Korean prolongationist has failed to pay attention to this reality. Third, the Korean socialists carried out the instructions of the Political Secretariat of the Comintern to revoke the Korean Communist Party's branch sanction, to observe the principle of one country, one party, and to renew the Communist Party of Korea. Fourth, the Korean socialists had a strategic prospect that they could succeed in the Korean revolution with the support of the Chinese revolution.[48]

Shin Jubaek, □

The "Red May Struggle" in 1930 was a decisive turning point for the Korean socialist movement in abolishing the traditional stance of Korean extensionism, and from the CCP's point of view, the May Struggle was an opportunity to create an atmosphere within the CCP that could accept Korean socialists on a large scale.

D. Consequences of Koreans Joining the CCP

With the accession of the Koreans to the Communist Party of China, the organization of the Northeast Party of the Communist Party of China has undergone rapid development. First, since the Korean National Communists focused their Party-building work mainly on the rural areas, where ethnic Koreans lived, the Chinese Communist Party, which focused on the cities, took an epoch-making turn in the establishment of rural guerrilla bases for the anti-Japanese armed ranks. Second, with the exception of large cities such as Shenyang, Dalian, Changchun, and Harbin, the Northeast Party organization was established by the Korean National Communists at the prefectural level and below. In the beginning, most of the local branches, Most of the first secretaries of the Special Branch, Guwi, Prefectural and Central Prefectural Committees were of Korean descent, and there were also Koreans among the main members of the Special Committees of Southern, Eastern, and Northern Manchurian and Manchurian Provincial Committees.

According to the statistics for March 1931, 618 of the 636 rural party members in the East Bay District were ethnic Koreans, and 193 out of 200 Rural Party members in the South Bay District were ethnic Koreans.[49]

Finally, in November 1930, the Manchurian Provincial Committee declared that the Korean people's membership in the Communist Party of China had been successful. The changes that occurred as a result of Koreans joining the CCP were as follows. First, Koreans joined the CCP in large numbers.

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[48] Xin Jubai, □History of National Movements in China in the 1920s~30s, p. 262.

[49] Kang Ki-joo, A Study on the History of the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the Korean Nation in China, pp. 198～199.

The provincial organization of the Manchurian Provincial Committee, centered on the rural areas, expanded rapidly. For example, as of April 1931, there were a total of 1,190 members of the Manchurian Provincial Committee, of which 618 (96.5%) were Koreans out of 636 members in East Manchuria, 193 (96.5%) out of 200 Party members in South Manchuria, and almost all of the 244 members in North Manchuria were Koreans. As of January 1931, more than 90 percent of the 1,500 members were young Koreans from poor peasants. Accordingly, the accession of the Koreans increased the influence of the CCP in Manchuria.

Shin Jubaek, □

Second, from the point of view of local Party and Dan cadres, the Party and Dan in East Manchurian Province

The members of the special committee and the heads and members of each prefectural committee were all Korean. If it were not for the Koreans, the organization of the East Bay Special Committee itself could not have been so extensive. The situation was similar in the case of the North and the South. Third, however, there were only one or two Korean members of the Manchurian Provincial Committee. They were also non-commissioned officers. This is an example of the CCP's wary attitude toward Koreans.

Fourth, this gross deviation in national composition is due to the Communist fortune of Manchuria.

For the Chinese landowners, it could have been seen as a national struggle for the Koreans rather than as part of a class struggle.[40]The actual situation of the Party and the organization of the group, which was mainly composed of ethnic Koreans, was unrealistic in view of the composition of the population of the Northeast region, so adjustments were made quickly. At that time, there were less than 1 million Koreans out of a total population of 30 million in the Northeast, so new party members were recruited to represent the Han Chinese and other ethnic groups, which were the majority of the temple. However, the members of the Chosonjok Party continued to hold a considerable proportion after that, and they also held high-

[40] History of the Korean National Movement in Manchuria 1920~1945, pp. 272~274.

ranking positions. Li Dongguang, who was elected as the special secretary of the South Manrim Municipal Committee in November 1934, Li Shenglim, who was appointed to the Songjiang Provincial Committee in March 1936, Many KPP cadres were active at all levels in party positions, including Ri Bok-rim, who was appointed head of the Organizing Department of the North Manchurian Provincial Committee in September 1936, Kim Chae-chung, who was elected secretary of the North Manchurian Provincial Committee in April 1939, and Choe Yong-gun, who was elected secretary of the Northeast Party Committee established in the Soviet territory in September 1942.[41]It can also be seen that Cho Seon-in's excessive representation in the East Mandang Party served as the socio-economic background that unfolded in the 1932 anti-people's union struggle.

2. September 18 Manchurian Incident and Activities of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army

From 1930, as soon as the Korean Communists joined the Chinese Communist Party, the Manchurian Incident broke out and they participated in the anti-Japanese armed struggle under the

[41] Kang Ki-joo, A Study on the History of the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the Korean People in China, p. 201.
Shin Jubaek, □

leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. On September 18, 1931, the Japanese army, thanks to the non-resistance of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang government, captured Fengchuan in one day, and in a very short time, captured most of the major cities of the two provinces of Liaoning and Jilin, and occupied Yanbian. In March 1934, the state of Wimanchukuo was established.

In the process of occupying the Northeast, the Japanese army slaughtered countless masses of the people, and also carried out bloody suppression against the various peoples of the Northeast in order to establish colonial rule. Beginning in April 1932, the Japanese military carried out a military campaign against the settlements of the ethnic Koreans in East and South Manchuria and launched the "Great Bloody Rebellion." In the Yanbian area alone, more than 4,000 ethnic Koreans were killed.[52] In opposition to this, all the nations of China

and how our Korean compatriots waged an armed struggle.

A. Generator (Late 1931~February 1936)

The anti-Japanese struggle against Japan's occupation of Manchuria was officially led by the Chinese Communist Party. On September 20 and 22, 1931, the Chinese Communist Party immediately issued a declaration and resolution against the atrocities of Japanese aggression and appealed to the people of all walks of life throughout the country to fight the anti-Japanese salvation and at the same time instructed the Party organizations in the northeast to organize and arm the masses to wage an anti-Japanese guerrilla war.[53]

In accordance with the resolution of the Communist Party of China, the Manchurian Provincial Committee also issued a series of declarations and resolutions, calling on the Korean people and the masses of the people of all ethnic groups to unite in the struggle against Japan and repel the Japanese imperialist aggression by force.

On September 28, the CCP East Manchurian Special Committee convened an emergency meeting and delivered the directives of the CCP Manchuria Provincial Committee, issued a series of documents such as an urgent resolution against the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and an article informing the masses against the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, and at the same time called for the establishment and expansion of various anti-Japanese organizations

and the fight against Japan's occupation of the Northeast. However, the Manchurian organization of the Communist Party of China was distracted by the struggle against the Kuomintang and fell behind in forming a resistance organization against the Japanese invasion. In Banseok County in the south and the Gando area in the eastern bay, where there are many Korean Party members and a tradition of armed resistance, the armed organizations organized by the Communist Party earlier than in other places.

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[52] Hwang Yong-kuk et al., 『History of the Korean Revolutionary Struggle』, pp. 199～200.

[53] Ibid., p. 216.

It was born.[42]

Under the guidance of Dong Changying, the special secretary of the CCP, the CCP East Manchurian Special Committee held a district meeting in December 1931 and decided to strengthen the leadership of the Party on the basis of the instructions of the CCP Central Committee, mobilize the masses to establish guerrilla forces and wage guerrilla warfare. In addition, in February 1932, the Manchurian Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a work instruction to the East Manchurian Special Committee, emphasizing that "it is the main task of the Party to wage a guerrilla war" and pointed out that the Party's leadership over the guerrilla

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[42] Haruki Wada, North Korea: From a Guerrilla State to a Regular Military State, p. 43.

forces should be established. Accordingly, in April, the East Manchurian Special Committee demanded the establishment of anti-Japanese guerrilla forces in each county on the basis of this directive from the Manchurian Provincial Committee. Yanji, Huarong, Wang Qing, Hunchun and other county committees decided to hold their respective Party and Dan Zeal Members' Associations and carry out the work of building guerrilla groups on a wide scale. From the winter of 1931 to the spring of 1932, each prefectural committee infiltrated the backbone of excellent Party and members into the struggle of the masses and actively carried out the work of building the People's Anti-Japanese Armed Forces on the basis of assault squads, detachments and squadrons.[43] As a result, dozens of large and small anti-Japanese guerrilla groups led by the CCP were established in various parts of the South, East and North Bay.

An important policy in the development of the anti-Japanese guerrilla forces was the January 26, 1933 "Letter of Instruction from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to Party organizations at all levels and all Party members in Manchuria" (the so-called January 26 Instruction Letter, or January Letter). This directive instructed the Communist Party of China (CPC) to correct the "left-leaning activism" of class-to-class struggle and to launch a

[43] Hwang Yong-kuk et al., 『History of the Korean Revolutionary Struggle』, pp. 240～241.

broad anti-Japanese armed united front. Not only the workers, peasants and small property classes, but also the proletariat, he instructed them to develop a united front of the whole nation. As a result of this directive, four anti-Japanese units, including the volunteer army formed by the former Northeast Army, the Salvation Army composed of workers, peasants and the small and provincial classes, the Grand Provincial Association composed mainly of peasants, and the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army led by the Communist Party of China were united to carry out the anti-Japanese armed united front.

> The guerrilla forces deployed in the South, East, and North Gulf developed into 11 armies in total.

and established the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army, which was developed in 1935 as the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, reflecting the instructions of the Seventh Communist International to build a united front among the nations.

> Under the direction of the South Manchurian Guerrilla Army and the First Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army, Ri Hongguang was appointed by seven ethnic Koreans at the end of 1931.

As a young man, he founded the Red Guards, which was the first anti-Japanese military campaign in Manchuria. This was developed on September 18, 1933 by the First Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army. Yang Jung-woo was the military commander

and captain, Park Han-jong was the chief of staff, and the president and captain of the first company was Ri Hong-kwang. It was established on November 7, 1934 as the 1st Army of the Northeast People's Revolution, and by the end of 1935, the number of troops in the 1st Army had increased to about 1,600. In the spring of 1936, it was developed into the First Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army.

As the Manchurian Provincial Committee instructed the General Command of the Anti-Japanese Allied Forces to be organized as soon as possible, taking advantage of the favorable opportunity for the First Army Independence Company in South Manchuria, the General Command of the Anti-Japanese Allied Forces was organized in April 1934, and Yang Zhengwu was elected as the general commander and Li Hongguang as the chief of staff.

The East Manchurian Guerrilla Army and the Second Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army

In April 1932, the East Manchurian Special Committee, based on the instructions of the Manchurian Provincial Committee, proposed the establishment of anti-Japanese guerrilla forces in each county. Yanji, Huarong, Wang Cheng, Hunchun and other counties held a meeting of party and unity members, respectively, and decided to establish a guerrilla army. Thus, from the autumn of 1932 to the spring of 1933, anti-Japanese guerrilla groups were established in the areas of Yanji, Wangcheng, Huarong, and Hunchun. The four guerrilla groups—the Yanji County Guerrilla Army, the Huarong

County Guerrilla Army, the Wangcheng County Guerrilla Army, and the Hunchun Guerrilla Army—were collectively called the East Manchurian Guerrilla Army, with 420 troops and more than 90% of the Joseon ethnic group.[44]

At this time, Kim Il-sung formed a separate unit of 15~16 people in Ando in April 1932. The Ando Detachment came to Machon, the base of the guerrilla forces in Wangcheng County, in January 1933 and joined the Wangcheng Guerrilla Army, after going back and forth between Ando, Tonghua, Yang Se-bong, and the Korean Revolutionary Army, Donhwa, Akmok, and Namwaldu.[45]

In March 1934, the East Manchurian Special Committee unified the guerrilla forces of Ne County into the 2nd Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army, appointed Zhu Jin as president and Wang Dektae as Zheng Zheng, and formed the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Tön as Yanji, Huarong, Wangcheng, and Hunchun guerrilla forces, respectively. At this time, Kim Il-sung was appointed to the rank of third lieutenant. When the Independent Company of the 2nd Army of the People's Revolutionary Army in the Northeast was formed, Kim Il-sung was a member of the 3rd Tön, with Cho Chun-hak (later Bang Jin-seong) at the head of the 3rd Tön and Nam Chang-il (later Kim Il-sung) at the 3rd Tön.

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[44] Ibid., pp. 241～255.

[45] The Workers' Party of Korea, The Campaign of Comrade Kim Il Sung, p. 96, records the beginning of 1933, and Professor Pak Chang-wook testifies that it was January 1933.

In May 1935, the 2nd Army Independence Division was expanded to the 2nd Army of the People's Revolutionary Army in the northeast of the country in accordance with the resolution of the Yoyingyong Conference, with Wang Deo-tae as the military commander, Wei Zhengmin (Han Chinese) as the head of the army, Yi Hak-chung as the deputy chief of the political department, and Yu Han-hung as the chief of staff. By this time, the army had grown to about 1,200 men, about two-thirds of whom were Korean.[58]

In accordance with the resolution of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International Party, the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army was reorganized into the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army 2nd Army in March 1936 as a coalition system with other ethnic groups such as the Chosonjok, and the military commander and Jung Jung were still Wang Deok-tae and Wei Chung-min. At this time, the CCP released the Korean militants who had been imprisoned for their involvement in the Minsaengdan Incident, organized them into two and three companies, and appointed Kim Il-sung as the president of the third company. [59]

The North Bay Area of the 3rd-7th Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army and the 3rd and 7th Armies of the Anti-Japanese Coalition Army in North Bay is the forerunner of or part of the 3rd and 7th Armies of the Anti-Japanese Coalition Army.

It is the place where the Ha, Shan, Ning'an, Tangyuan, and Liao Ha anti-Japanese guerrilla groups were founded. In October 1933, the

13-member Zhu Ha Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Corps was established with Cho Sang-ji as the general and Ri Bok-rim as the political instructor, and the following year it grew to 500 members, and in January 1935 it was reorganized as the 3rd Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army, and in August 1936 it was reorganized into the 3rd Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army. The crew has already developed into the thousands. At this time, Kim Chaek was in charge of the Political Department of the Fourth Battalion. The Sanguerrilla Army began in 1933 with four members of the party, including Kim Myung-man, and was formally established in March 1934 and developed into the 4th Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army in March 1936.

From the beginning of November 1930, the Tangyu Brigade was led by Choi Yong-geon and Ri

By learning basic military knowledge and undergoing military training, the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army was founded.

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[58] Shin Ju-baek, 『History of the Korean National Movement in Manchuria 1920~1945』, p. 357.

[59] Kang Ki-joo, 『A Study on the History of the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the Korean Nation in China, p. 209.

Laid the foundation of. Of the 40 or so partisans, all but three were ethnic Koreans. In October 1934, it was organized into the Tang Yu Attack Company under the direction of the Manchurian Provincial Committee, and in January 1936 it was developed into the Sixth Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army, and in June of

that year it became the Sixth Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army. The team grew to more than 4,500 members.

The Yoha Guerrilla Corps was founded in 1932 by Choi Seok-cheon (Choi Yong-geon), who was an instructor at the Hwangpo Military Academy, under the leadership of the Yoha Central Prefecture. All 120 members were ethnic Koreans, with Choi Yong-geon as the captain and Kim Moon-hyung as the head of the government department. In March 1936, it was established as the Seventh Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, and its members developed to about 1,000 members. The Yongan guerrilla corps was transferred to the 5th Army by Ju Bo-jung.

From the above, there are several characteristics of the anti-Japanese movement in the Northeast region. First, the members and members of the Korean National Party and patriotic youths played an active, back-to-back and Juche role in the establishment and development of anti-Japanese guerrilla forces in various places. In the early days of all anti-Japanese guerrilla groups, all or many of them were ethnic Koreans, and later developed into the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 7th armies. Out of a total of 11 corps, 6 corps were founded and developed by the Chosonjok.

> The general commander of the 2nd Route Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army said that the facts at that time were as follows:

It was pointed out as well. "The stubborn co-guerrilla corps, the mighty anti-oil guerrilla corps, the Juha guerrilla army, the mountain

guerrilla army, the tangyuan oil guerrilla corps and the Yoha guerrilla army were all founded by the Joseon Jokdong and the revolutionary Korean masses, and later developed into the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 7th armies of the Anti-Japanese Coalition Army. There were also many excellent Korean comrades in the Fifth Army. In each county of the Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, there were many propagandists, from the military chiefs and political department chiefs to the regiment generals, chiefs, and instructors."[46] Kim Il-sung was one of so many Koreans.

> Second, the anti-Japanese guerrilla forces, under the direct leadership of the Party, were to be able to organize their membership and members (Communist Party Office)

It is the armed ranks of the people who absolutely obey the leadership of the Party, which was formed on the basis of its skeletal competence. The anti-Japanese guerrilla corps was established by selecting outstanding Party members, members and anti-Japanese youths from the Manchurian Provincial Committee and its affiliated organizations at all levels in accordance with the instructions of the Party Central Committee, and from the very beginning, the Party, single organizations and political organs were systematically established in the unit, and the political work system was strictly enacted.

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[46] Zhu Bozhong, "Report from the Jilin Provincial Committee Work Conference," (December 1946); Kang Ki-joo, 「A Study on the History of the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the First Peoples of the Chinese Dynasty, reprinted in p. 214.

Officials of the Party, single organizations and political institutions must express their proactivity and creativity

He gave full play to the work of educating the government and politics in a variety of ways suitable for the harsh war environment. For example, each guerrilla beggar and guerrilla group published a large number of publications such as the Struggle, Combat Bulletin, People's Bulletin, and the Anti-Imperialist Front, and according to the data released by the Japanese Empire at the time, there were more than 500 species of such species, and the number of copies in the hands of the enemy alone in 1933 alone reached 45,000.

In the 1st-7th Army, which was decided directly by the CCP, Korean cadres were important.

Although they played a role, there were very few Koreans in the Salvation Army or in the 8th and 11th Armies, where the Forestry Corps was the basic competency.

The Korean People's Division, which was formed under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CCP) and was part of the Third to Seventh Armies in North Manchuria, had only a few leaders prominent. Representative figures are Kim Chaek, Heo Hyung-sik, Choi Yong-geon, and Lee Hak-bok.[47]

[47] Kang Ki-joo, 「A Study on the History of the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the Korean Nation in China, p. 215.

B. Heyday of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army (February 1936~June 1938)

Beginning in the summer of 1935, the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army (NPA) militarily and organizationally united with other anti-Japanese forces. At the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in July 1935, the new policy of the anti-fascist Popular United Front was adopted. The Chinese Nationalist Party delegation also suggested the basic direction of the new policy for all elements and factions who do not want to become exiles and unite to form an anti-Japanese coalition army.

C. The official transmission of the new policy to the East Man, South Man, and Gildong districts began on February 5, 1936 at the North Walnut Conference, where Wei Chung-min met with Ju Bo-jung at Bukhudu, Yanyan County.[48]

Wei Chung-min, secretary of the East Manchurian Special Committee, and Ju Bo-jung, commander of the 5th Army, met at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in July 1935 and adopted the new anti-fascist popular front, and Wei Chung-min, who had returned from attending the meeting, held a meeting to deliver the new policy to the East Man, South Man, and Gildong districts. The three main contents of the new policy are 1) to concentrate the forces of all Manchuria, 2) to divide Manchuria into four guerrilla

[48] Shin Ju-baek, □History of the Korean National Movement in Manchuria 1920~1945□□, p. 422.

zones: South, East, North, and Gildong, and 3) to change the name of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army to the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army. This new policy is intended to unite the Salvation Army and the Korean troops in the mountains and unite them into a united front of the anti-Japanese struggle.

In accordance with the new policy, in February 1936, the General Headquarters of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army was established, with Yang Jung-woo as commander-in-chief, Cho Sang-ji as vice-admiral, and Li Hongguang as chief of staff. From then until the end of 1937, the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army was the most magnificent and active period, with as many as 40,000 members at its peak, and the Japanese and Wiman armies were massively annihilated everywhere.63 At the Seventh Session of the Comintern[49], a new policy on the Korean question was finalized.

It is a meeting of unmarried people. The meeting was held in early March 1936, and a document dated March 8 of the Manchurian Provincial Committee [50]was presumed to be a report on the results of the meeting. The decisions were made as follows: 1) to reorganize

[49] Kang Ki-joo, A Study on the History of the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the Korean Nation in China, p. 223.

[50] Kim Woo-jong, "Letter from Wei Minsaeng and Wang Deok-tae to the Peacock Committee and Comrade Yun Sung", Historical History of the Korean Anti-Japanese Occupation in the Northeast Region } (Heilongjiang Province: Heilongjiang Provincial People's Publishing House, 2003), Vol. 8, pp. 269～271.

the 2nd Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army into the 2nd Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, 2) to establish 3 new companies and organize 2 companies into 3 companies, to organize 3 companies with more than 100 members who had been released from prison on charges of rebellion and to appoint Kim Il-sung as the 3rd president, 3) to form the Fatherland Liberation Association of Koreans in Manchuria, and 4) to end the struggle against the people's livelihood.

The meeting that formulated a detailed plan of action for the implementation of the Unmarried Fellowship in Dongman was the Donggang Conference in May 1936. At this meeting, it was decided to have the 1st and 3rd companies of the 2nd Army advance to the Mt. Paektu area. In other words, it was decided that Kim Il-sung's 2nd and 3rd divisions should advance to Mount Paektu.

In July 1936, at the Hari Conference, Wei Chung-min, the commander of the 2nd Army, met with Yang Jung-woo, the commander of the 1st Army, and 1) merged the Namman Special Committee and the East Manchurian Special Committee into the Nammando Provincial Committee, and 2) formed the 1st Route Army by merging the 1st and 2nd Armies. Therefore, as the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd companies of the 2nd Army were renamed the 4th, 5th, and 6th companies, respectively, Kim Il-sung's 3rd company was changed to the 6th company, and it was decided to operate in the Mt. Paektu area. Through the Hari Conference, the center of the Korean people's armed struggle against Japan shifted from the East Bay area

to the Changbaeksan area.[51] In addition, at the Hari meeting, it was decided to organize 3) the Association for the Liberation of the Fatherland of Koreans in Manchuria. Instead of forming a Korean-only National Revolutionary Party, he decided to organize the Korean People's Homeland Restoration Association.

C. Period of Decline of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army (June 1938~Late 1940)

The three-year plan of the Manchukuo policing of the northern eastern frontiers of the Japanese imperialists, which began in April 1936, steadily attacked the anti-Japanese guerrilla forces for three years. As part of this, the Japanese imperialists carried out a policing operation in the eastern province of South Bay from 1936 and a purge of the Samgang district from 1937.

The Japanese imperialists' subjugation of the anti-Japanese forces began with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937.

It was further expanded in the wake of the Battle of Bocheonbo in June 1937.

The Battle of Bocheonbo itself was insignificant, but it was a continuation of the Northeast

It was an operation of great symbolic significance in that it was the military's first domestic vacuum operation. In view of the fact that

[51] Hwang Yong-kuk et al., The History of the Revolutionary Struggle of the Korean People, p. 375.

the armed units of Manchuria had entered the country, the Japanese army reacted very sensitively. Japan, which was preparing for the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, reacted very resolutely to the entry of the Manchurian armed forces, which were trying to disrupt the rear.

The Japanese made desperate efforts to destroy the organization of the Fatherland Liberation Association under the pretext of the Battle of Bocheonbo, and by September of the following year, they had arrested 739 people and prosecuted 188 of them. This is the so-called Hyesan incident.

> And since 1938, Japan has organized extermination operations against the guerrillas.

It was promoted as One is the establishment of collective villages, a strategy to separate the peasants from the partisans by relocating them to strategic villages called collective settlements, and the other is to convert the surrenderers without killing them and use them as partisan punitive units. The greatest success of the second strategy was in June 1938, when Jung Bin, the first commander of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, surrendered and stood at the forefront of the Japanese army and helped subjugate Yang Jung-woo. Yang Zhengwu, the commander-in-chief of the 1st Route Army and the commander-in-chief of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, surrendered as an arm and dealt a decisive blow to the entire 1st Route Army. When the commander of the 1st Army, Jung Bin, surrendered, the rain of the troops was leaked.

In preparation for this, in July 1938 a council of seniors was convened and the 1,400-strong force was reorganized into three armies. At this time, the 6th Company of the 2nd Army was reorganized into the 2nd Sector Army. Since June 1938, the anti-Japanese coalition forces have suffered heavy losses as they have struggled for many years in isolation and have suffered heavy losses, and the Japanese imperialists have been constantly carrying out "sweeping away the enemy," making it impossible to maintain even the minimum level of survival. At this time, Kim Il-sung's troops were forced to make the so-called arduous march. Kim Il-sung said, "For more than 100 days, from the beginning of December 1938 to the end of March of the following year, we marched through the snow from the southern defeat of Monggang County to the northern pavilion of Changbaek County, eluding the pursuit of the Japanese army. North Korean history records this as the "March of Suffering." 66

Beginning in October 1939, the Kwantung Army launched a campaign of subjugation called the Southeast Security Operation. This is an operation in which planes are flown in the snow in the winter to search and drive the guerrillas into the barn alleys. In January 1940, three months after the start of the operation, Yang Jung-woo, the commander of the 1st Route Army, was killed, and the following month, Lim Su-san, the chief of staff of Kim Il-sung's troops, surrendered to the Japanese. After surrendering, Lim Susan organized the Rim Susan Work Corps to work for the subjugation of

Kim Il Sung.[67] Almost all of the guerrilla bases were destroyed in the Japanese campaign to exterminate the Japanese.

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[66] Kim Il Sung, With the Century, p. 141.

[67] Haruki Wada, North Korea: From a Guerrilla State to a Regular Equalizer, p. 52.

Yang Jung-woo, Heo Hyung-sik, and many other high-ranking commanders and many other members were sacrificed, and there were also many surrenderers and fugitives. In the early 1940s, the unrest within the organization was so serious that even Wei Chung-min, the leader of the First Route Army, admitted that "it is difficult to prevent the flight and surrender right now."[52] By the end of 1940, there were only about 1,000 troops left.

Under these circumstances, in early 1940 and early 1941, the leaders of the Party and the military in the northeast held a meeting in the territory of the Soviet Union and put forward a policy of forming a three-member committee consisting of Wei Chung-min, Ju Bo-jung, and Kim Chae-chung, and moving troops into the territory of the Soviet Union to maintain the long-term struggle. Accordingly, from the end of 1940 to the spring of 1942, all but a small unit of the Anti-Japanese Coalition Army were withdrawn to the territory of the Soviet Union.

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[52] Reprinted in Shin Ju-baek, 『History of the Korean National Movement in Manchuria 1920~1945, p. 429.

At first, they planned to cross over for a while, winter, and return in the spring to resume guerrilla warfare, but in April 1941 the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Japan and the Soviet Union banned the movement of troops to Manchuria. Inevitably, we moved on to long-term camp training. In August 1942, the Anti-Japanese Coalition Army organized a prison guard. Joo Bo-jung held the position of Ryeojang, Ri Jo-rin served as vice-admiral, and Choe Yong-gun held the post of chief of staff, while Kim Il-sung held the post of first warrant officer with the largest number of Korean national officers, while Ahn Gil, Kang Sin-tae, and Kim Chae-chung held the positions of first, second, and third lieutenants, respectively.

> Under the leadership of the China-China Joint North Korea Committee, headed by Choi Suk-chun,

In addition to intensifying political learning and military training in the camp, small battalions were frequently dispatched to the Northeast to carry out missions such as military reconnaissance, crowd work, anti-Japanese propaganda, and small-scale guerrilla warfare.[53]Kyodo was disbanded after the defeat of Japan in August 1945, and Kim Il-sung and his party entered the port of Wonsan aboard the Soviet fleet on September 19, 1945, more than a month after liberation.

[53] Kang Ki-joo, ⍰A Study on the History of the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the Korean People in China⍰⍰, pp. 233～234.

3. The Development Process of Kim Il-sung's Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle

A. Joining the Communist Party of China ~ 3 Transition Period (October 1931~1935): Eastern Manchurian Period

(1) Kim Il-sung's activities in the People's Left and his entry into the Chinese Communist Party Kim Il-sung was active in the nationalist-affiliated Ministry of the People's Affairs before joining the Chinese Communist Party. He attended a nationalist-affiliated school, attended Yukmun Middle School with a scholarship provided by the nationalist group, and after dropping out of Yukmun Middle School, he worked in the nationalist-affiliated People's Ministry, following his seniors Lee Jong-rak and Choi Chang-geol, whom he met at Hwaseong Ui-suk.

Kim Il-sung graduated from elementary school in Musong and entered Hwaseong Uisook in Musong in June 1926 at the age of 13. Hwaseong Uisook was a military vocational school for soldiers at the rank [54] of platoon commander and above, established by the nationalists in the Ministry of Justice, the predecessor of the

[54] The Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of New People, and the Ministry of Councilors were in talks with the Manchurian General Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea to establish a national unity party, but they broke down, and the nationalists of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of New People's Affairs and the Ministry of Councilors formed the Ministry of the People in September 1929.

Ministry of People's Affairs, for the purpose of training cadres of the independent army. After his father's death in December 1926, Kim Il-sung came to Musong, where his mother lived, and [55] never returned to Hwaseong Ui-sook, where he had attended for six months. Because he was so young, it was difficult for him to get along with his classmates who were about 10 years older. So my father's friends moved him to Yukmen Middle School in Jilin in January 1927.[56]In 1929, when he was a student at Yukmun Middle School, he was appointed by Sang Wol, and he learned socialist ideas for a short period of time until he was sent to prison in the fall of 1929. Yukmun Middle School was run by the Chinese Communist Party and had a relatively liberal number of teachers. Sang Wol was a member of the Communist Party in the hall. Kim Il-sung encountered Marxism-Leninism there. Another person who influenced Kim Il-sung's Marxist learning was Pastor Son Jeong-do. Pastor Son Jeong-do started a Christian church and ran the Yigil Student Association for Jilin students. Kim Il-sung learned the basics of Marxism-Leninism in two directions at Yukmun Middle School and Pastor Son Jeong-do's Yeogil Students' Association. 6~7 Koreans in Yukmun Middle School, It is said that there were about 5 Korean students at Mun School and a few Korean students at Jilin Law.

[55] Haruki Wada, North Korea: From a Guerrilla State to a Regular Bacteria State, p. 40

[56] Interview with Prof. Chang Wook Park, (June 2006).

In 1928, a movement against the Jilin-Huering Railway broke out in Jilin. When it was said that Japan would invade China by building a railway, a protest movement arose. The movement against the Gilhoe Railway was first raised in the Jilin Code and was mainly a Han Chinese movement, but Koreans joined in the demonstration at Jilin Square with more than 3,000 participants. Kim Il Sung also attended the meeting. However, it was not a rally led by Kim Il-sung, as North Korea claims. Kim Il-sung may have mobilized the Soseondae (Boy Vanguard) under his leadership. But it doesn't make sense to command the whole of Jilin. [57] Through this series of movements, justice was the stage of nationalism during this period. The young wing of wealth was shifting to the left. In 1927, Jilin was "already under the control of the ML Party," and in 1928, the students of Nanman Academy and Huaxing Middle School also turned left, and even Banxi County, Jilin Province, became the base of the ML Party.[58] Kim Il-sung is not unrelated to these trends among young people. According to Japanese intelligence data, Kim Il-sung participated in the formation of the "Korean Communist Youth Association" in early May 1929 along with Heo So, Han Seok-hun, Yi Geum-chun, Sung-ja, Kim Dong-hwa, and Shin Yong-geun. The

[57] Interview with Prof. Chang Wook Park, (June 2006).

[58] 桂基華, "Reminiscences of the Independence Movement of the Third Department, the Ministry of the People, and the Korean Revolutionary Army", Journal of the History of the Korean Independence Movement, Vol. 1, 1987, p. 405; Reprinted in Shin Ju-baek, A Study on Kim Il-Sung's Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Movement in Manchuria, p. 149.

Korean Communist Youth Association has been an illegal organization centered on young people that has become leftist since the time of the Ministry of Justice.[59] In his recollections, Kim Il-sung claims that he was arrested by the Chinese authorities in the fall of 1929 while investigating a case involving a reading company at Jilin No. 5 Middle School caused by the activities of the Communist Party of Korea, and was released in early May 1930.[60]

When Kim Il-sung was released from prison, he was expelled from Yukmun Middle School.

I had nowhere to go, so I went to visit my brother, Lee Jong-rak, whom I had known since Hwaseong's Sook. Lee Jong-rak was a company commander of the Korean Revolutionary Army of the nationalist People's Department, a key member of the left wing of the People's Party, and a member of the People's Left. He was the organizer of the alliance. There were people within the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the People's who were loyal to the Hua Yao faction, the ML faction, and the Shanghai faction, and Lee Chong-rak was the one who insisted on moving from the Ministry of the People to the left. It is speculated that Kim Il-sung was influenced by Lee Jong-rak here and served as a squad leader in the unit.[61]

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[59] Shin Ju-baek, A Study on Kim Il-sung's Manchurian Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Movement, p. 150.

[60] Kim Il-sung, "『With the Century,』 Vol. 1, pp. 345~361.

[61] Interview with Professor Chang Wook Park, Yanbian University (June 2006).

Kim Il-sung had a relationship with the young communists, young people who were oriented from nationalism to communism, and participated in the leadership of the Cho Son Revolutionary Army, which was formed by one of them, Yi Jong-rak.[62] The Communist Youth Association of Korea was pro-people and anti-ML in terms of its power structure at the time, and it was in the same flow as the new trend among the young people under Kim Il-sung's Ministry of People's Affairs during this period.

Some of the left-leaning youths within the People's Ministry, such as Lee Jong-rak, Choi Chang-geol, Kim Won-geun, and Kim Il-sung, worked together in the South Korean Youth League, which was formed in February 1929, and gradually turned to the left, criticizing the Ministry of the People, opposing the ML faction, and maintaining a friendly attitude with the reconstruction faction. However, from the mid-1930s, Li Chong-rak and others not only broke with the reconstruction faction because they had different views on the issue of joining the Chinese Communist Party, but also openly opposed the Ministry of the People from August 1930. In August 1930, on the occasion of the Executive Committee and the Congress of the Korean Revolutionary Party, the Ministry of the People was divided into two camps. The left wing of the People's Ministry formed the

[62] Haruki Wada, North Korea: From a Guerrilla State to a Regular Military State, p. 41.

Revolutionary Command of the Korean Revolutionary Army (September 1930), which was renamed the Revolutionary Army of the East in the spring of 1931.[63] According to Haruki Wada, another name for the Gilgang Command of the Korean Revolutionary Army is the League of Overthrow Imperialists (Alliance). The report of the Communist Party of China of March 17, 1931, mentions three groups that are just forming a third force among the anti-people's forces: the Indigenous Faction, the Pro-League, and the Overthrow Imperialist League, and describes this third organization as follows:

> "The Taze Alliance was formed by some of the people who have been branching out from the ranks of the people's army. Its central leader is Li Zhonglak, and its base is in the northern part of Banseok, the unique Sugil River line, and Hideok County. There are about 800 Korean peasants and about 20 armed men. In December last year, a party correspondent tried to solve the problem, but it was not solved. In February of this year, Li Zhongrak and four others were captured by the Japanese. This Taje alliance falls short of the pro-alliance in terms of popular capacity and ideology. But the armament is more powerful than them.[64]

The alliance that Kim Il-sung allegedly organized in 1926 was actually organized by Yi Jong-rak, and Kim Il-sung distorted the

[63] Kim Il Sung, With the Century, Vol. 2, pp. 390～391.
[64] ⍰東北地區朝鮮人革命鬪爭資料匯編⍰, (Shenyang: Liaoning People's Publishing House, 1992), p. 727.

alliance of Jong-rak, who was a close friend of Hwasong's camp at the time, as his own.

In 1931, the Yi Jong-rak unit was completely destroyed by the Japanese authorities, and Lee Jong-rak was also arrested by the police on January 28, 1931, so the Gilgang Command of the Korean Revolutionary Army was disbanded. Choi Chang-geol was also murdered in November 1931 by Yang Se-bong's troops of the Korean Revolutionary Army of the Ministry of the People.

> Kim Il-sung, who was a member of this unit, escaped arrest and by early 1931

I fled to Ando, where my mother lived.[65] If Kim Il-sung had led the alliance, he would have continued his activities there regardless of the arrest of Lee Jong-rak.

> Kim Il-sung was 19 years old in October 1931, shortly after the September 18 Incident.

joined the Chinese Communist Party.[66] At the time when the CCP established an armed unit and decided to wage armed struggle against the Japanese imperialists, Kim Il-sung joined the CCP, and it is highly likely that he joined the Chinese Communist Party under

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[65] Haruki Wada, 『Kim Il Sung and the Manchurian Anti-Japanese War』, pp. 65～66.

[66] The Institute of History of the North Korean Academy of Social Sciences, ed., The History of the Modern Revolutionary Movement of the DPRK (Pyongyang: Institute of History of the Academy of Social Sciences, 1961); (Seoul: Book Publishing Hanmadang, 1988), p. 233, December 20, 1935, the above Chung-min's report reads "Joined the Party in 1931." Haruki Wada, 『Kim Il Sung and the Japanese War in Manchuria, p. 86.

the name Kim Il-sung. It was a general tendency among Koreans of this era to register as an excuse for fear of involving their family members when joining an armed unit. It would be reasonable to think that it was at this point that the person who appeared in Japanese official constitutional documents under his real name until 1930 was changed to Kim Il-sung.[67]

In summary, Kim Il-sung's ideological orientation was originally nationalist, but he came out as a nationalist leftist, then under the influence of the Korean Communist Party, and then joined the Chinese Communist Party.

(2) Kim Il-sung's Expedition to South Korea Kim Il-sung joined the Chinese Communist Party and began a full-fledged armed struggle in accordance with the Chinese Party's policy. At that time, after the September 18 incident in 1931, the East Manchurian Special Committee of the Communist Party of China held a meeting in Myeongwol-gu, Ando County Province in December 1931 and decided to resist by force. The meeting was held under the leadership of Dong Changying, secretary of the East Manchurian Special Committee, and it was decided to organize an armed force under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. In accordance

[67] Haruki Wada, Kim Il Sung and the Manchurian Anti-Japanese War, p. 86, footnote 55.

with the decision of this conference, the communist-affiliated anti-Japanese armed struggle began in East Manchuria.

> After Kim Il-sung joined the Chinese Communist Party, he became a member of the Chinese Communist Party.

He was to act as a man. At that time, Kim Il-sung was a member of the Chinese Communist Party and was incorporated into the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, which operated strictly under the command of the Chinese Communist Party. The leader of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army to which Kim Il-sung belonged was the Communist Party of China, and its program was the program of the CCP, and every move of Kim Il-sung's troops was ordered by the Chinese Communist Party. However, Kim Il-sung does not appear to have been significantly integrated into the CCP organization at the beginning of his career. This is because, as we will see below, there is a period of wandering from the old country army to the Korean Revolutionary Army in the south of the country. Kim Il-sung's period of wandering in South Korea is as follows.

After the Myeongwol District Conference, Kim Il-sung was dispatched to Sosa Ando as a member of the Dongman Special Committee's public hearing team. This is because there was a mother's house in Sosaha. Kim Il-sung acted as a constable dispatched by the Party, and in the spirit of the Myeongwol District Council, he organized a separate unit of the Salvation Army of the Chinese Commander-in-Chief under Sosa Ando. It is about 15~16 people. However, what Kim Il-sung organized was a separate unit,

not a guerrilla army. It is a separate unit (political operatives) of the Salvation Army. The guerrilla corps is a stand-alone independent unit, whereas the separate unit is a unit that guides the way and provides support. The CCP set forth the task of the formation of a separate unit, which is "the agitation and inthoroughness of the units of the Chinese nationalist-affiliated Salvation Army through the struggle. It is an organization that actively promotes anti-Japanese elements and awakens the masses of soldiers nationally and class-wise, thus firmly leading them to the path of anti-Japanese struggle."[68] In other words, the separate unit was organized by the Communist Party of China (CCP) and is an organization for propaganda and political work for the former military of the country. However, North Korea calls the separate unit organized by the Communist Party of China (CCP) the "Ando Guerrilla Army" and uses it as the anniversary of the founding of the North Korean People's Army. "On April 25, 1932, the great leader of the revolution, Comrade Kim Il Sung, founded the first Marxist-Leninist revolutionary armed force of the Korean people, the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army, with the members of the Korean Revolutionary Army and the core of the Communist Party and the Anti-Imperialist Youth League as the backbone of the Communist Party and the core of the Anti-Imperialist Youth League," it reads.[69] The Byeondong

[68] Haruki Wada, 『Kim Il Sung and the Manchurian Anti-Japanese War』, p. 81.

[69] Workers' Party of Korea, 『Comrade Kim Il Sung Strategy, p. 88.

Corps was an organization that infiltrated the Salvation Army and armed them with ideas, but they were often turned away. That may be why Kim Il-sung took his detachment to the Korean Revolutionary Army of Yang Se-bong, a nationalist in the South. Kim Il-sung left the so-called South Manchurian Pavilion with a separate unit. One of the objectives of the South Korean Expedition was to procure weapons, and the other purpose seems to have been to find Koreans because Kim Il-sung was unwilling to join the Chinese army. The person who visited in Namman was Yang Se-bong of the nationalist Korean Revolutionary Army. Yang Se-bong was a man who worked with Kim Il-sung's father, Kim Hyong-jik, and when the son of a colleague came to him and suggested that they fight in solidarity, Yang Se-bong rejected the door, saying that nationalism could not be in solidarity with communism.

Yang Se-bong rejected Kim Il-sung, saying, "Nationalism has defeated the party, but it has not killed people." At that time, he was referring to the killing of the communist-affiliated autocrat general, General Kim Chao-jin, and others. In the North Korean film "The Star of Joseon," Yang Se-bong was portrayed as giving a grand welcome to the arrival of the spirit of Joseon. North Korean historiography states:

> The commander of the anti-Japanese troops, who was openly hostile to the Korean communists, agreed to wage a joint struggle against the Japanese in majesty admiration for his mature insight and thorough anti-imperialist revolutionary

spirit in analyzing the complex political situation with keen insight and making clear decisions.[70]

But in fact, he was shut down by Yang Se-bong. So Kim Il-sung went back to Choi Chang-gal of the professional alliance. Choi Chang-gal had already been killed in battle. He did not know that he had already been killed in November 1931 by Yang Se-bong's subordinate of the Cho Son Revolutionary Army, an armed unit of the Ministry of the People.87 Kim Il-sung's trip to Namman was in vain. I had to return with a detachment. He did not come to Ando, but to Dongling County and then to Wang Qing, which was in January 1933. North Korea claims this as the South's Manwon Affair.

If Kim Il-sung was a member of the CCP, he would not be able to move to the South Korean ethnic units to conduct joint operations. If Kim Il-sung's Star Dong Battalion is a unit established by the CCP, like Wang Qing's Yi Kwang Star Battalion, it cannot move troops to South Korea without the permission of the Military Department of the Dong Manchu Special Committee. At that time, Kim Il-sung's unit was not a unit created by the CCP, but a separate unit of the Salvation Army, so it seems that it could have been moved from place to place without the approval of the CCP. Professor Kwon went to Ando several times to investigate the situation in the city, and it is said that local residents testified that the Han Chinese commander Wu

[70] Ibid., p. 87.

Commander, who was the director of the Public Security Bureau, raised an anti-Japanese banner and established the Woo Command Corps, and Kim Il-sung organized it as a separate unit of the Woo Command Unit.

Kim Il-sung was a nationalist and communist in the early days of the Chinese Communist Party.

It can be seen as wandering in between. Kim Il-sung was most influenced by the Ministry of the People from an early age in Musong, South Man. Kim Il-sung's school, Hwajeon Uisuk, is the school of the nationalist Ministry of the People.[88]

(3) Joined the Wangcheng Guerrilla Army and was appointed as a 3-tön (団) lieutenant It was in January 1933 that he came back to Wangcheng with his detachment. At this time, a guerrilla army had already been established in Wangcheng. Kim Il-sung's Star

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87 Shin Ju-baek, A Study on Kim Il-sung's Manchurian Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Movement, p. 162.

88 Interview with Professor Im-Oh Nam, (June 2006).

Dong Dae joined the Wangcheng guerrilla army. The Yongan Guerrilla Army also joined Wangcheng, and the Wangcheng Guerrilla Army, the Yongan Guerrilla Army, and the Kim Il Sung Special Brigade were combined to form the Wangcheng Guerrilla Battalion. The captain was Yang Sung-sung and the captain was Kim Il-sung. Because Kim Il-sung spoke Chinese well, he became a lieutenant in the Wangcheng Battalion (3 tön). Becoming a political commissar for Wang Qingdae is an important position.[71]

The Battle of Dongnyeon Hyeonseong in September 1933 was a famous battle and an important occasion for Kim Il-sung's rise. This battle was commanded by Joo Bo-jung and was carried out in the form of a combined operation in accordance with the "Letter of Instruction of January 26, 1933" to unite the units of various ethnic groups to fight against Japan. Two companies, one company of Kim Il-sung's Wangcheng guerrilla army and one company of Choe Chung-guk, gathered at Raja District and joined the units of the former army of Si Se Yong and entered Dongnyeong County. At this time, Li Qingchen also brought the Independence Army. The nationalist Yi Cheong-cheon and the communist Kim Il-sung fought in solidarity. Kim Il-sung was at a time when the influence of the Communist Party was not strong. They fought together, but North Korea claims that only Kim Il-sung participated, while South Korea claims that only Lee Cheong-sung participated.

[71] Interview with Professor Chang Wook Park, Yanbian University, (June 2006).

The Battle of Dongning County was a battle led by the Salvation Army to establish a base for guerrilla activities. Thousands of Salvation Army troops were deployed, but they were a ragtag group and could not fight properly. When the Japanese counterattacked, the Salvation Army quickly retreated, and in the process of retreating, the brigade commander of the Salvation Army, Sa Chung-hwan, was wounded. Kim Il-sung had Choe Chung-kuk carry him on his back and rescue him. This later had a great influence on Kim Il Sung. It is said that in gratitude to Xia Chonghuan for rescuing him, he himself joined the Chinese Communist Party.[90]

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(4) The allegations of the Minsaengdan and the North Manchurian government (1st) The Minsaengdan case was a case in which the DPP participated in the anti-Japanese armed struggle

The arrest and execution of Koreans on suspicion of being part of a Japanese spy group was caused by the overlap of the Japanese imperialists' moves to divide Koreans and Chinese, the ethnic conflict between Koreans and Chinese communists, the faction within the Korean communists, and the left-leaning error of not trusting those who came from the intellectual property class of the CCP. Korean intellectuals, former members of the national

Interview with Professor Chang Wook Park, Yanbian University, (June 2006).

independence movement, and former members of the tributary party were mainly suspected, and more than 500 Korean anti-Japanese leaders were arrested and executed on suspicion of being a member of the People's Liberation Party. The background is as follows.

In 1931, the September 180,000 Incident led to the outbreak of internal conflict in northeast China. The pro-Japanese forces in the Korean community in East Manchuria became more powerful, and forces such as the "Association for the Promotion of Self-Government" rapidly switched from pro-China to pro-Japanese with the rapid collapse of the Northeast warlords, and the Communist line began to participate in the anti-Japanese armed struggle under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CCP). The Minsaengdan was organized in February 1932 in an environment where the political forces of Korean society were divided into two camps, the pro-communist and the armed struggle, and they advocated "Gando Korean autonomy" under the leadership of the pro-Japanese forces. The Japanese faction, led by Pak Suk-yun and others, argued that the people's livelihood was more important than the revolution, and insisted on establishing an autonomous organization under the leadership of the Japanese and gaining the right of suffrage under the Governor-General of Korea. Under slogans such as "The Communist Party is the enemy, let's find a way to live, and let's organize the Self-Defense Forces," Japan initially acquiesced in the strategy of dividing the Chinese and

Koreans, but the Kwantung Army raised the issue. The Japanese imperialists could not tolerate the "Gando Korean autonomy" of the Cho ancestors in the larger strategic goal of colonial rule over the Northeast and the establishment of Manchukuo, and they had to be wary of the fact that the Minsaengdan was a single social organization of the Korean nation, even though it was organized by the pro-Japanese factions they trusted. In addition, the "self-government movement" of the Minsaengdan could not help but be opposed by the CCP because it would destroy the DPRK-Chinese anti-Japanese united front that had just been formed. As a result, the group was disbanded for a short period of five months due to the change in attitude of the Japanese imperialists, the coldness of Chinese society, and the violent opposition of the CCP.[72][73]

Even after the dissolution of the Minsaengdan in July 1932, the Communist Party of China continued to carry out the anti-people's struggle as part of its own organization and the anti-espionage struggle within the anti-Japanese guerrilla zone as an extension of the struggle against the people's union. From October of that year, the anti-civilian protests against the Koreans intensified day by day and escalated out of control. In the course of the anti-people's struggle, which lasted for three and a half years until its end in

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[72] Kim Sung-ho, 「A Study on the 1930s Yanbian Minsaengdan Incident 」} (Seoul: Baeksan Archives, 1999), pp. 537～

[73] .
Interview with Professor Chang Wook Park, Yanbian University, (June 2006).

March 1936, more than 560 East Manchurian Korean Party and Dan cadres and anti-Japanese revolutionaries were unjustly executed, and thousands of others were suspected, ostracized, and persecuted.[74]

> The beginning was a plan by the Japanese imperialists to divide the Koreans and the Chinese.

At that time, due to the national conflict between the Chinese and Koreans in the CCP and the CCP's left-leaning mistakes, the situation deteriorated to the point where it was defined as a faction of the Communist Party of Korea = Korean nationalism = a Japanese spy. At one time, it was even claimed that all Koreans were members of the people's union. Under these circumstances, almost all Korean cadres and intellectuals were purged.[93] The revival of the anti-Mintu that had been in a lull was manipulated by the Japanese

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This is another incident of the people's union. While Ri Song-il, the chairman of the Minsaengdan Sukban Committee, was in Eoryeong, Kim Dong-han, chairman of the Cooperation Association (a pro-Japanese task force among our compatriots, an organization outside the Japanese military police), scattered a fake letter addressed to Ri Song-il in the mountains. As a result of this letter incident, Li Song-il was driven to the Minsaengdan and executed.

[74] Ibid., p. 539.

On March 21, 1935, just before the shooting, Li Song-il said that when he saw that I was going to die, he was a shadow of the people's union.[94]

By creating a new Minsaengdan incident, Japan achieved unexpected results. After that, the anti-Mintu was carried out in a kind of witch hunt, and anyone who wanted to save his life would declare that someone else was a member of the Minsaengdan, and if he was accused of being a Minsaengdan, he would be tortured severely, and he would be executed and the other suspected Minsaengdan would be accused, and he himself would be executed, and more than 500 people were executed. Chae Kwang-chun, a participant in the anti-Japanese armed struggle at the time, recalled the "anti-Me Too" situation that he personally experienced as follows:

> At that time, Dong Jang-young, Cho A-beom and others said that there were 60%, 70%, and 80% of the people's livelihood in the children's group, and that some counties had 60%, 70%, and 80% of the people's livelihood groups. Some people said that spilling rice grains while eating is a function of Minsaengdan, and even farting is a function of Minsaengdan.[95]

Kim Il-sung was also accused of being a member of the People's Liberation Army during the Battle of Dongnyeong County in

Interview with Professor Chang Wook Park, Yanbian University, (June 2006).

September 1933. Regarding Kim Il-sung's accusation of slaughter, Sa Chung-hwan objected. Japan

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94 Testimony of Hayoon Kim, July 27, 1981. In 1935, Kim Ha-yun, an old man who was a gatekeeper at the "School for the Children of the Revolution," said of Kim Il-sung, "He is a well-known man. He speaks Chinese well, so when Ri Song-il was judged as a minsmer, Kim Il-sung stood as the tong."

95 Kim Sung-ho, 1930s A Study on the Yanbian People's Livelihood Incident, reprinted in p. 172.

They say that they cannot agree with the people who fought against the military as the people's union. He defended Kim Il-sung in the old country's army. He was good at fighting, good at Chinese, and he was grateful to Sa Chonghuan for saving him from danger. However, Kim Il-sung was dismissed from his position as a third-term lieutenant and was forced to leave the guerrilla army and worked as a teacher at a small school.96

On July 27, 1981, Professor Nam Im-oh met an elderly man named Kim Ha-yoon and an elderly man named Yoo Eun-sik and interviewed them about Kim Il-sung. Kim Ha-yoon was an old man who worked as a gatekeeper at the "Revolutionary Children's School" at the time, and Yoo Eun-sik was a member of the guerrilla battalion and was a machon who was a member of Kim Il-sung's Wang Chung-tyeon. In Machon, there was still a sign on the tree at the site of the house that read, "Wang Chengtuan Site," but North Korea renamed it "Command Site." Hayoon Kim said,

I think it was in 1933, and Kim Il-sung was a member of the operational staff or a political commissar, and at that time, Kim Il-sung was arrested on suspicion of being a member of the people's union. I don't know how long, but it's true that I've suffered a lot. Later, I heard that the main security officer of Yongan had told him to release Kim Il-sung.

Kim Il-sung was the one who fought the most in Dongman, so should we doubt even Kim Il-sung? That's why Kim Il-sung came out. At that time, I was guarding the school for revolutionary children, and Kim Il-sung came to the school with a hairy house, saying that he would teach me to read. It turned out that he had just been released from prison. Before long, however, Kim Il Sung left again. When asked why he was leaving, Kim Il-sung said, "I am resentful. I will be insured as a struggle. Just a few guys," and he said that he took a few of them out to fight the Japanese, and it was a great fight. Later, I heard that many people were killed by the people's union at that time, but they couldn't kill Kim Il-sung, but in the old army in Machon, Kim Il-sung was so rumored that if he killed Kim Il-sung,

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He said he would not stand idly by in the Salvation Army. It is said that Kim Il-sung took a few men with him to fight against the Japanese in the Cheongyo area, and when he returned, he brought one of them with him.[75]

On May 30, 1934, the date of the establishment of the Wang Chung-tön Department, Kim Il-sung, a member of the 4th Regiment

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[75] Interview with Prof. Im-Oh Nam, Yanbian University, (June 2006).

Interview with Professor Chang Wook Park, Yanbian University, (June 2006).

of the 3rd Tön, led a small unit of the 3rd Tön to fight at Yoyeong Yeong. He was relieved and allowed to lead a small army into battle, and he fought vigorously.

Kim Il-sung's release from prison seems to have been largely due to the Salvation Army and Ju Bo-jung's life-saving campaign. The East Manchurian Special Committee suspected Kim Il-sung and suggested that Kim Il-sung be dealt with, but Zhu Bo-jung, the governor of Jilin, knew about this and demanded that Kim Il-sung be sent to him without doubting him. It is said that this was because Kim Il-sung's prestige in the anti-Japanese units of Ju Bo-jung and the Salvation Army was high.[76] However, the East Manchurian Special Committee again ordered the arrest of Kim Il-sung. This Regarding the background of Kim Il-sung's escape from arrest, Zhong Zhong-un, who was the CCP Wang Qing-special secretary at the time, testified as follows:

> It was in 1935 when Zhong Zhongyun (Zhong Zhiyun, correspondent of the Manchurian Provincial Committee of the Central Qingdan, and secretary of the CCP Wang Qing) was a special secretary in Raja District. One day, he received a letter of instruction from the special committee to arrest Kim Il-sung (presumably the chief secretary of the Dongman Special Committee, Yu Jeong-min) along with Wang Yun-sung (who later served as the head of the Propaganda Department of the Wang Cheng Special Committee, the special secretary of Hunchun, the political commissar of the 4th Tön of the

[76] Interview with Professor Hongbin Choi, Yanbian University, (April 2004).

Independent Division, and a member of the Political Committee of the 4th Company of the 2nd Army). Wang Yun-sung did not agree to arrest Kim Il-sung. Wang Yunsheng told Zhong Yun to indicate what to do. Jong Jong-un asked if there was a way to free Kim Il-sung. Wang Yunsheng said that as long as you agree, the way is for me. Jong Woon liberates Kim Il-sung

Interview with Professor Chang Wook Park, Yanbian University, (June 2006).

> I agreed. In response, Wang Yun-sung ordered Kim Il-sung to go to North Korea to find Ju Bo-jung. Don't let him come back. And it is said that Kim Il-sung had already left and suggested that the main security officer should deal with it. Thus, Kim Il-sung left for North Korea. This is the famous "North Manchurian Pavilion". Jong Woon They really made a mistake, but they also protected the Joseon people.[77]

In this way, Zhong Jong-un and Wang Yun-sung sent Kim Il-sung to the Fifth Army of Jubojung, far away in the northern bay, to save Kim Il-sung. This is what North Korea calls the so-called First North Korean Expedition.

When Kim Il-sung was in the main security unit of the 5th Army in North Manchuria, he met with Opyong, the governor of Gil-dong, and talked about the struggle against the people's livelihood in Dongman.Oh Pyong was also [78] known as Yang Song as a former chief editor of the Xinhua Ilbo in Yanyan. Around January 1935, Oh Pyong summoned Kim Il-sung and received a detailed report on the actual situation of the anti-people's livelihood struggle, expressed the opinion that the anti-people's struggle was left-leaning and that the line before reunification was wrong, and on February 10, 1935, he sent a letter to the Dong Manchu Committee, criticizing the mistake of "anti-people's struggle" and insisting that the autonomy

[77] Interview with Prof. Kwon Lip, (July 2006).

[78] In Kim Il-sung's Memoirs, Vol. 3, p. 378, it is stated that he had a talk with Oh Pyong for about 10 days.

of the Korean nation and Korean independence should be the central slogan. Oh Pyong's Position Kim Il-sung learned that the CCP was aware of the problems of the struggle against the people's livelihood. I knew it was going to end soon. Kim Il-sung returned to Dongman and spoke about the problems of the struggle against the people's livelihood on March 21, 35 at the Yoying-gu Conference, which attracted the attention of the leadership of the Communist Party of China. After Oh Pyong's talks with Kim Il-sung in the North Man's camp, the anti-people's struggle in the East Bay

A report on the dispute was issued, the gist of which was as follows:[79]

> First, Japanese imperialism organized the Minsaengdan in order to induce Koreans in East Bay to oppose the Chinese and destroy the unity between China and the Korean people. Second, it is said that the number of members of the Minsaengdan is 6 to 7 percent within the Party and the Dan. In response to this, he insisted that, first, the Korean national

[79] Letter from the CCP Manchurian Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP) to the East Manchurian Special Committee, "On the East Manchurian Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Movement, the United Front, the Tactics of the Anti-People's Livelihood Struggle, Party Work, Mass Work, etc." (February 10, 1935); Kim Woo-jong, Historical History of the Korean Anti-Japanese Occupation in the Northeast Region Vol. 7, p. 167~175; "Report (gist) of the CCP Manchurian Provincial Committee, Gil Dong Soon Si-won (Oh Pyong): General Situation in Yong'an, Subjugation of the Ilmanbido Army and Development of the Guerrilla Movement, Local Work and Work for January, etc.," (February 1935), Kim Woo-jong, Historical History of the Korean Anti-Japanese Occupation in the Northeast Region, p. 207.

> autonomy should be implemented in Gando, second, the CCP Central Committee and the International Communist Party should recognize the slogan of the independence of the Korean nation as the most important slogan, and third, the anti-Japanese national revolutionary united front should be established within the Korean people.

This report by Wu Ping was the first statement on Korean national autonomy in Yanbian, and it was the beginning of the establishment of the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in 1952, which led to the prohibition of the struggle against the people's livelihood and the establishment of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army and the Fatherland Liberation Association. [80] In addition, this awareness of Oh Pyong's Minsaengdan incident and the Korean issue was an innovative slogan that brought to the fore the awareness that was sprouting little by little at the time. If Oh Pyong's directive in 1935 was an occasion for new thinking, the new policy of the Communist International was an occasion for the future of the Korean people. [81] The essence of the new policy on the Korean issue expressed in[82] the letter of Oh Ping (Yang Song) is as follows.

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[80] Kim Sung-ho, "The Minsaengdan Incident and the Korean Partisans in Manchuria," 『Historical Criticism』, Summer Issue (2000), p. 128.

[81] Shin Ju-baek, 『History of the Korean National Movement in Manchuria 1920~1945, p. 433~434.

[82] "Letter from the CCP's Gildong Provincial Committee to the Liao Ha Central County Committee and the Fourth Army" (Delivered by Yang Song (Wu Ping), a member of the CCP delegation in Moscow, in the name of the

Our Party's insistence on the Korean nation in the Northeast: (1) The Chinese and Korean peoples should unite and jointly resist Japan to win the independence of the Chinese and Korean people. Our Party's insistence on Gando in East Bay is that "the Sino-Korean people should unite to overthrow the rule of the Japanese Empire and Manchukuo and establish the Gando Korean Ethnic Autonomous Region." (2) The current East Man People's Revolutionary Army should be reorganized into the Sino-Korean Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, and at the same time, an independent "Korean National Revolutionary Army" should be established in East Manchuria, and the independence of the Korean nation should be seized by entering Korea and carrying out guerrilla activities. (3) All those among the Koreans who do not want to become slaves of the Japanese imperialists should be united to form an anti-Japanese united front within the Korean people. In addition to incorporating reliable Korean workers and peasants into the Chinese Communist Party, he also organized the "Ming Party for the Revolutionary Revolution of the Korean Nation." (4) In order to make it convenient for the training of comrades in the Party and to do their work well, the Korean comrades should independently establish Party subcommittees and Party branches. However, it should be in the joint position or in the co-existing position. The Korean personnel department shall be brought out under the prefectural committee or the special committee, and the head of the department shall participate in the prefectural committee and the special committee.

Kim Il-sung's Position in the Minsaengdan Incident

At that time, Kim Il-sung had a very negative view of the Minsaengdan.

Gildong Provincial Committee. Kim Woo-jong, Historical History of Korean Anti-Japanese History in the Northeast Region, Vol. 8 ?, p. 278.

However, it seems to be accepting the CCP's view. Kim Il-sung claimed in his Brief History of the First Route of the Anti-People's Struggle that the struggle against the people's livelihood "has achieved great successes, but there are also many mistakes made in its execution [83] ." He believed that he had achieved "great successes" in the anti-people's struggle. This view is reflected in North Korea's history books. According to the recollections of Kim Myong-hwa, a former member of the anti-Japanese Communist Party, the "people's welfare groups" began to intrude into the important Party organs and even the guerrilla command, and "they did everything in their power to try to disrupt and destroy the revolutionary ranks and carry out military conspiracy maneuvers."106

Choi Hyun [84] even has a subtitle titled "Caught in the People's Liberation Gang." Lim Chun-chu said, "It is said that the Minsaengdan, a group of Japanese imperialists composed of renegade nationalists and sectarians who had defected from the revolution, infiltrated the revolutionary ranks and carried out all kinds of maneuvers to destroy the anti-Japanese national liberation

[83] Kim Il-sung, 『Hyangryon1st Military Pharmacist』, p. 633; Haruki Wada, 『Kim Il Sung and the Manchurian Anti-Japanese War』』,
Requoted in p. 121.

[84] Cf. Revolutionary Tradition Research Materials, On the Road to the Revolution (Reminiscences of Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Fighters (1), 1960), p. 90.

movement.[85] 「Kim Il-sung's strategy strategy 」 states that the struggle against the people's livelihood was a struggle to purge the people's union, the enemy's spy organization that had joined the revolutionary ranks.

All of them.[86]

From this point of view, it is possible that Kim Il-sung at the time was hostile to people like Ri Song-il and insisted on punishment. There is testimony that Kim Il-sung interpreted in Chinese when judging Ri Song-il on the charges against him.

> That person is a reputed person. He speaks Chinese well, so when Ri Song-il was judged as a minsmer, Kim Il-sung stood as an interpreter. Li Song-il is the chairman of the East Man-sukban Committee. Even Li Song Il was shot.
> All of them.[87]

(5) Return to East Bay and Removal from Charges of Minsaengdan Kim Il-sung returned from North Korea to East Bay in February 1935. Kim Il-sung's

The decision to return to Dongman appears to have been made through consultation between the 5th Army Commander, Joo Bo-

[85] Lim Chun-chu, Reminiscing about the period of the anti-Japanese armed struggle, p. 93.

[86] Workers' Party of Korea, 「Comrade Kim Il Sung Strategy, p. 146.

[87] Interview with Professor Im-Oh Nam, (April 2004).

joong, and Gil Dong-sun, Siwon, and Opyong, while he was in the 5th Army of Yong'an, North Man. Kim Il-sung returned to Dongman in anticipation of important political adjustments, such as the Daehwang Outer Conference and the Yoying-gu Conference to discuss important issues such as the destruction of the guerrilla zone by the Japanese imperialist army and the issue of the people's livelihood complex.

Rhubarb Session

In January 1935, the Manchurian Provincial Committee, concerned about the severity of anti-people fighting within the East Manchurian Party, entrusted Wei Zhengmin as the plenipotentiary representative of the Manchurian Provincial Committee and dispatched him to Dongman. The task of the above magnification was to examine and understand the case of the Minsaengdan, and in the handling of the Minsaengdan matter, he was instructed not to kill people at will, except for those who had clear evidence and had reported to the provincial committee for ratification. This was not to give the East Manchurian Special Committee the right to the death penalty. On 1 February, the Manchurian Provincial Committee sent a letter to the East Manchurian Party and the Special Committee on Dandan, emphasizing the united front with the Korean people and the reform of education as a way to deal with it. In accordance with this directive, the Extraordinarily Conference was held between February 24 and March 3, 1935.

C. This is the first enlarged meeting of the East Manchurian Party and the Special Committee, which was attended by high-ranking officials of the Party and the Dandan. Thirteen Chinese and 13 Koreans attended, but Kim Il-sung did not attend because he was not qualified to attend. At this meeting, Jong Jong-un maintained a hard-line stance in his report, claiming that 70% of the Koreans and 80~90% of the Korean revolutionaries in Dongman were members of the Minsaeng Gang or suspected of it. He emphasized the track record of arresting more than 500 people, and also pointed out the side effects of destroying the united front as a criticism of the mistake. It was also decided to set up a sukban committee to deal strictly with the issue of the people's livelihood group, and Li Song-il was appointed as the chairman of the three-member sukban committee.[88] At this meeting, it was decided to re-establish the East Manchurian Special Committee, to have Yu Chung-min in charge, and to make a decision on its organization, and in February 1935, the Second Independence Company was established, and Kim Il-sung was appointed as the Political Commissar of the Third Battalion. Kim Il-sung had been politically reinstated.[89]

Yo Permanent Assembly

[88] Haruki Wada, ⍰Kim Il Sung and the Manchurian Anti-Japanese War, p. 119.
[89] Shin Ju-baek, ⍰A Study on Kim Il-sung's Manchurian Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Movement, p. 169~170.

The meeting was held on March 21, 1935, and was the annual meeting of the political commissars of the 2nd Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army. In other words, as a military cadre meeting, it was a meeting to reflect the decisions of the Grand Outer Conference, which was a party and a single meeting, to the military. Kim Il-sung, who was elected as the third political commissar at the Rhubarb Conference, was also present. The meeting was presided over by Yu Chung-min and was attended by only three Koreans, including Kim Il-sung. Kim Il-sung's attendance at this meeting signifies the restoration of his honor and his formal recognition as a member of the Political Commissariat of the Third Party.[90] Since it was an important meeting, Ju Bo-jung [91] and Oh Pyong must have consulted and instructed Kim Il-sung to return to Dongman to attend the Yoying-gu Conference.

At this meeting, Kim Il-sung made remarks on the issue of the struggle against the people's livelihood and expressed a critical opinion on the struggle of the people's people's union. It is presumed that he was firm in his stance on the detection of real people's livelihood groups such as Li Song-il, but he was opposed to

[90] Haruki Wada, ⍰Kim Il Sung and the Manchurian Anti-Japanese War, p. 121.

[91] Zhu Bozhong studied in the Soviet Union and was appointed as the military secretary of the Manchurian Provincial Committee in February 1932, but was sent to Manchuria by Zhou Enlai. He is the highest-ranking person in the Manchurian Provincial Committee and the most important leader of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army.

doubting many sincere guerrilla fighters.[92] This can be attributed to the fact that Kim Il-sung was told by Oh Pyong that the CCP's sedentary and dogmatistic tendencies were severe. Kim Il-sung met with Oh Pyong, the CCP's Gildong Sun Si-won, in the Yongan 5th Army, and [93] learned from Oh Pyong that there were many errors in the case of the anti-people's livelihood struggle, and that it would soon be stopped. Kim Il-sung came to Dongman and made strong arguments at the Yoyeong Conference (March 21, 1935), which brought him to the attention of the CCP leadership, and it is believed that he was appointed as the head of the 3rd Division of the 2nd Army in March 1936. As many as 500 people were executed, so there were no Korean cadres in East Man. That's why.

The main decision on the anti-Japanese strategy at the meeting was the dismantling of the guerrilla zones in East Bay and the relocation of the areas of struggle. The first reason is that the guerrilla districts in East Bay were almost completely destroyed by the Japanese imperialists. Second, in accordance with the policy of breaking through all the encirclement of the enemy and advancing into a new area and expanding into a new guerrilla movement, the 2nd Army will be separated into the South and the North Bay.

Third, as a countermeasure of the CCP to the issue of the people's livelihood group, it was decided to leave the East Bay and enter new

[92] Haruki Wada, ?Kim Il Sung and the Manchurian Anti-Japanese War, p. 121.
[93] Kim Il-sung reveals in his memoirs that he met Oh Pyong. "We're the main

areas and recruit as many Chinese as possible to renovate the ethnic group.

This decision was made in the wake of the Minsaengdan issue, which led to the distrust of Koreans in the East Bay region.

and wariness psychology is also presumed to have had a certain effect.[116] Following this decision, Kim Il-sung's Second Army was to embark on a second expedition to North Korea.

(6) In accordance with the decision of the Second North Korean People's Revolutionary Army and the Seventh Communist International Congress, the 2nd Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army on May 30, 1935

When I was in the middle of the mountain, Wu Ping, the Manchurian correspondent of the International Communist Party, was also there. ... We sat down with him for about 10 days and had a wide range of discussions." (Memoirs of Kim Il Sung
Vol. 3, pp. 378～379.)

[116] Kim Sung-ho, ⍰A Study on the 1930s Yanbian Minsaengdan Incident⍰⍰, pp. 197~199.

The formal establishment of the military was announced. Wang Deok-tae, chief of the Political Department, Yu Hak-chung, chief of the Political Department, Yu Han-hung, chief of the General Staff, Ahn Bong-hak, a Korean, Bang Jin-seong, the third general, and Kim Il-sung, the third political commissar, were appointed. There is not a single Korean in the newly formed military and the first class

leadership of the masters. Of the eight political commissars and the heads of the four affiliated groups, only two are Koreans: Ahn Bong-hak, the head of the first group, and Kim Il-sung, the political commissar of the third group. This was partly due to the exclusion of Koreans, but most of the Koreans were executed due to the anti-people's struggle against the people's livelihood.[94][95]

Wang Deok-tae and Li Hak-chung led the 1st and 2nd dans in the direction of Ando, while the chief of staff, Yu Han-hung, led the 3rd and 4th dans to the north, in the direction of Daejeon-bang. Kim Il-sung participated in the Second North Manchurian Expedition in late June 1935.

In the wake of the North and South Manchurian administrations, anti-democracy is bound to weaken

Lost. One of the reasons for this is that Koreans have left Dongman, where they make up the vast majority, and have advanced into areas inhabited by a wide range of other ethnic groups, and they recognize that the organizational foundation of the Minsaengdan within the organization that the leaders of the anti-democracy movement had been convinced of would be severed and its organizational foundation would be greatly weakened. 118

Kim Il-sung's Second North Manchurian Expedition, like the first, served as a great opportunity for Kim Il-sung. Kim Il-sung's 3rd Dan

[94] Ibid., p. 169.

[95] Ibid., p. 199.

Wangcheng and 4th Dan Hun Chun met with the 5th Army in Yong'an in July. Kim Il-sung met with Joo Bo-jung again for the first time in about seven months.[96]

Together with part of the 5th Army, the Western Detachment was formed and fought in the Akmok and Donhwa areas for nearly half a year. During this period, Kim Il-sung further strengthened his friendship with Ju Bo-jung through cooperation with the Fifth Army.[97]

> At this time, Yu Zhengmin, who had gone to Moscow, returned to Manchuria in February 1936.

I came to the main guard of the 5th Army first. He met with Zhu Bozhong in Beihudu and delivered instructions to the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party. This is the so-called Northern Walnut Society. The instructions of the Seventh Congress of the Communist Countries, brought about by Yu Chung-min, are the so-called new policy, which are of great importance to the Korean nation as a whole and are of great importance to the Korean nation. At the Seventh Congress in 1935, in order to rally forces against Japanese imperialism and German fascism, it was thought that this would cause conflict between the nations, and the instructions that came out of it were to "implement Korean self-government, the Korean communists should establish a combined army between

[96] Kim Il Sung, With the Century, Vol. 4, p. 178.
[97] Haruki Wada, Kim Il Sung and the Manchurian Anti-Japanese War, p. 127.

China and Korea, and the Korean people should establish a base for themselves alone."

Up to that time, when our compatriots had been identified as the people's livelihood group, the new policy of the Communist International Party was to "fight for the independence of Korea, for the national autonomy in Manchuria, to fight for the independence of the Korean peninsula, and for the independence of the Korean peninsula, for the independence of the Korean peninsula, the Korean people living in Manchuria should establish a separate army, and the Korean National Revolutionary Party" signified a very important change in the CCP's policy toward the Koreans. Wei Zhengmin came with this great instruction and conveyed it to Zhu Bozhong at Jingbak Lake on February 7. The place where the largest number of our compatriots were located was the 7th Army, which was personally established by Choi Yong-geon in Yohajibang, and Ju Bo-jung personally wrote a letter to the 7th Army. Then, under the instruction of Wei Zhengmin to go to Dong Bay to discuss the Yanbian issue, Wei Zhengmin left the Gyeongbak Lake on February 9. On his way down to Mihonjin, he met Wang Deok-tae and Kim Il-sung of the 2nd Army at Namhudu, and they followed Wei Jeong-min to Mihonjin according to Wei Chung-min's instructions. Kim Il-sung met with Oh Pyong in the first North Manchurian Expedition, and Wei Chung-min in the second North Manchurian Expedition. This led to Kim Il-sung's interaction with the CCP cadres and his appointment as the third president of the Communist Party of China

(師長) as he became aware of the situation and trends. This is the reason why North Korean history books claim that the South Walnut Conference was held, but in fact it is claimed that the South Walnut Conference was not held, but that Kim Il-sung convened a military caucus meeting at the South Walnut to decide on the new policy, as Kim Il-sung met Yu Chung-min at the South Walnut and learned the contents of the new policy.[98]

On February 9, 1936, Wei Chung-min left North Korea and came to Mihonjin in Ando, where he presided over a meeting of Mihonjin around March 8. In order to strengthen the united front among the nations, it was decided to reorganize the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army into the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, to establish a third company instead of separating the second army by ethnic group, and to establish the Fatherland Liberation Association instead of the Korean National Revolutionary Party.

> After repeated discussions at this meeting, it was decided to establish the Korean National Revolutionary Party.

Since it was not realistic to carry out the new policy of the Communist International Party, it was decided to establish the Fatherland Liberation Association instead of the Korean Nationalist Party. It is said that the DPRK National Liberation Association is the top secret National United Front organization of the Chinese Communist Party. Pyongyang claims to be a completely

[98] Interview with Prof. Im-Oh Nam, Yonbyon University, (April 2004).

independent organization organized by Kim Il Sung. However, the fact is that there is no Kim Il-sung in the promoters of the Fatherland Liberation Society, but Oh Seong-ryun and Lee Dong-kwang are the initiators. It was also decided that the new policy of the Communist International to establish an independent army was unrealistic. The reason why the Korean people cannot build a separate army is that in the case of the first company, more than half of them are Koreans, but the second company in Jinhanjang has the most stringent ammunition, but if it is missing, China will be in trouble, so it was decided to create a third company as an alternative. In this way, three new companies were established and Kim Il-sung was appointed as their president.[99]

B. Period of the 6th President of the 2nd Army (1936~October 1940): Mt. Paektu and the Namman Period

(1) Establishment of the three companies of the second army As we have seen above, the formation of the three companies of the second army is related to the Minsaengdan incident. As part of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Communist International response to the Minsaengdan incident, the three companies were established. As one of the ways to end the Minsaengdan incident, the establishment of the 3rd Company of the

[99] Interview with Prof. Im-Oh Nam, Yanbian University, (June 2006).

2nd Army and the appointment of Kim Il-sung as the head of the 3rd Brigade effectively made Kim Il-sung the biggest beneficiary of the Minsaengdan Incident During the anti-people's union struggle, most of the experienced and politically savvy Han Inji thieves were executed. For example, Kim Myung-kyun, Kim Sung-do, Kim Il-hwan, Ma Jun, Park Gil, Park Dong-geun, Park Doo-nam, Lee Seung-il, Yang Yang-ryong, Lee Sang-muk, Lee Yong-guk, and Joo Jin. Accordingly, at the end of the 1920s, new young people who had awakened to the socialist movement took up key positions in the East Manchurian Special Committee and in the guerrilla corps. Most of them had entered the socialist movement by practicing the left-leaning line of the CCP. Many 500 ethnic Korean anti-Japanese leaders were purged during the anti-people's struggle, and Kim Il-sung says the following: "All the Koreans who were writing and giving speeches were rounded up and destroyed."[100] In fact, all the high-ranking people in Yanbyon died, and only those of the middle and lower ranks, such as Kim Il-sung, survived. After all the conductors were dead, Kim Il-sung

In 1936 he became the third chief of staff.

As a result, the Korean National Revolutionary Army, which had been proposed in the new policy, was not established, as there was a lot of controversy within the CCP. The testimony of the main

[100] Kim Il Sung, With the Century, Vol. 4, p. 10.

bodyguard, who opposed the formation of armed units by ethnicity, is as follows:

> (1) Objective conditions did not permit it, and the struggle for the expansion and development of the guerrilla zone was so urgent that it was not possible to have ample time. (2) In terms of state viewing, the army has already broken the ethnic divide. Once the army is divided again, it is easy for the enemy to provoke a rift and create a new division of the nation (as in the case of the Minsaengdan incident). These two internal and external causes influenced each other. (3) The Koreans were a minority in the Northeast, and they were also dispersed, and the majority were Han Chinese, so it was easy for the Joseon army to act alone and become isolated. (4) There was also an ideological struggle within the party. At that time, the North Koreans strongly opposed their policy, saying that it was nihilistic and that they were not allowed to speak the Korean language to the Koreans, and that even those who went to East Bay were not allowed to speak directly in the Korean language, and that the customs and customs of the Koreans should be the same as those of the Han Chinese. For this reason, the decision of the time was decidedly a political propaganda slogan in Manchuria and could not be realized. (5) In addition, the army in East Manchuria could not maintain its sphere of activity and could not be separated again because its organization had been destroyed.[101]

Because of the opposition of the leaders of the North Manchurian provinces and the fact that the situation did not allow it, the new policy of dividing the guerrillas into ethnic groups could not be

[101] Testimony of the Bulletin; Reprinted in Shin Ju-baek, 『History of the Korean National Movement in Manchuria 1920~1945, p. 441.

implemented. In other words, the establishment of the Third Company of the Second Army was the result of a tentative agreement between the leaders of the guerrilla forces in the East Manchuria, and not the conclusion of the policy of forming armed units for each nation that reflected the opinions of the leaders of the North Manchurian region as a whole. From this, it can be said that the 3rd Company of the 2nd Army played a part in the Korean National Revolutionary Army. However, it should not be said that the conclusion or result of the new policy of forming an armed force exclusively for Koreans was the formation of a third company itself. The issue of forming a Korean-only army was not agreed upon among the leaders of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, and continued to be discussed among the leaders of the North Manchurian and Gildong districts afterwards.

All of them.[102]

> Considering these facts, Kim Il-sung is known as the "Korean People's Revolutionary Army."

It is impossible for North Korean historiography to claim that he commanded his own organization and troops.[103]

(2) Activities of Kim Il-sung's unit as the 6th president of the 2nd Army The policy of the Mihonjin Conference was

[102] Ibid., p. 440.

[103] Interview with Professor Chang Wook Park, Yonbyon University, (April 2004).

formulated in May 1936 at the 2nd Army's military-level caucus, or Dong Gang. At the meeting, Kim Il-sung's third company entered the Paektusan area bordering Korea, including Musong, Changbaek, and Imgang, and decided to establish a new guerrilla zone, and the future action plan of the Second Army was confirmed in detail. In June, he organized the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th dans in Donggang, and in July, he went to Tonghua Hari and met with Yang Zhengwu to form the 1st Route Army, and then the 1st Army of Namman and the 2nd Army of Dongman were combined to form the 1st Route Army, and then the 1st and 1st of Dongman, Companies 2 and 3 became companies 4, 5, and 6. Kim Il-sung's three companies were reorganized into six companies from July. The 7th and 8th dans were Korean people, and the 9th and 10th dans were all Han Chinese. Kim Il-sung took only the 7th and 8th dans with him and sent the 9th and 10th dans to other places. Kim Il-sung carried only the Cho Son family, and Cho A-beom, a Chinese, was a political commissar of the 6th Company of the 2nd Army, and he led the 9th and 10th dans, dividing the troops with Kim Il-sung. This is because there were many conflicts over the issue of the people's livelihood.[104]

At the meeting, the issue of dimming was also discussed. About the Korean National Movement

[104] Kim Sung-ho, The People's Democracy Incident and the Korean Partisans in Manchuria, p. 142.

The CCP Central Committee's new policy began to be put into practice from the time of the Eastern Lecture Conference.[105]

Accordingly, the Fatherland Liberation Association was established, and since it was the Anti-Japanese National United Front, it was present in each region. Kim Chae Jong established the Fatherland Liberation Association in North Man, and Kim Il-sung established the Fatherland Liberation Association in Changbaek County, South Man.

Kim Il-sung's full-fledged activities as the commander of the 6th division of the 2nd Army

It was mainly anima. In other words, it focused on underground activities. Since the administrative organization was ruled by the Japanese, it was operated by a special organization called Japan during the day and the Fatherland Liberation Association at night.

Battle of Bocheonbo

It can be said that the Battle of Bocheonbo on June 4, 1937 inherited the spirit of the new policy. In the Battle of Bocheonbo, three companies, including six companies of Kim Il-sung, two and four companies, participated in the battle and attacked Bocheonbo. Bocheonbo is a mountainous village with 308 houses and 5 Japanese policemen, and there is Hyesanjin with 13,000 people in the neighborhood, so the attack on Bocheonbo was known

[105] Shin Ju-baek, 「A Study on Kim Il-sung's Manchurian Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Movement」」}p. 175.

throughout the country through this place. Kim Il Sung's troops burned down government offices and other buildings and retreated. None of the five officers were killed as they fled, and two were killed, including a stray bullet in the middle of a police officer who was on his back and a Japanese restaurant owner was killed. Kim Il Sung's troops engaged the pursuing corps and withdrew unharmed. The Battle of Bocheonbo itself was a battle with no major casualties, except for the symbolic meaning of being the first time the Japanese police had invaded Korea, but after that, the Japanese police chased the battle and continued to the Battle of Kansambong, and the Japanese suffered heavy losses. In the wake of this battle, Kim Il Sung's name became widely known throughout the country through newspapers.[106]

Hyesan Incident

The Hyesan incident is the aftermath of the Battle of Bocheonbo. In the wake of the Battle of Bocheonbo, the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army entered the path of annihilation. For Kim Il-sung, it was an opportunity to make his name known in the country, but it also served as an opportunity for other units to provoke an all-out counterattack by the Japanese army and be crushed. First of all, it is called the Hyesan Incident, which is a case of a sweep of members

[106] Haruki Wada, North Korea: From a Guerrilla State to a Regular Military State, pp. 49～50.

of the Fatherland Liberation Movement. The Liberation Association of the Fatherland was disbanded due to the arrest of 739 people in Changbai County, and the Changbai County base was dismantled, and the struggle became quite difficult after 1938. Kim Il-sung's leadership before and after the Battle of Bocheonbo was an act that showed the limits of his political leadership.

It can be seen that it is.[107]

The Arduous March (December 1938~March 1939, 100 days) The Japanese army launched a three-star combined subjugation in 1938. Jilin, Gan

As a result of mobilizing more than 70,000 Kwantung Army and police in the capital and Tonghua provinces to subdue the 1st Route Army, the 1st Route Army was annihilated in the area of Changbai County. Since the surrender of the 1st Route Army, Zheng Bin, on June 29, 1938, exposed the failure of the military organization, Wei Chung-min held the 2nd Senior Citizens' Conference in July 1938 and urgently reorganized the organization and activities of the 1st Route Army, and reorganized the 1st Route Army into a three-way army.

C. Kim Il-sung confirmed this on November 28 when he met Yang Jong-woo, who was moving in the direction of Hari, and was informed of the results of the Second Presbyterian Conference in

[107] Shin Ju-baek, A Study on Kim Il-sung's Manchurian Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Movement, p. 180.

the South, and was appointed commander of the 2nd Sector Army. The 2nd Sector Army was formed. From then on, Kim Il-sung served as the commander of the 2nd Frontier Army.

After the surrender of the 1st Commander, Jung Bin, to the Japanese, the 1st Route Army was in crisis. When the situation became difficult, on February 20, 1940, Im Su-san, the chief of staff of the 2nd Defence Army, surrendered and organized the Imsu-san Attack Team to engage in the subjugation of Kim Il-sung. The Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army was surrounded for 40 years and then escaped. In other words, they moved from their base in Changbai County to Yanbian such as Ando, Huarong, and Donhua. Yanbian was judged to be safe. However, Kim Il-sung's troops were chased by Maeda's punitive squad and retreated to a dead end, but they changed their strategy and set up an ambush, then attacked the pursuing army and almost annihilated Maeda's troops. This was the Battle of Hongqi River in Huarong County in March 1940. This battle got Kim Il-sung in trouble. This is because after the annihilation of Maeda's troops, the pursuit of the subjugation army intensified. Most of the fighting at this time was for food and munitions. In order to prevent the transfer of munitions and food to the guerrillas, the Japanese imperialists were so strict that they were not allowed to buy more than two pairs of shoes even in private homes.

(3) The collapse of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army and its crossover into the Soviet Union

In 1940, each unit of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army suffered heavy losses and experienced setbacks in the struggle against the Japanese and Wiman forces.[108] Most of the members were killed in the subjugation of the Japanese army, and some surrendered to the Japanese army. The 1st Route Army was divided into quarters. By the early 1940s, the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army had been almost completely defeated.[109] Most of the leaders of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army were killed. Only the main body survived. Kim Il-sung's immediate superior, Commander of the Second Army, Wang Deok-tae, was killed in May 1939 at Monggang County. Yang Jung-woo, the commander-in-chief of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, was killed in action on February 20, 1940. When Yang Jung-woo was killed, Wei Jeong-min was replaced by Wei Jeong-min, who was killed in action in March 1940.

C. Commander of the 3rd Route Army, Cho Sang-ji, was also killed in action in February 1942. Kim Il-sung's guerrilla warfare at Mt. Paektu was one of the factors that allowed him to survive without dying. Because the other units of the Anti-Japanese Coalition Army fought in the vast fields of Manchuria, they were easily exposed to Japanese aircraft and were easily killed, and in fact, many of them

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[108] Choi Sung-chun, The History of the Yanbian People's Anti-Japanese Struggle (Yanbian: People's Publishing House, 1999), p. 361.

[109] Seo Dae-sook, □A Study on the History of the Korean Communist Movement□□}p. 265.

were killed. At this time, Kim Il-sung had about 120 men in Ando and Musong counties. Chen Hanzhang, a Chinese citizen, had about 70 people in the Donhua District, and Zhenguang had about 20 people in Huazhen County. There were about 160 soldiers in Zhao Ah Bum, Choi County, and Han Hua counties in Wangcheng, Huarong, Yanji, and other counties.[110] After Wei Zhengmin's death, all of these forces slowly moved north to join the Third Route Army under the command of Zhu Bozhong and withdrew to Khabarovsk at the end of 1940. On February 23, 1940, following the death of Yang Zhengwu, the commander-in-chief of the 1st Route Army, Wei Zhengmin held the second Dudoryu Conference in Dudoryuha, Hwazhen County, in mid-March, and decided on the activities of small units and the movement of armed units to the border areas between China and the Soviet Union.[111]

Kim Il-sung learned of this policy in early July. This is because, according to a document written by Kim Il-sung himself on September 30, 1941, Kim Il-sung stated that in July 1940 Kim Il-sung met with Yu Chung-min in Hanchong District, Donghwa County. Kim Il-sung claims that this policy was decided at the Sohalba Colony Conference, which was decided at the Dudoryu Conference of the Vice-Admiral of the Republic of Korea.

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[110] Ibid., pp. 264～265.

[111] □Yongbyon Party: Incidents and People}(Yanbian: Yanbian People's Publishing House, 1988), pp. 229～230; Reprinted in Hsinchu Bai, A Study on Kim Il-Sung's Manchurian Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Movement, p. 183.

Kim Il-sung entered the Soviet Union in August 1940 with Kang Wi-ryong and 16 others.

I went. On the way, on the top of a mountain in Hunchun, Kim Il-sung married Kim Jung-sook. Among those who have survived until recently, Yeo Young-jun and Seo Soon-ok testified.[112] According to the diary of Jubojung dated December 11, 1940, Kim Il-sung with 16 men passed through Hunchun in October (the 23rd day of the 9th month in the lunar calendar). Eventually, Kim Il-sung menstruated around October 22 or 23, 1940.[113]

(4) Camping in the Soviet Union

After entering the Primorsky Territory of the Soviet Union in 1940, when the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army formed the Anti-Japanese Coalition Army's Kyodo or 88th Brigade Zone in 1941, Kim Il-sung became the commander of the 1st Zone and later became the 1st Warrant Officer.[114] At that time, the 88th Brigade consisted of four battalions. The brigade commander was Joo Bo-joong, the battalion commander of the 1st Battalion Kim Il-sung, the chief of staff Ahn Gil, the 2nd Battalion Battalion Commander Se Se-young (5th Army Commander), the 2nd Battalion Battalion Commander Kang Geon (Kang Shin-tae), the 3rd Battalion Battalion

[112] Interview with Prof. Im-Oh Nam, Yonbyon University, (April 2004).

[113] Shin Ju-baek, A Study on Kim Il-sung's Manchurian Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Movement, p. 184.

[114] Interview with Prof. Im-Oh Nam, Yanbian University, (June 2006).

Battalion Commander 000, the Chief of Staff Kim Chaek, and the 4th Battalion Battalion Commander Kang Geon. Choi Yong-gun was the secretary of the Northeast Party Committee of the Communist Party of China and held the highest position among the Cho predecessors, with a total of 1,000 members.

The 1st Route Army (2nd and 3rd Route Army) was deployed in the South Camp, and the 2nd and 3rd Route Army were deployed in the North Camp. Kim Il-sung belonged to the southern camp. There were about 170 Koreans. Kim Il-sung had only been to Manchuria once for a small unit operation, in April 1941 (lunar calendar) in order to find a perjury citizen. Ju Bo-jung severely reprimanded Kim Il-sung for leaving Yu Jeong-min alone and crossing into the Soviet Union, and he carried a letter from Ju Bo-jung asking him to punish him appropriately. But Yu was already dead.[115]

Kim Jong-il was born in Primorye Territory in 1942. It is clear that the place of birth is the USSR, and it is indisputable. He is the same age as Ju Bo-joong's daughter and grew up together.

There are three real relief trees in Yanbian, and it is said that three of them were kept in the Yanbian Museum and given as a gift to the DPRK in 1956. Since then, he has brought pictures of relief trees from Kim Il Sung University, and there are more than 200 of

[115] Interview with Professor Chang Wook Park, Yonbyon University, (April 2004).

them, and among them, Comrade Kim Jong Il Long Live and Comrade Kim Jong Sook are all lies.[116]

(5) Returning home When Germany surrendered to the Allies and Japan's defeat became apparent, the Korean Work Committee was formed in July 1945. It was composed of a three-member nuclear team consisting of Kim Il-sung, Choe Yong-gun, and Kim Chae-chung, with Kim Il-sung appointed as the head of the work committee, Choe Yong-gun as party leader, and Kim Chae-chae as administrative responsibility. The Korean Communist Committee was not a voluntary organization of Kim Il-sung, but was decided by the Northeast Party Committee of the Communist Party of China and was directed by the Soviet Union. In other words, it was decided by the Northeast Party Committee of the Communist Party of China on the instructions of the Soviet Union. The Chinese Communist Party was in the coastal zone at the time, so it could not give direct instructions. The direct command was directed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. By decision of the Northeast Party Committee of the Communist Party of China, Kim Il-sung was appointed head of the Korean Work Committee.

When the Soviet Red Army declared war in 1945, Kim Il-sung wanted to join him, but the Soviet Union hesitated because of

[116] Interview with Professor Chang Wook Park, Yonbyon University, (April 2004).

international relations. In other words, Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang regime did not allow the Chinese Communist army to emerge. Because of the treaty between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Nationalist Party. Kim Il-sung entered the port of Wonsan aboard the Soviet fleet on September 19, 1945, after Japan was defeated and retreated.

Chapter

1930ye～1940North China Anti-Japanese Movement of the

1. Significance of the Korean Volunteer Army

The Korean Volunteer Corps was founded in October 1938 under the leadership of Kim Yak-san (Kim Won-bong).

It is the anti-Japanese force of our nation. The two factions, Kim Yak-san's Kuomintang and Choi Chang-ik's Communist Party, competed with each other and conflicted, and in the end, Choi Chang-ik, who was in the majority, broke away and defected to the Communist Party's Eighth Route Army, which was reorganized into the Joseon Righteous Army, and Kim Yak-san was assigned to the 1st Zone of the Kwangbok Army of the Provisional Government of Chongqing.

The Korean Volunteer Army is a very significant anti-Japanese history of our nation in that it was formed in the province at the time of the defeat of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army in Manchuria and its crossing into the Soviet Union, and it carried out the struggle until the defeat of Japan.

The legitimacy of the Korean Volunteer Corps was inherited by the Korean Volunteer Army, which was numerous in number, and after the defeat of Japan, some of its cadres entered North Korea and became coastal troops, and the rest of the troops advanced to Manchuria and changed their name to the Northeast Korean Volunteer Army, and recruited a large number of Korean compatriots and expanded them to tens of thousands of people, and participated in the civil war as members of the Communist Army.

After the Chinese civil war ended with the victory of the Communist army, the units of the Northeast Korean Volunteer Army, organized by the Chosonjok, entered North Korea in three divisions and several independent regiments and battalions at the request of Kim Il-sung and were reorganized into the Cho Son People's Army and participated in the June 25 invasion of the South.

In this way, the Korean Volunteer Army participated in the Anti-Japanese War, the Chinese Civil War, and the June 25 War.

It is a very important armed group that participated in three major wars. However, after the war and the purge of all the coastal factions, which are synonymous with the Korean Volunteer Army, in the internal power struggle in North Korea, all historical records of the Korean Volunteer Army were erased from North Korea. Only the anti-Japanese coalition army in which Kim Il-sung in Manchuria participated has been distorted into the only unit that fought an armed struggle against Japan, and the Japanese coalition army in the northeastern port is also called the "Korean People's Revolutionary Army," which did not exist in history.

North Korea does not recognize the existence of an armed group of the overseas independence movement called the Korean Volunteer Army before liberation. If we look at the history of the martial generals who were active abroad just before the liberation of Korea, it is widely acknowledged that the number of Korean volunteers was the largest, the best in the coordination of the

troops, the best in the mental education of the troops, and the most active in anti-Japanese activities.[117]

The Korean Volunteer Army was an anti-Japanese partisan activist in Manchuria

It was almost the only surviving communist political organization in China after this setback, and it had an armed organization, the Korean Volunteer Army, under its command.

C. In addition, the Independence League movement, which was reorganized in North Korea as the New People's Party of Korea after liberation, formed an independent force and became one of the influential mothers of the North Korean Workers' Party and the Korean People's Army.[118]

2. Formation of the Korean Volunteer Army

July 1937 Japan invaded all of China using the Nogu Bridge Incident as an excuse

At the same time, when the anti-Japanese coalition forces in Manchuria intensified and the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition

[117] Kim Jung-saeng, The Entry of the Korean Volunteer Army into North Korea and the June 25 War (Seoul: Myongji Publishing House, 2000), p. 36.

[118] 鐸木昌之, "The Forgotten Communists: Focusing on the North China Korean Independence League," Lee Jeong-sik and Han Hong-koo, (Seoul: Stone Pillow, 1986), p. 55.

became impossible to exist, the remaining troops fled to the Soviet Union, so the sound of guns against Japan, including the Korean guerrillas, virtually disappeared from Manchuria.

After the disappearance of the anti-Japanese movement in Manchuria, which is the most extensive and important of the overseas bases of the anti-Japanese independence movement, some of the surviving anti-Japanese fighters went to the Soviet Union, and most of them lived as pure citizens in Manchuria, but not a few patriotic fighters entered the Shanhaiguan in search of a way to wage an anti-Japanese armed struggle.

The patriotic fighters who gathered in the hall had different ideologies and political beliefs.

First of all, because the Shanghai Provisional Government has been in power for more than 10 years, there were some people who joined the Provisional Government, and although they believed in nationalism in ideology and ideology, they had different methods of struggle, so they insisted on an independent line and organized various independent groups, among which many young governors gathered in the line of the Righteous Brigade.[119]

Among them, the most representative figure is Kim Yak-san (Kim Won-bong). Kim Yaksan

[119] Kim Jung-saeng, The Entry of the Korean Volunteer Army into North Korea and the June 25 War, p. 37.

In 1919, he founded the Righteous Brigade in Jilin, northeast China, and began a movement to resist Japanese aggression by assassinating and destroying it. In 1925, when the Japanese government issued a wanted order against Kim Yak-san, and its activities became difficult, it changed the fighting method of the Righteous Brigade and started to train military cadres. In 1926, he entered the Hwangpu Military Academy with a large number of members to train leaders of the anti-Japanese struggle.

Following the September 18 Incident in 1931, Kim Yak-san organized the Korean National Revolutionary Party on November 10, 1932 and was appointed as its general secretary. Many patriotic fighters gathered in the hall were a mixture of nationalist and communist factions, and they were inspired by the trend of China's state-communist cooperation, and finally formed the Korean National Front League in the form of an anti-Japanese united front in November 1937, with Kim Won-bong as its leader, and with the approval of Chiang Kai-shek of the Kuomintang government, the Korean Volunteer Corps was established on October 10, 1938 in Wuhan, Hubei Province.[120]

However, from the beginning, it contained the spark of contradiction and division. Finally, in December of that year, just a few months after the founding of the Korean Volunteer Corps, the

[120] Kang Ki-joo, 「A Study on the History of the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the Korean Nation in China, p. 132.

Communist Party led by Choe Chang-ik left Chongqing and moved to the Communist Party's anti-Japanese base in Taehengsan, where they established the Korean Independence League and the North China Korean Volunteer Army.

At that time, Korean nationalist activists were optimistic that China would win an all-out war between China and Japan, and they thought that this war was a unique opportunity to achieve national liberation and wanted to take advantage of it. For example, Kim Won Bong, in his letter to the comrades of the Korean revolution, judged that the independence of Korea would be possible on the day of China's victory.[121]

After the establishment of the Independence League and the Korean Volunteer Army, the Jinjinnam District

The Independence League and the Korean Volunteer Army Zone were also established in the anti-Japanese bases in a wide area, including the Jinjin area in the middle of Hangshan, the mobile area adjacent to Manchuria, the northwestern part of Qin in northwestern Shanxi Province, the Central Plains area of Jiangsu and Anhui Province, and the Shandong region, and under the direct

[121] Kim 若山, <告朝鮮國內革命同志書> <The 2nd Term of the Korean National Front>, ed. Institute for the History of the Korean Independence Movement (Vol. 2, 1988), p. 167; Yeom In-ho, reprinted in the Independence Movement of the Brave Army of Joseon (Seoul: Nanam Publishing, 2001), p. 4.

guidance of the local Communist Party and the command of the local Eighth Route Army and the New Shrine Army, they carried out vigorous anti-Japanese activities and steadily expanded their forces.

On November 4, 1940, the Korean Volunteer Corps held its first enlarged meeting of cadres at the headquarters of the General Headquarters in Chongqing, attended by the squad commanders of each zone, and after reviewing and evaluating the experience of the anti-Japanese struggle over the past two years, it was decided to advance to North China, an area where a large number of Korean compatriots reside and a district of the Chinese Communist Party's Eighth Route Army. This decision was made because of the active anti-Japanese line of the Communist Party of Mao Zedong's Eighth Route Army compared to the passive anti-Japanese and active anti-Communist line of the Kuomintang government, and the Chinese Communist Party's interest in the Korean Volunteer Corps and its decision to move to North China also influenced the decision. In addition, there are about 200,000 ethnic Koreans living in North China, compared to only 15,000 in South China. The fact that he did not live there also acted as an important variable, and he moved the base of the erotic struggle in North China.[122] As a result of this decision, the majority of the members of the Korean Volunteer Corps were transferred to the area of operation of the Eighth Route

[122] Kang Ki-joo, A Study on the History of the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the Korean Nation in China, pp. 150～155.

Army, which was controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after the enemy of North China from April to June 1941.

On July 11~14, 1942, the North China Korean Youth Federation held its 4th National Congress in the Red Hu District of North China, the Eighth Route Army Activity Zone under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and the Taihengshan Mo area of Shanxi Province, and Peng Dehui, Vice Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Eighth Route Army, delivered a congratulatory speech on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army. At this meeting, it was resolved to rename the North China Korean Youth Association into the Korean Independence League and to reorganize the North China Zone of the Korean Volunteer Corps into the Korean Volunteer Army.

The presidents are Kim Doo-bong, Choi Chang-ik and Han Moo as vice presidents, and Mu Jeong, Heo Jeong-sook, Lee Yoo-min, Park Hyo-sam, Park Il-woo, Kim Chang-man, Yang Min-san, Joo Chun-gil, Woo Man-yong, Ha Ang Chun, Lee Chun-am, Jang Jin-kwang, and Kim Ho. The commander of the Korean Volunteer Army is Mu Jeong, and the vice commanders are Pak Hyo-sam and Pak Il-woo. These are the people who entered North Korea after liberation and became a member of the National Assembly.[123]

[123] 楊昭全·李輔溫, 「Korean Volunteer Army Anti-Japanese Warriors」, p. 196. 」

The North China Korean Independence League and the Korean Volunteer Army brought about rapid development.

A detachment was set up in the Ru District. In November 1942, the Jinxi and North Divisions, in September 1943, the Qiyeolryo Division, in the summer of the same year, the Pingxi Division, and in January 1944, the Akye, Huibuk, Huinam, Sojung, and Zhejiang branches were combined to form the Huazhong Division, and by May 1945, nine branches were established in North China and China, and in June 1945, the Donggang (South China) Branch was established. Each branch had its own volunteer corps under its umbrella, and almost all of its members became volunteers. In this way, the Korean Volunteer Army grew into a powerful anti-Japanese armed force in the anti-Japanese war in China as the backbone and fundamental capability of the Korean nation's armed struggle against Japan.[124]

In order to cultivate talents, the school was renamed North China Korean Cadre Training School, and then it was called North China Korean Youth Revolutionary School, and Kim Doo-bong, vice-principal Pak Il-woo, and registrar Jang Ji-min were supervised, and in 1944 the name of the school was changed to North China Korean Revolutionary Military School, and Mu Jung himself served as the principal until the defeat of Japan. As a result, the Youth Federation, which started with a few dozen members, grew to 2,000 members

[124] Kang Ki-joo, ⍰A Study on the History of the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the Korean Nation in China, p. 159~160.

of the Independence League just before independence, and the group of good volunteers who started with 100 members expanded to 800.

> At the time of Japan's defeat, our people began an anti-Japanese struggle at home and abroad.

Among the existing groups, the armed group with the largest number of members, the most sound organization, the highest level of culture among its former members, and the most active in the armed struggle against Japan is the Korean Volunteer Army.[148]

3. Activities of the Korean Volunteer Army

It can be divided into two years of the Kuomintang district period and the Eighth County district period after that, but since the content is similar, we will look at them comprehensively.

(1) The knowledge and military level of the members of the anti-Japanese propaganda work of the enemy army were very high, especially the students from the United States, Japanese students, and graduates of the French School in Shanghai, who were fluent in foreign languages, and especially because they were fluent in Japanese, so that they could not be compared with any other Chinese army in the war against Japan. In this regard, the most fruitful and most characteristic anti-Japanese struggle among the activities of the Mune Volunteer Corps was the political propaganda

offensive against the Red Army. The Korean volunteers put up slogans, spread paras, made pamphlets, made broadcasts to the enemy, and carried out political propaganda against the enemy, especially near the front positions.

The propaganda method is mainly about 100 meters or even 20 meters close to the enemy camp

They approached the streets and carried tin barrels or megaphones with loudspeakers, and they used to make speeches, sermons, talk, sing, and make jokes, infiltrate enemy lines or behind enemy lines, distribute leaflets, pamphlets, and passes, and put up slogans, cartoons, and dolls, and in Guilin and Chongqing, they broadcast Japanese speeches. Although it is an incomplete statistic, in the two years since its founding, the Cho Volunteer Corps has printed and distributed 50,000 pamphlets in Japanese, Chinese, and Korean, 500,000 pira, and 10,000 passes.

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[148] Kim Jung-saeng, The Entry of the Korean Volunteer Army into North Korea and the June 25 War, p. 45.

and 400,000 slogans.[125]

Through this propaganda, they predicted that the Japanese chaebols and warlords would invade Korea.

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[125] 100 Years of China-DPRK Friendship Story} (Yanbian: Yanbian People's Publishing House, p. 126); Kang Ki-joo, A Study on the History of the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the Chinese Korean Nation, reprinted in p. 137~138.

and exposing their sins in China and Korea. At the same time, they exposed their crimes against the Japanese people, made many Japanese soldiers realize the injustice of Japan's war of aggression against China, and made them realize the miserable fact that Japan's war of aggression is bound to fail, and that they sacrifice their lives for the benefit of the Japanese tycoons and warlords. As a result, it was discovered that the corpses of a large number of Japanese soldiers kept the "pass" (letter of intent to surrender) sown by the Korean Volunteer Army, and the Japanese soldiers were able to find out from their diaries that the propaganda of the Korean Volunteer Army had a great influence on their fighting spirit. Moreover, many Japanese prisoners of war were educated by the Korean Volunteer Army, converted to become anti-Japanese fighters, and fought against the Japanese invaders together with the Korean and Chinese armies.[126]

(2) Propaganda work for the anti-Japanese military and people The Korean Volunteer Corps carried out a wide range of propaganda work against the anti-Japanese military and people in order to arouse the anti-Japanese consciousness and patriotic spirit of the anti-Japanese masses and allies, to boost their morale, and to strengthen and promote the friendly relations and pro-ship

[126] 楊昭全·李輔溫, 『Korean Volunteer Army Anti-Japanese Warrior』, p. 217.
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solidarity between the DPRK and the Chinese people. Mainly through the press and broadcast media. Publications include magazines, newspapers, and booklets, which are available in Chinese and Korean. < Combat High School at the Volunteer Corps Headquarters, >< Railway Station > Battleground in Zone 1, > < China Communications Battalion in Zone 3, In the 1st squad of the 2nd Zone, the < Volunteer Corps Hansu Fan >, in the 2nd Squad < the Joseon Volunteer Corps Hwang Su Pan> in the 3rd Brigade, in the 3rd Squad the < Joseon Volunteer Corps North China Plate> and in the 3rd Zone <Gangnam Communication>. In addition, the Korean Volunteer Corps broadcast twice a day to our compatriots living in Korea, China and the United States in both long and short waves. This kind of propaganda had a great effect not only on China and Korea, but also on the Korean people in the United States. As a result, in April 1939 the Korean Volunteer Association was organized first in New York, then in Los Angeles in September, and in Chicago in October, and in April of the following year it was established in Los Angeles. There were 71 participants from Los Angeles, 45 from New York, and 40 from Chicago, for a total of 156 participants. They also established the <Volunteer Bulletin> as an organ magazine, set up bureaus in New York, Hawaii, and Cuba, carried out anti-Japanese propaganda and anti-Japanese activities in the United States, and actively supported the Korean Volunteer Corps in both material and spiritual ways, such as collecting donations for the Volunteer Corps.

In order to raise anti-Japanese consciousness among the Chinese people, the Korean Volunteer Corps published and distributed newspapers and magazines in the Chinese language, held lectures, entertainment sessions, performances, established elementary schools, and produced and disseminated songs and anti-war songs. As examples of anti-war songs, he taught us to defend our country, defend our hometown, the Chinese nation will not perish, march to the volunteer army, go back to the northeast, Arirang, and the guerrilla army. [151]

[151] Kang Ki-joo, A Study on the History of the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the Korean Nation in China, p. 144.

(3) International Propaganda WorkThe Korean Volunteer Army led the Korean National Independence Movement to the World Anti-Fascist War at the time.

By becoming a part of it and having an international character, it attracted the attention and support of the world's major anti-fascist people and governments, including China, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.[127]

For example, on February 8, 1939, the Korean Volunteer Corps jointly held a press conference with the Taiwan Independence Revolutionary Party in Gerim, which was attended by more than 300 domestic and foreign dignitaries, including journalists from the United States, France, and the Soviet Union, as well as Japanese writers, and representatives of the Kuomintang Southwest Administrative Political Department and the Fifth Route Military Political Department. On this occasion, Kim Kyu-kwang, the chairman of the political team of the Korean Volunteer Corps and the moderator of the conference, presented the plight of the Korean people who are being exploited and oppressed by the Japanese

[127] 楊昭全·李輔溫, 「Korean Volunteer Army Anti-Japanese Warrior」, p. 217. 「」

imperialists and the reality of the Korean Volunteer Corps participating in the war against China.[128]

(4) The Battle of the Korean Volunteer Army against Japan The Korean Volunteer Army was not a pure combat unit, so the number of participants

It wasn't very frequent. However, they carried out guerrilla raids and ambush battles in combination with the Eighth Route Army and the Gentlemen's Army, and achieved many successes in the course of armed propaganda and in the course of the anti-sweeping struggle in the bases. In addition, they frequently infiltrated the enemy army with guerrilla operatives, informants, and underground operatives to collect political and military information on the Japanese imperialists, to scout the enemy's military facilities and troop deployment, and to investigate the enemy's military sentiment and public sentiment.

(5) Red Sphere Organizing Activities Red Zone Organizing Activities Infiltrate Cities and Rural Areas Occupied by the Japanese Army.

[128] Kang Ki-joo, A Study on the History of the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the Korean Nation in China, p. 147.

It is to create a Lip Alliance and a volunteer army. The Red Zone organization activities began in earnest in 1944 when the activities of the Eighth Army were intensified. Mu Zheng organized the Red Ball Battalion in the Taihang Mountains and dispatched a large number of work teams to the cities and rural areas of North China, as well as to Manchuria and Korea. As a result, the Independence League branches or groups were formed in Beijing, Tianjin, and other cities, and the presence of the Independence League and the Volunteer Army gradually expanded among the Koreans in the rural areas of North China. As a result of the enemy's organizational work, after the defeat of the Japanese imperialists, a large number of ancestors in rural areas in North China joined the volunteer army, and supplies from the rural areas were supplied to the volunteer army. In particular, in North Manchuria, based on such enemy operations, immediately after the defeat of the Japanese Empire, the Independence League emerged as the most powerful force.
I could.[129]

(6) Cadre trainingThe members of the Korean Volunteer Army, which consists of a small number of personnel,

[129] Yeom In-ho, The Independence Movement of the Korean Volunteer Army, p. 344.

He has made many achievements in expanding the organization. In August 1941, the North China Branch of the Korean Medical University opened a cadre training class as a temporary organization in Taehengsan Mountain, and from July 1942 opened a permanent school to provide military and political education to new recruits. From 1944 onwards, when the defeat of the Japanese imperialists was deepening, the Independence League and the Volunteer Army established the Korean Military Administration School in various places such as Yanyan, Taihangshan, Shandong, and Huazhong to provide high-quality political and military education. In 1945, members of the volunteer army who were active in various regions were gathered and educated at the military political school, and it is estimated that the number of volunteer soldiers who belonged to the military political schools in various places was around 850.[130]

4. Activities of the Korean Volunteer Army after Japan's defeat and entry into North Korea

The Korean Independence League and the Korean Volunteer Army heard the news of Japan's surrender and were immediately confronted

[130] Ibid., p. 346.

The task was to return to the homeland as soon as possible, and there were no questions in that regard. However, there were two problems with the immediate return of the Korean volunteers.

First, because the Korean Volunteer Army had been under the complete control and command of the Chinese Communist Party since it was organized in North China, it lost the independence and independence of the Korean Army, and second, even if it had the right to act independently, there was a considerable risk for hundreds of Korean volunteers dispersed in various parts of North China to move to Manchuria or the coastal ports.

However, the top leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) ordered the Korean Volunteer Army to assemble in Manchuria, keeping in mind the strategy of preempting Manchuria, which had been a key point in the civil war with the Kuomintang in particular. Thus, the all-party goodwill army gathered at Bongcheon, Manchuria. The strength of the Korean Volunteer Army in Manchuria is about 850 to 860 men. As the future course of action of the dragon army of Northeast Korea gathered at Bongcheon, Manchuria, three guidelines were issued by the decision of the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.[131] First, the leadership of the Korean Independence League and some cadres of the Korean Volunteer Army immediately

[131] Kim Jung-saeng, The Entry of the Korean Volunteer Army into North Korea and the June 25 War, p. 80.

Return to North Korea.

Second, the rest of the cadres and members of the Korean Volunteer Army remained in China and moved to the region.

Divide and enlarge the army and protect the lives and property of our compatriots. Third, divide into south, north, and east bays, and organize each zone.

Appoint a responsible person.

In accordance with this policy, all the central executive committee members of the Independence League and the cadres who entered the North were in a hurry to return home, and each zone began to take action in each zone under the command of the appointed cadres, and the unified command apparatus of the Northeast Korean Volunteer Army was wiped out.

In accordance with the first policy, key cadres of the Korean Volunteer Army entered North Korea in the first batch at the end of the year. The names of those who are known as the coastal faction in North Korea are Kim Doo-bong, Choi Chang-ik, Han Bin, Bang Woo-yong, Ko Bong-ki, Kim Min-san, Jin Ban-su, Park Moo, Hon Soon-kwan, Ha Ang-chun, Jang Jin-kwang, Heo Jung-sook, Kim Young-sook, Jang Su-ryeon, Mu Jeong, Park Hyo-sam, Kim Chang-man, Lee Chun-am, Joo Chun-gil, Yoo Shin, Kim Se-kwang, Son Dal, Yang Kye, Lee Rim, Kim Han-joong, Lee Ji-kang, Lee Cheol-joong, Jang Jung-kwang, Jang Jung-jin, Jang Ji-min, Jang Ji-bok, Joo Hyuk, Jin Guk-hwa, Choi Bong-rok, Choi Young, Ha Jin-dong, Wan-ryeon, Kim Cheol-won, and Pung Jung-cheon.

In 1946, the second batch of North Koreans entered North Korea as individual entrants was as follows: Pak Il-woo, Lee Yi-sung, Lee Kwon-moo, Cho Ryeol-kwang, Kim Eung, Ju Yeon, Lee Sang-jo, Kim Yeon, Lee Keun-san, Gong-ho, Park Hoon-il, Choi Myung, Han Kyung, Kim Taek, Jang Pyeong-san, Lee Deok-moo, Lee Dae-sung, Kim Shin, Kim Heung, Lee Myung-seon, Choi Kye-won, Lee Dong-ho, Yun Chi-pyeong, Koo Jae-so, Kim Oh-jin, Kim so-man, Yoo Won-won, Kim Jong-won, Kim Byung-gwon, Kim Byung-hun, Lee Won-young, Cho Byung-ryong, Chae Kuk-ban, Lee Myung, Lee Lee-min, and Wang Wang-in.

The rest of the cadres and members who did not enter North Korea and remained in China were involved in the civil war. Units were reorganized to participate in the war. Not only were the units reorganized, but the recruitment was expanded, with a total of 122,000 Korean volunteers who participated in the Korean Civil War. There are 43,000 people in Yanbian District, 40,000 people in South Bay District and South Jilin District, 14,000 people in North Jilin District, 18,000 people in Wensong Provincial District, and 7,000 people in Heilongjiang Province and other districts. At that time, the population of ethnic Koreans in Manchuria was 1.1 million~1.2 million, and 10% of them participated in the Korean Civil War. If we compare the population of Manchuria with 36 million immediately after liberation and 1 million people, which is 3% of the number of Chinese who participated in the army, the

number of our compatriots who participated in the army is astounding.

All of them.[132]

> Most of the Korean volunteers who remained in China participated in the Korean Civil War.

Some units entered North Korea early at Kim Il-sung's request. The first unit to enter North Korea is the Hunchun Security Corps, which has about 2,000 soldiers. In addition, 500 Korean graduates of the Choyang Cheonkyo Battalion entered North Korea in June 1946. They became the backbone of the middle and lower ranks of the Korean People's Army in North Korea. After the Chinese Civil War ended with the victory of the Communist Party, from July 1949 onwards,

All the Korean troops will enter North Korea. In 1950, ~~just before the 25 June War, the entry of Korean armed units into North Korea continued even after the war began. After the end of the Communist Civil War, the Communist army was victorious not only because it was mentally superior to the Kuomintang but also because it was not inferior in terms of the number of troops. Such an outcome could not but stimulate Kim Il-sung's ambitions to invade the South.~~

During this period, Kim Il-sung and his envoys visited Peking and Moscow several times, and in May 1949, when Kim Il-sung's special envoy Kim Il-il slandered Peking and raised the issue of the

[132] Ibid., p. 118.

formation of the Korean People's Army in China, Mao Zedong immediately promised that the two divisions stationed in Manchuria could enter North Korea immediately, and that other Korean-Chinese units could return to the North once the Chinese Civil War was basically over.

> In this way, with the understanding and compromise of Kim Il Sung, Mao Zedong, and Stalin, China

The Korean Volunteer Army began to enter the North, and three divisions and several regiments of troops entered the North and were organized into the Korean People's Army. The total number of these troops is between 55,000 and 60,000.[133]

[133] Ibid., p. 142.

Chapter

'Kim Il Sung by the Soviet Military
of the "Anti-Japanese
Mythologi神話化)

It is a well-known fact that the regime in North Korea was established by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union militarily occupied North Korea, recruited more than 500 Koreans from the Soviet Union to play a practical role in establishing the regime, and recruited Kim Il-sung from the 88th Brigade of the Soviet Army to serve as the supreme leader. In order to ensure that Kim Il-sung could maintain his regime stably, he supported and nurtured the partisans to grow into a dominant group.

The Soviet Union also used the anti-Japanese armed struggle as the justification for the new regime in order to establish the partisans as the dominant group. This series of Soviet plans and efforts became the root and backbone of today's North Korean system. In other words, the role played by the Soviet Union in the process of forming the North Korean system was decisive. However, although much information has been published about the role of the Soviet Union, there is still much research to be done on the role of the Soviet Union and its effects.

Due to the lack of research on the role of the Soviet Union, there is still some controversy about the characteristics of the North Korean system. For example, there is a view that the formation process of the North Korean system is viewed from the perspective of Sovietization, and on the other hand, there is a view that the formation of the North Korean system is viewed from the perspective of the development of Kim Il-sung's self-help revolution. Of course, the latter is the official position of the North Korean

authorities, but some studies in South Korea and Japan implicitly support it. For example, Haruki Wada's study[134] is a typical example of Kim Il-sung's theory of self-help revolutionary development. Haruki Wada based on the concept of the theory of the guerrilla state. The partisans, Kim Il-sung's faction, eliminated their rivals on their own. They have seized hegemony and formed a system according to their logic. This position supports Kim Il-sung's emphasis on the development of self-reliance revolution. This is because Kim Il-sung's partisans monopolized power and formed a system on their own. It is not enough to explain how Kim Il-sung was able to become the supreme leader of North Korea in his early days and how he was able to wield such a powerful influence after becoming supreme leader.

The Sovietized view of the formation of the North Korean regime interprets the process of establishing people's power in North Korea as a political process in accordance with the planned program of the Soviet Union. As for Kim Il-sung's seizure of power, the Sovietized view is that the Soviet Union supported Kim Il-sung and raised him to be the supreme leader of North Korea.

On the contrary, Kim Il-sung's theory of self-procrastination revolutionary development explains that the anti-Japanese armed struggle organized and led by Kim Il-sung was "a historical catastrophe that achieved the final victory of the liberation of the

[134] Haruki Wada, 『Kim Il Sung and the Manchurian Anti-Japanese War』.

country as the first national liberation war and revolutionary war," and furthermore, that the experience of the anti-Japanese armed struggle was the historical root of the establishment of the regime.[135] In other words, Kim Il-sung's view of the development of self-reliance revolution is that Kim Il-sung liberated North Korea and established the North Korean regime on the basis of the anti-Japanese armed struggle.

> North Korea's argument based on Kim Il-sung's theory of revolutionary development is that the Soviet Union took over North Korea

It is a distortion of history that denies the historical fact that a large number of Koreans living in the Soviet Union were mobilized to establish a pro-Soviet regime, but it is difficult to refute the claim that Kim Il-sung led the formation of the North Korean regime after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1948.

That is why there is a need for complementary research on the perspective of Sovietization. It is necessary to analyze the specific role that the Soviet Union played in the process of establishing the North Korean regime and why Kim Il-sung was able to seize the hegemony of the regime from the beginning of the regime and to maintain his leadership even after the withdrawal of the Soviet military government.

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[135] Kim Kwang-woon, A Study on North Korean Political History I: The History of the Founding Party, the Founding of the Nation, and the Founding of the Armed Forces 〔〕} (Seoul: Sunin, 2003), pp. 18～21.

In order for the Sovietization perspective to be more convincing, it is necessary to argue how the Soviets supported and carried out a planned program in order to nurture Kim Il-sung as the supreme leader and to make the partisans the dominant force.

This chapter states that the Soviet Union upheld Kim Il-sung as supreme leader and held his power to power.

In order to consolidate it, we will use the history of the anti-Japanese armed struggle as a basis for legitimacy, and in the same way, we will examine the process of nurturing the partisans as a ruling group.

1. Soviet occupation of North Korea and the formation of a pro-Soviet regime

With the defeat of the Japanese Empire, the Soviet troops that entered North Korea destroyed the North Korean region.

The establishment of a pro-Soviet regime by Vietization is attested to by official documents released by the Soviet Union. It can be said that the Soviet Union's securing of control over North Korea was a very important task in many aspects, such as expanding its control over Northeast Asia after World War II, securing floating ports, and containing the United States.

The fact that the Soviet Union established a pro-Soviet regime in North Korea is well documented by the testimonies of Soviet

Koreans who participated in the establishment of the North Korean regime at the time, the testimonies of Soviet officials at the time, and the recently released official Soviet documents.

The most important thing for the Soviets to establish a pro-Soviet regime in North Korea was to establish a political apparatus and to fill the top leadership and power elite with Soviet-supporters. However, unlike most Eastern European countries, the situation in North Korea, which could not rely on local communists to push for communism, had a significant impact on Soviet tactics. This was due to the fact that the communist movement on the Korean peninsula was very weak. The Communist Party of Korea, founded in 1925, was dissolved in 1928 by a special decision of the Comintern due to factional strife within the party. In addition, due to strict police control and severe repression, only a small number of Communists who carried out their activities illegally were active mainly in Seoul and the southern provinces, which were the more developed areas of the Korean Peninsula. As a result, the Soviet military administration faced a serious problem of cadre personnel from the beginning of the occupation of North Korea. In other words, there were few local communists in North Korea who could be entrusted with responsible positions.[136][137]

[136] Andrei Lankov, Contemporary Political History of North Korea from Soviet Sources (Oreum, 1995), p. 104~

[137] .

In the early stages, the Soviet military authorities do not seem to have abandoned the hope that they would be able to win over Cho Man-sik, who was the most popular politician in Pyongyang at the time, to their side. In the fall of 1945, Soviet officers met with Cho Man-sik, the leader of the nationalist movement, several times and asked him to head the old administrative apparatus, but negotiations were not easy. Therefore, the Soviet military administration, realizing that the alliance with the local nationalists could not succeed, gave priority to the Cho Man-sik. Nationalism was completely different from communism.

All of them.[138]

So the Soviets brought a large number of North Korean regime cadres from the Soviet Union.

C. It was drawn from among the Koreans living in the Soviet Union. The Koreans of the Soviet Union came to North Korea in three groups, the largest of which were those who entered North Korea with the Soviet Army as Soviet soldiers immediately after liberation, and the second group were selected through the Military Mobilization Department, a special agency that had jurisdiction over conscription from September to October 1945. They were 12 of them, including Heo He-yi, who were conscripted like soldiers and departed Tashkent, Uzbekistan on October 29, 1945 and sent to North Korea. It was placed under the jurisdiction of the Deputy

[138] Ibid., pp. 68～70.

Chief of Staff of the 25th Army. The third group is those who have been technicians or advisers to various sectors of government agencies since 1947.[139] The most prominent of the Soviet faction is Zhu Yi. He took a leadership role in North Korea as soon as he arrived in November 1945 and played a major role in the North Korean Communist Party, which had already begun to form at the end of 1945. He was also the first of the minority Koreans to directly participate in the creation of the state organs of the North Korean communist system.

In October 1955, when the Soviets were being purged, the Minister of Culture and Propaganda of North Korea

According to the testimony of Chung Sang-jin, who was a member of the past, there were [140]428 Korean cadres who went to North Korea from the Soviet Union, and they controlled North Korean affairs until they were purged in 1955~1956. They played a key role in various sectors of North Korea, holding the positions of vice ministers of various ministries and seizing real power. In other words, the actual situation of each ministry was made by Soviet-style Koreans. According to the testimony of the head of the summit, there were 20 people who were in charge of North Korean politics as the vice presidents of the awakening. Vice Chairman of the Party

[139] For a detailed analysis of the formation of the Soviet faction, see Chung Sang-jin (Minister of Culture and Propaganda of North Korea until October 1955, his name in North Korea is Jung Yul) interviewed on May 3~10, 2004; Interview again on October 13~14, 2006.

[140] Interview with Jung Sang-jin, (May 3~10, 2004).

Central Committee, They are said to be Minister of Culture Tae Seong-so, Vice President of the Army and Army Ki Seok-bok, Vice Minister of Propaganda Sang Sang-jin, Vice President of the Supreme Court Kim Bong-chul, Minister of Forestry Yong-seok, Vice Minister of Internal Affairs Bang Hak-se, Foreign Minister Park Dong-choo, Vice Minister of Justice Kim Taek-young, Secretary of Russia Moon Ye-ri (Moon Il), Vice Minister of Transportation Pak Eui-wang, and Principal of a High-Class Party School Kim Seung-wan. Among them, he was murdered by Kim Il-sung in 1953 in a way that faked suicide.

Each military unit also had Soviet advisers. All of them were in charge of the Kim Il-sung family, but the actual situation was the Soviets. At that time, the military officials were Choi Yong-geon, Choi Hyun, and Kim Chae-chung, who had been active in partisanship for a long time, and most of them were uneducated and ignorant. According to Jung Sang-jin's testimony, Choi Hyun is a person who "does not even know who is a traitor."[141]

By and large, Soviet Koreans were not appointed heads of various institutions. The reason for this was that they feared that it would provoke discontent with Soviet rule. They were usually the 'second-in-command,' but because they were in power, they were not hindered from controlling or directing the activities of the

[141] Interview with Park Chang-wook (Korean-Chinese who volunteered for the North Korean army during the Korean War), (February 2004).

organization. In 1950, only three of the North Korean government ministers were held by Soviets, but six were vice presidents.[142]

The Soviets were the practitioners who eventually created the regime and system in North Korea. According to Chung Choo'[143]s testimony, the people who brought the Soviet dictatorship to North Korea were the Soryan Koreans. It is said that the products of the Soviet system, such as the Soviet ideological system, were copied as they were. In particular, it is said that those who knew that Stalin's dictatorship was frightening in the Soviet Union established the dictatorship in North Korea. They testified that it was meaningful to create the North Korean state, but it was a sin to create a dictatorship. The cadres sent from the Soviet Union were suppressed by Stalin by the Korean revolutionaries of the Far East. They went to North Korea knowing that they had been shot and executed. They were dissatisfied with the Stalinist system, though they could not express it in words because they had experienced Stalin's repressive policies. For example, in the case of Chung Jin, communism was a utopia until 1937, when he was forcibly relocated to Central Asia. But after his father was executed by the

[142] Normal testimony; Andrei Lankov, A Modern Political History of North Korea from Soviet Sources, p. 150.

[143] Testimony of Jung Chu (a student at the Russian University in North Korea, a member of the Literary and Artistic Composers' League, who gave up his return to Korea in 1956 due to criticism of Kim Il-sung's personality cult while studying in Moscow).

Stalinist regime in 1937, he changed his mind. It is said that when the Stalin regime shot his father, it was the same as the Communist ideology in his own country. The deportees cannot support the Soviet Union. They were given three days to get into the car with only what they could get their hands on, and they traveled to Central Asia for a month, and many people died along the way. Among them, the leading Koryo were taken away by the security organs and all were reportedly executed.[144]It is ironic that the Koreans, who had such a terrible experience under Stalin, were sent to North Korea to serve in the Stalin regime. They were once again "forcibly displaced" by the Stalinist regime.

2. The Soviet Union's Establishment of Kim Il-sung

It was confirmed that the intention of the Soviet occupation of North Korea was the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime.

As such, it is easy to understand that the Soviet Union would have selected and nurtured Kim Il-sung as the leader of the pro-Soviet regime. Let's take a look at Kim Il-sung's selection and establishment process, as well as his development as the supreme leader.

[144] Interview with Jung Sang-jin, (October 2006).

A. Kim Il-sung's Establishment Process

Suh Dae-sook claimed that the Soviet occupation authorities had Sovietized North Korea and insisted that Kim Il-sung's seizure of power was the result of the decision and sponsorship of the Soviet Union, which is [145] consistent with the testimony of a Soviet military official at the time as reported by the JoongAng Ilbo Special Reporter. Scalapino and Lee Jong-sik also assume that the Soviets would have had the final say in North Korea, and argue that Kim Il-sung was more of a "puppet" of a foreign power than any other leader at the time. The Soviet governing body of North Korea pointed out that it was only transferred from the military headquarters to the Soviet embassy after the establishment of the North Korean regime.[146] These previous studies are confirmed by new data.

At first, the Soviet command had no choice but to take into account the minimal influence of the Communists in North Korea at that time. Therefore, since he could not completely ignore Cho Man-sik and other nationalist leaders, he tried to cooperate with them, believing that it would be desirable to use their authority. Apart from the alliance with Cho Man-sik, the Soviets were looking for a

[145] Seo Dae-sook, 「History of the Korean Communist Movement」.

[146] Robert Scalapino·Chong-Sik Lee, *Communism in Korea, Part I: The Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 317～318, pp. 381～382.

pro-Soviet leader to act as a minion of the Soviet Union from an early age, and Kim Il-sung was finally selected. It seems that there was a contest with Pak Hun-yong in deciding on Kim Il-sung. There were two systems of Soviet rule in North Korea: the 25th Corps and the KGB system. It is said that the 25th Corps supported Kim Il-sung, and the security organs supported Pak Hun-yong. However, Stalin is said to have chosen Kim Il Sung. Since North Korea was already under the control of the Soviet Union, he saw the person who had a good control of South Korea as Pak Hun-yong, and instructed Pak Hun-yong to entrust South Korea to Kim Il-sung and North Korea to Kim Il-sung.

All of them.[147]

> Scalapino and Lee Jung-sik are the factional fights of the Soviet Union and the Korean communist movement.

Because of this, the veteran Communists say they may have decided not to consider him as a candidate for North Korea's supreme leader. On the other hand, Kim Il-sung not only did not participate in the factional struggles of the communists in the past, but also had experience in the anti-Japanese struggle and had the opportunity to receive political education and evaluation in the Soviet Union for more than four years, which was a big plus. It is highly likely that the Soviet leadership evaluated Kim Il-sung, who had been guided and trained in the Soviet Union for four years, as capable of

[147] Interview with Jung Sang-jin, (October 2006).

leadership and trustworthy. Scalapino and Lee Jung-sik judged that Kim Il-sung would submit to Soviet control more easily than anyone else, which influenced the Soviet Union's final decision. He reasoned that he would.[148]In fact, the verdict against Kim Il-sung had been made early on. Kim Il-sung

There is testimony that he was selected by the Soviet authorities as the new leader of North Korea just before he entered North Korea from the 88th Brigade. The fact that Kim Il-sung was personally selected by the Soviet authorities as the new leader of North Korea in the 88th Brigade is very important for understanding the characteristics of the North Korean system. If Kim Il-sung was personally selected by Stalin and was supported by Stalin and the Soviet Union in the process of seizing power and forming the regime, then Kim Il-sung and the formation of the North Korean system can be assessed as having been greatly influenced by the Soviet Union.

Direct to the fact that Kim Il Sung was nominated by Stalin

This evidence was confirmed by the testimony of the person concerned at the time. Former Deputy Director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Ivan Ivanovich Kobanenko (72 years old at the time of the 1993 interview, living in Moscow), who was adjutant to Marshal Vasilevsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Far Eastern

[148] Scalapino-Lee, Communist in Korea, part 1, p. 325.

Army at the time, testified for the first time about Kim Il-sung's selection and affection. According to him, on August 24, 1945, the Soviet Union, which had won the war against Japan, was struggling with the selection of a candidate for the leadership of the Central Committee for the early settlement of the Sovietization of North Korea. In early September 1945, Marshal Vasiliev, Commander-in-Chief of the Far Eastern Army, ordered Captain Kim Il-sung of the 88th Reconnaissance Brigade recommended by the Far Eastern Army to be sent to Moscow. It is said that after receiving an urgent order, Kim Il-sung was sent from Khabarovsk to Moscow by a special Soviet transport plane.[173]

Commander Balsilevsky, who had received Stalin's instructions to send Kim Il Sung to Moscow, placed a transport plane on standby at a military airfield near Khabarovsk and summoned Captain Kim Il Sung of the 88th Reconnaissance Brigade.

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[173] JoongAng Ilbo Special Reporting Group, 「Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 」, (Seoul: JoongAng Ilbo, 1993), p. 202.

It is said that two agents of the KGB's Far Eastern Headquarters were directed to Moscow, and the meeting between Stalin and Kim Il Sung lasted for four hours, including a meal. After the meeting, Stalin proposed Kim Il-sung as a candidate for the supreme

leadership of North Korean politics and instructed the Soviet army to actively support him.[149]

Soviet documents as well as testimonies of Soviet officials at the time confirm that Stalin interviewed Kim Il-sung. It is said that between late August and early September 1945, when the Soviet Army established its headquarters in Pyongyang, Stalin instructed Marshal Aleksander Vasilyevsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Far Eastern Army, to "recommend a Korean leader who would lead North Korea in accordance with the will of the Soviet Union," and the Soviet Far East Army examined Kim Il-sung, and the Russian Ministry of Defense still has a record of the examination. This is a part of the transcript of the conversation between the Soviet Far East Army officials and Kim Il-sung.

> "Do you want to continue serving in the Red Army?"
> "Yes, it is."
> "What if I suggest you go to work in North Korea?" "I am always ready to work wherever I can help in the task of the world revolution."
> "A very good answer."

As a result of the examination, the General Headquarters of the Soviet Far Eastern Army recommended Kim Il Sung to Stalin I did. The recommendation reads: "Steadily receiving education on Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. Mentally well-equipped." After

[149] Ibid., pp. 202～204.

receiving the recommendation, Beria rated it "good" and reported back to Stalin.

According to the recollections of Reserve Colonel Grigory Mecler, who was the head of the intelligence and political operations department of the General Headquarters of the Soviet Far Eastern Army, Stalin summoned Kim Il-sung to Moscow for a private interview immediately after reading Beria's report. In response, Kim Il-sung uttered "Yes, yes" with an expression of impernation, and Stalin was satisfied.[150]

It can be inferred that the meeting between Stalin and Kim Il-sung at that time did not presuppose that Kim Il-sung was the supreme leader of North Korea. It is possible that he was vaguely selected as one of the top leaders of North Korea. However, it will not be necessary for the supreme leader of the Soviet Union to personally interview a person who is not assumed to be the supreme leader of North Korea. In addition, the introduction of Kim Il-sung as a national hero and a famous partisan leader at a rally in Pyongyang on October 14, just 25 days after Kim Il-sung entered North Korea on September 19, meant that he had already been appointed as the supreme leader.

Also, in the eighth volume of Kim Il-sung's memoirs "With the Century", Kim Il-sung said that the mosque

[150] The Dong-A Ilbo, "Revisiting the Five-Year History of Independence 5: Kim Il-sung Was Examined by the Soviet Army," September 12, 2004.

The fact of his visit to the bar is stated:

> One day before the campaign against Japan, I went to the mosque with the Allied commanders. When I went to the meeting convened by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, I saw that all the responsible officials of the front commands involved in the war against Japan, including Meretskov and Stikovrul, were already there. I met Commander-in-Chief Waselevsky there. We supported the Fatherland Liberation Operation Plan based on our Air and Amphibious Warfare Act. …
>
> During our stay in Moscow, we visited Lenin's Mausoleum and visited the Museum of History. We also visited these monuments related to the defense of Moscow and watched the movie Chabayev again. A few days later they took us to Zhudanov. At that time, Zhudanov was a member of the Politburo Committee and secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Zhudanov said that he would meet with envoys from the East on the commission of Stalin and praised the anti-Japanese armed struggle that we had been conducting. He said that he had heard a lot about the Korean partisan Kim Il Sung through Stalin and Stikov, and that he was glad that he looked much younger than he had heard. What he meant was that Stalin had a different interest in this activity.[151]

Before Kim Il Sung entered North Korea on September 19, 1945, Stalin

[151] Kim Il Sung, With the Century 8 volumes, pp. 450～451.

It was confirmed to be true. On October 14, 1945, at a rally in Pyongyang, the Soviet military government officially named Kim Il-sung as the leader of North Korea.

> Kim Il Sung returned to Vladivostok and commanded the 1st Battalion of the 88th International Brigade

He returned home on September 19 aboard the Soviet warship Pugachev, and arrived in Pyongyang by train on September 22. The 25th Army under the Soviet Far Eastern Army arrived in Wonsan on September 19, 24 days after the establishment of the garrison headquarters in Pyongyang on August 26, 1945.[152]

> According to Kobanenko's testimony, Kim Il-sung was killed by the Soviet military government in North Korea

Above all, he was able to be selected as the supreme leader of the anti-Japanese struggle.

It is said that it is probably because of the popularity that is widely known to the people as "Kim Il Sung General." Pak Hun-yong also made a note of his remarks acknowledging Kim Il-sung's popularity at the time. It is said that the Soviet Union made the most of his "reputation" and put the Party (the responsible secretary of the North Korean Branch of the Communist Party of Korea) and the

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[152] At this time, the person who greeted Kim Il-sung and his party at the port of Wonsan was Chung Sang-jin, who was a special sergeant of the Marine Corps of the Soviet Army at the time and later became the Minister of Culture and Propaganda. When asked to shake hands with Kim Il-sung, he reportedly introduced himself as "Kim Sung-joo." It is said that the summit staff returned to the headquarters and reported that there was no Kim Il-sung in the group. (Testimony of Jung Jin)

executive power (Chairman of the People's Committee of the North Korean Municipal People's Committee) in his hands and pushed for "democratic reform."[153]

> There were also difficulties in Kim Il-sung's process of coming to power. A big force like Park Heon-young

Because there was. In the early days of the regime, the two leaders, Pak Hun-yong and Kim Il-sung, showed a big difference in the leadership of the two leaders, such as the leadership line. Compared to Kim Il-sung, who smoothly took control of North Korea with the support of the Soviet military, Pak Hun-yong fought a difficult battle in South Korea, but the Communist Party's flow gradually began to flow in the north.

> Kobanenko, who was adjutant to the Soviet Far Eastern Military Command at the time, said, "Kim Il Sung

Pak Hun-yong, who had accumulated a lot of grievances, exploded his discontent in a letter he wrote to Stalin in May 1946, when the First Communist Party was dissolved," and "this letter had an unexpected effect, and it developed into an opportunity for Pak Hun-yong to meet Stalin with Kim Il-sung for the first time."

> In May 1946, the KGB Far East Headquarters came to the commander with a letter from Pak Hun-yong. At that time, the General Headquarters of the Far Eastern Bloc was disbanded and replaced with the Far Eastern Military District, and the

[153] JoongAng Ilbo Special Reporter, ? Question: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, pp. 298～299.

commander was replaced by Marshal Marinowski. The long letter in Soviet language criticized Kim Il-sung in a colorful way, saying that he had a lot of dictatorships, ignoring the domestic communists who had fought underground against Japan during the Japanese imperialist era, and that he was unilaterally advocating policies that were not in line with the reality of South Korea while walking an independent line while ignoring the Central Party, and that he was dividing the party by excluding party members who followed him (Pak Hun-yong). The letter also sharply criticized the Soviet military government, saying that the leadership of the Soviet military government had neglected him as the leader of the Party and was unilaterally actively cooperating with Kim Il-sung, thus undermining the Party's authority and hindering the revolutionary work. After much deliberation, the Commander-in-Chief ordered that the final judgment be sent to the Moscow Party Central Committee for Marshal Stalin to decide. I was told that the Central Party had been troubled by this letter from the KGB for a while. Eventually, Pak's letter was reported to Stalin. Stalin read this letter and strongly instructed the KGB headquarters to instruct the 25th Army in Pyongyang and Kim Il-sung's camp to immediately rectify the merits of Pak's claims. Stalin's instructions did not stop there. When I heard rumors about the "Pak Hun-yong Leadership Theory," which was strongly advocated by some in the city, I received an unexpected instruction: "I will personally meet Pak and Kim, and call them to Moscow." Writing in Russian, Pak's letter was sent to the KGB's Far Eastern Headquarters in Khabarovsk through Shav Shin (KGB), then Vice Consul General of the Soviet Consulate General in Seoul.[154]

[154] Ibid., pp. 210～212.

Lebezhev (died May 1992), who was the political commander of the Soviet military government at the time,

According to the JoongAng Ilbo, in July 1946, Stalin interviewed Kim Il-sung and Pak Hun-yong and finally chose Kim Il-sung as the supreme leader of North Korea.[155] Stalin's sudden interview with the two men can be seen as Stalin's interview with Kim Il-sung twice, according to the testimony of Kobanenko, who was the adjutant to the Commander-in-Chief at the time, and the testimony of Lebedev, the political commander of the Soviet military government at the time. From the testimonies of these relevant figures, it can be seen that Kim Il-sung did not become the supreme leader of North Korea on his own, but was chosen by Stalin of the Soviet Union to be the supreme leader of the Soviet Union and was created by the Soviet military government. Under the tutelage of the Soviet Army, he was selected as the leader of Stalin's policy.[156]

B. Promotion of personality cult against Kim Il-sung in the Soviet Union

North Korea was founded by the Soviet Union and ruled for a time by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's policy directives were translated into Korean and notified to Kim Il-sung, who carried out

[155] Ibid., pp. 211～212.

[156] For more detailed testimonies, see ПiЗЃEx: Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

the policy accordingly. In addition, Kim Il-sung had to write a report in Russian and obtain Russia's approval. North Korea's politics in this era has been evaluated as "rule by interpretation."[157]

By the way, the Soviet Union supported Kim Il-sung as the supreme leader of the pro-Soviet regime

In order to solidify Kim Il-sung's power, he promoted a cult of personality against Kim Il-sung, like Stalin. Even though Kim Il-sung could not do much autonomously from the Soviet Union, he promoted a cult of personality against Kim Il-sung. Since he became chairman of the Provisional People's Committee of North Korea in February 1946, the Soviet Union has highlighted Kim Il-sung as "Kim Il-sung, the hero of the Korean people." When the government was formed in September 1948, he was referred to as "Leader." Suryeong means leader. And the Soviet Union conferred the title of "Marshal" on the 40th anniversary of his birthday in 1952, during the war. The full-fledged personality cult of Kim Il-sung began when he was given the title of marshal during the war. High-ranking officials said, "Comrade Kim Il Sung is an enemy. Shouldn't he be given a title?" and was given the title of marshal with Stalin's support. It is said that at this time, the personality cult of Kim Il-sung began in earnest.[158] Kim Il-sung's personality cult was promoted in earnest during the war in order to mobilize loyalty

[157] Lim Eun, The Secretariat of the Kim Il-sung Dynasty of North Korea (Seoul: Korea Yangseo, 1982).
[158] Interview with Jung Sang-jin, (October 2006).

during the Korean War. In particular, Kim Il-sung's 40th birthday, April 15, 1952, was a turning point. Kim Il-sung was worshipped by the party and state organs in almost the same way as Stalin. On April 15, 1952, in the Rodong Sinmun, Pak Chung-ae wrote:

> Comrade Kim Il Sung possessed all these noble qualities and characteristics: an accurate grasp of the historical tasks of the Korean working class and the laws of the historical development of society, a keen awareness of the environment and conditions of the revolution, revolutionary bravery, sensitivity to the new, boundless love and trust in the people, inseparable connection with the masses, burning hatred and hostility towards the enemy, and far-sightedness.[159]

The personality cult of Kim Il-sung was led by the Soviet Union. Stalin

As a way of dominating Eastern Europe and North Korea as satellite states, it sent its own leaders to seize power and implanted and promoted a Soviet-style cult of personality so that the status of its leaders would not be shaken. Kim Il-sung was one of those satellite leaders.

Just as Kim Il-sung became the supreme leader of North Korea by the Soviet Union's plan, the practice of personality cult in North Korea was implanted by the Soviet Union. Stalin not only promoted a personality cult of himself in the Soviet Union, but also spread a personality cult of the supreme leader in other socialist countries.

[159] Rodong Sinmun, April 15, 1952.

The Soviet Union created a ladder of personality cult within the socialist sphere in order to achieve Moscow's control within the communist bloc. In other words, Starlin, who sat at the top of the ladder of personality cult within the Communist bloc, ruled over the dictators of the satellite states who sat on the low steps. And these satellite dictators, relying on Stalin's unparalleled power and confidence, took the top of the ladder of personality cult in the country and ruled over the people.

After World War II, it became an incurable endemic disease in all the Stalinist regimes of the world.[160]

The most important evidence that the Soviet Union led the personality cult of Kim Il-sung is the Soviet control of the North Korean media and its media propaganda. Lebezhev, who served as the political commander of the 25th Army of the Soviet Army in North Korea, testified in detail about the media policy toward North Korea during the Soviet military administration.[161] According to his testimony, in the Primorsky Military District of the Soviet Army, the Political Bureau No. 7, which was in charge of analyzing the situation in the East, trained officers who spoke Korean, Chinese, and Japanese, and later came to North Korea and were in charge of

[160] For more information on the cult of personality in the Soviet Union, see Park Hyung-joong, A Study of the North Korean Phenomenon (Seoul: Research History, 1994), pp. See 247～263.

[161] JoongAng Ilbo Special Reporter, □ Only: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Volume, pp. 48～57.

the media. As soon as the Soviet military government entered North Korea, it took over all the facilities and offices of the Pyongyang Daily Newspaper, which was the most equipped in Pyongyang, and organized a Soviet military newspaper to publish the newspaper in Korean. The North Korean media had to operate only within the limits set by the Soviet military government. The limit is the goal set by the Soviet military government, and it is said to be the mid- to long-term goal of "Sovietization of North Korea." The media under the Soviet military government are directly controlled, guitar

The media was said to have been indirectly controlled by means of censorship.

It is said that there were two criteria for control. The first was propaganda about the "great Red Army that liberated Korea," and the second was to highlight Kim Il-sung as a political leader. It is said that it was an urgent task of the Soviet military government to make Kim Il-sung a national hero against Japan, and the Soviet military government used all the media as far as possible to imply to the people that Kim Il-sung was the one who had the absolute support of the Soviet military government and that he was the one who would become its future leader. It is said that there was almost no mention of domestic factions or volunteers. It is said that the TV station made sure to play "General Kim Il-sung's Tune" at the beginning and end of the broadcast.[162]

It is said that the idolization of Kim Il-sung was initiated by the Soviets at the behest of the Soviet Union.[188] It is said that after the Soviet military administration and the military government, the Soviet embassy always reminded the Soviets of this task. At that time, when the Soviets went to the Soviet ambassador's residence, they were instructed to serve Kim Il-sung well.

Therefore, it is said that no one who came out of the Soviet Union could insult Kim Il-sung or covet Kim Il-sung's position. This is

[162] Ibid., pp. 58～63.
Interview with Jung Sang-jin, (October 2006).

because those who came out of the Soviet Union realized that loyalty to Kim Il-sung was their basic duty. According to the Korean way of thinking at that time, Kim Il-sung was like a young child, so it was difficult to call him the leader, but he had to be called that. However, around 1948~1949, Kim Il-sung's body gained weight, so much so that when he sat down, he had two necks. It is said that it looks like the royal character is carved in the middle of the neck. The Soviets gave the same testimony.[189] According to the testimony of the Scholar

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It is said that the Soviets gave Kim Il-sung a personality cult. Pak Chang-ok, head of the Propaganda Department, Pak Chung-ae, secretary, and Pak Yong-bin, head of the Organization Department, are said to have flattered Kim Il-sung in a mutually competitive manner. They believe that they received compensation for flattery from Kim Il Sung. People who came out of the Soviet Union lived a luxurious life that could not be compared with North Koreans, which is similar to the difference between the lives of Koreans and local Koreans in Tashkent today. The main content of the cult of personality was about partisan activities, but it is said that he continued to write a series of articles about the history of Kim Il-sung in the Rodong Sinmun, and he expanded and deepened it day by day. It is said that he made him look like he was prepared from an early age. These details were not made by the Soviet government,

but were led by Soviets who worked mainly in the propaganda department. It is said that the Soviets had business experience and knew the direction of propaganda well. Jang Hak-bong himself testified that he did a lot of such propaganda during his three years as the principal of the Political Military Academy. He is said to have assisted and helped Kim Il-sung and promoted him to raise his honor and prestige so that he could unite South Korea and become the leader of all Korea.

3. Cultivating Soviet partisans and mythologizing the anti-Japanese armed struggle

A. Training for partisans

When Kim Il-sung's partisans arrived at the port of Wonsan in September 1945, they were accompanied by a total of 72 men from the 88th Brigade.[190] from the 88th Brigade at the time

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[189] Jang Hak-bong (Principal of Kim Chaek Military Academy, Soviet Returning to the Soviet Union in 1958, Tashkent

Interview, (June 29, 2005). [190]
Interview with Jung Jin, (October
2006).

The Chisanfa was, in fact, insignificant. In addition, Kim Il-sung was not highly educated compared to other communists and was not

Interview with Jung Sang-jin, (October 2006).

widely known to the public because he was active abroad. It was also the smallest group among the four major factions in the early days of the North Korean regime.

However, the reason why they were eventually able to eliminate the other factions and survive as the only force was because they were nurtured as the dominant group under the auspices of the Soviet military government from the beginning. The Soviet Union fostered partisans as the ruling group, first of all, in order to secure the basis of Kim Il-sung's political power. This is because the partisans must become the mainstream group in order for Kim Il-sung's power to be secured. In order to cultivate the partisans as a mainstream ruling group, they were given high-ranking positions in the North Korean government. From the very beginning, immediately after liberation, the highest echelons were partisans. The rise of each ministry was held by the Soviets, who dominated the affairs and played the actual role, but most of the ministerial positions were occupied by partisans. In other words, the partisans It was made to play the role of a symbolic subject of the regime. The cause of the USSR was the principle of establishing a man who really fought against Japan. Therefore, partisans such as Choi Yong-geon, Kim Chae-chung, Oh Jin-woo, Kang Geon, and Choi Hyun occupied positions of power and importance. In the military, too, they were mostly partisan midwives. The partisans were the masters from the beginning, the Soviets provided practical support, and the coastal factions supplemented them. A considerable number of coastal

factions also occupied high positions, but as a rule, the main positions were given to partisans. Domestic factions were also not moderated. This was because there were many domestic converts, many who had quit the communist movement, and did not participate in the revolution.[191]

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[191] Interview with Jung Sang-jin, (October 2006).

B. Mythologization of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle

The Soviet Union, for the sake of Kim Il-sung's personality cult, fought against the Japanese armed forces from the beginning of the regime

It was touted as a justification for Kim Il-sung. The Soviet Union used the partisans' armed struggle against Japan as a basis for the legitimacy of the Kim Il-sung regime. Kim Il-sung emerged as a well-known hero of the anti-Japanese armed struggle, and his conflict with Japan was explained as the reason for Kim Il-sung's appointment as supreme leader. In other words, the Soviet Union made it seem as if there was a link between the North Korean regime and the anti-Japanese struggle. It was propaganda as if Kim Il-sung had liberated North Korea through the anti-Japanese general struggle. The Soviet Union supported Kim Il-sung as the supreme leader and found the cause in the anti-Japanese armed struggle. Under the coalition government in which the four major

factions competed, the Soviet Union used the anti-Japanese armed struggle as a strategy to support Kim Il-sung.[163]

> The program of the North Korean regime ordered by Stalin is also to establish an anti-Japanese regime.

was. It was on September 20, 1945, that Stalin, in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the Soviet Armed Forces, issued a directive to the Soviet occupation command containing specific instructions on North Korea policy. Stalin instructed North Korea not to adopt the Soviet system, but instead instructed "to establish a bourgeois-democratic regime in North Korea on the basis of a broad alliance of anti-Japanese and democratic parties and organizations." [164] There is also the intention of a united front tactic with the South Korean region, but it is because the North is not yet in a position to carry the communist flag in the region.

The anti-Japanese characteristics of the North Korean regime were also heavily used to propagandize the legitimacy of the North Korean system. For example, it is said that Kim Il-sung criticized Kim Il-sung during the anti-Japanese struggle and said that you worshiped the emperor while studying, and that you had no right to speak. Hong Myung-hui went to North Korea in 1948 and said, "I came to South Korea because I didn't want to see the pro-Japanese

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[163] Interview with Jung Sang-jin, (October 2006)

[164] Reprinted in Kim Sung-bo, The Origin and Development of the Economic Structure of North and South Korea (Seoul: History and Criticism, 2000), p. 119.

elements playing the game, and there are people in South Korea who have no merit sitting in important positions," and claimed that Rhee Seung-man studied comfortably in the United States after losing his country, but Kim Il-sung fought in Manchuria for the 20th Star Award. The purge of remnants of Japanese imperialism in North Korea was the regime's justification logic. It is said that this was the instruction of the Soviet Union, and this moved the hearts of the people.

In order to use the anti-Japanese armed struggle as the ruling ideology, excavation of materials related to the anti-Japanese armed struggle began in Yanbian, China, from the beginning of the regime. From 1948 onwards he began to investigate the achievements of the partisan struggle. At that time, the main theme of North Korea's cultural propaganda was to reaffirm the greatness of Kim Il-sung and to highlight his great leadership in the partisan struggle.[165]

4. Kim Il-sung's Purge of the Soviets and the Mythologization of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle

> The Soviet Union and the Soviet faction, through this cult of personality, firmly established Kim Il Sung.

[165] Interview with Jung Sang-jin, (October 2006).
Interview with Jung Sang-jin, (October 2006).

Although he made him the supreme leader, Kim Il-sung is said to have had a strong sense of check on the Soviet faction.[195] So Kim Il Sung came to power early on

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It appears that he had a plan to purge the rival Soviet tycoons. In November 1951, Kim Il-sung stripped Cho Yong-yi of his position as first secretary of the Central Committee, citing the issue of censorship of party members who remained in the U.S.-occupied territories during the retreat of North Korean troops. By removing the Soviets, the Soviets began the first purge to eliminate the Soviets. The Soviet Union had nurtured him since 1945, but Kim Il-sung launched a counterattack after six years.

> The Soviets lost enough power that Kim Il-sung was able to eliminate the Soviets.

It started with the Korean War. The Soviet Union's passive participation in the Korean War and China's active participation in the Korean War were the other causes, and the Soviet Union's internal power struggle began to weaken after Stalin's death in 1953.[166] Kim Il-sung began his actions in earnest in October 1955 in response to the purge of the Soviet Union. It is said that on October 23, 1955, Kim Il-sung summoned to his office the members of the five-member Soviet group, Vice Premier Pak Chang-ok, Pak

[166] Andrei Lankov, A History of Modern North Korean Politics from Soviet Sources, p. 157.

Yong-bin, head of the Organization Department, Ki Seok-bok, vice president of the Army Corps, Counselor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Chung Yul, vice minister of the Ministry of Culture and Propaganda, Chung Yul and criticized their misdeeds. Regarding the rise of Jung Yul (Jang Sang-jin), (1) the four generations, that is, the fact that he rejected his own culture and praised foreign culture, (2) that he protected reactionary writers such as Lee Tae-joon, Kim Soon-nam, and Lim Ha-ryong and became close friends, (3) It is said that he pointed out and criticized the disturbance of his private life. Under these three conditions, Jung Yul was removed from his current position and relegated to the position of director of the library of the Academy of Sciences. It is said that during this meeting, Kim Il-sung intensively criticized Pak Chang-ok. In this way, Kim Il-sung wanted to eliminate the Soviets first, but an unexpected event occurred. In August 1956, the Yan faction staged a sectarian incident that sought to topple Kim Il-sung. However, the Yanyan faction's prayers were defeated, and the decisive reason was that the Yanyan faction had hoped for the Soviet Union's policy of criticizing the cult of personality and asked the Soviet embassy for support, but the Soviet embassy offered prayers to Kim Il-sung. Kim Il-sung's partisans counterattacked the coastal faction at the August plenary meeting and succeeded in purging them.[167] In this

[167] Interview with Jung Sang-jin, (October 2006).

Interview with Jung Sang-jin, (October 2006).

way, Kim Il-sung was able to eliminate the coastal faction first, and after the coastal faction was purged first, only the Soviets remained, making it easier for the Soviets to be purged.[168]

When this happened, 13 Soviets met and held a meeting. It is said that they agreed to go to the Soviet Union because it was obvious that they would die if they stayed here. They petitioned to return to the Soviet Union, and when Kim Il-sung ratified it, they returned to the Soviet Union safely. It is said that the summit team came to the Soviet Union in October 1957. However, it is said that all those who did not come to the Soviet Union at that time were caught and killed. The summit is said to have a list of 48 people who were shot. Forty-eight Soviets were shot, and the police never responded. There was never any consideration of the Soviet government.[199]

> The attitude of the Soviets to the purge of the Soviets is difficult to understand.

I was a bystander. When he was murdered in July 1953, the Soviets did nothing. The Soviet Union did not take any protective measures against its own citizens. Even if Khrushchev just said a word, it wouldn't be

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[168] Interview with Jung Sang-jin, (October 2006).

Khrushchev, conscious of China, declared non-interference in other countries. It is important to take control of North Korea, but it is not worth protecting the Soviet citizens in North Korea at the expense of relations with China.
It seems to have done.[169]

After the purge of the coastal faction and the Soviets, Kim Il-sung's partisans remained the sole power. Now, North Korea has been a system dominated by partisan hegemony for more than 50 years, and the anti-Japanese armed struggle has become the main ruling ideology. According to the top officials, in 1959, shortly after they returned to the Soviet Union, the slogan "Production, anti-humidity, anti-Japanese oil" began to be raised. The next chapter examines the process by which the history of the anti-Japanese armed struggle was mythologized.

[169] Kim Moon-wook (After graduating from Kim Chaek University of Technology, North Korea, he worked as an engineer in the technical acting room of the Nampo smelter in North Korea, was arrested as a political prisoner in January 1964 and defected to North Korea, dean of the Department of Far Eastern Studies at the National University of Oriental Studies in Tashkent, retired in December 2004) Testimony.
Interview with Jung Sang-jin, (October 2006).

Chapter

Appearing in the history books of each era of Nort
Mythologizing Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese arm
cours

1. Background and Characteristics of Publication of Historical Books

This section analyzes North Korea's first history book, The History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle, to the last published History, the History of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle. It can be seen that each historical book uses the history of Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against Japan as the subject of a personality cult, but interprets the history in terms of Marxism-Leninism, which was the ruling ideology of each era, or interprets history in terms of the newly created ruling ideology of Juche, or in order to justify Kim Chong-il's inheritance of power.

A. History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle (1949)

Immediately after liberation, North Korea established a 25-member committee for the compilation of Korean history within the Provisional Committee of North Korea on February 7, 1947, and on October 2, 1948, through a decision of the Fourth Cabinet Meeting, it was decided to compile the Recent History and the History of the Korean Synonym by 1949, thus compiling the history of the national movement during the Japanese period. At that time, North Korea was dominated by the Kim Il-sung line, while the Kim Il-sung line was dominated by the coastal elite who were at a certain distance from the Kim Il-sung line, such as Choe Chang-ik, Yi Chung-won, and Paik

Nam-un, so there were bound to be certain differences in the two sides' positions on the history of the national liberation struggle.

In October 1949, the Historical Compilation Committee published "History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle" under the leadership of Choi Chang-ik, but this book has been the subject of severe criticism since the late 1950s, when Choi Chang-ik [170] was singled out as the leader of the so-called August Sect Incident.

This was it. 201

Although the section on Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese armed struggle was written by Choi Chang-ik, the creation of the "leader Kim Il-sung" and the cult of personality actually began at this time. This is because the Soviet Union chose the anti-Japanese armed struggle as its state ideology at the beginning of its regime.

The "History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle" contains many idolizing Kim Il-sung and conceals facts that hinder the idolization of Kim Il-sung and distorts many facts. At this time, North Korea had already called Kim Il-sung a hero of the Korean nation, and it wrote, "Under the leadership of General Kim Il-sung, the hero of the

[170] The book was written by Nam Woon Paik, Sihyung Park, Munhwa Yoo, Dooyong Kim, Kwangjin Kim, Kyungyeon Kim, Seunghwa Kim, Changik Choi, and Sabsini. Choi Chang-ik wrote the sections on the history of the national movement in the Japanese period in Chapter 5, The Proletarian Class Movement, and Chapter 6, The Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle in the Process of Japan's Great Invasion of Japan.

Korean nation, we have witnessed the development of a valiant anti-Japanese armed struggle in Manchuria[171] ."

> The anti-Japanese armed struggle of the coastal faction in the province is completely different from Kim Il-sung's troops in Manchuria.

Despite the fact that the history unfolded irrelevantly, Choe Chang-ik, a coastal faction, humbled himself and distorted history by idolizing Kim Il-sung, and the achievements of the coastal faction in China are also described as Kim Il-sung's achievements. In other words, he wrote, "Encouraged by the brilliant success of the anti-Japanese armed struggle of Kim Il-sung's partisan units in Manchuria, the Korean youth in China also rose up in a powerful anti-Japanese struggle."[172]

> The "History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle" is noteworthy in that it is a historical account before it was distorted into a new ideology such as North Korea's anti-Japanese armed struggle and the Juche idea. In the 1949 edition, the word Juche ideology does not appear even a word, and it is referred to as "Kim Il Sung's partisan unit" or "Kim Il Sung's armed guerrilla unit." There is no mention of the "Korean People's Revolutionary Army," but there is no mention of being a member of the Communist Party's Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army. It is unusual that

[171] Historical Compilation Committee, 『History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle, (Pyongyang: Historical Compilation Committee, 1949), p. 409.

[172] Ibid., p. 402.

the armed guerrilla unit was claimed to have been created in 1931. Later history books describe the creation of the first armed unit in April 1932.

It is noteworthy that Kim Il-sung's troops in Manchuria and the Korean volunteers in North China were evaluated on the same level. In other words, "Kim Il Sung's armed guerrilla units, together with the Korean volunteer army in North China, not only dealt a direct blow to Japanese imperialism but also became the backbone of the Korean People's Army, the holy bird of national defense after the war[173]."It can be attributed to the fact that Choi Chang-ik and other coastal groups participated in the writing of history, and it is history before history is generally distorted.

Unlike other later historical books, the 1949 edition devoted 15 pages to Kim Il-sung's troops, detailing the activities of the Korean Independence League and the Korean volunteers in China. In later historiography, the history of the Korean Volunteer Army is completely erased.

"It was an organic organization of the Korean Independence League and the Korean Volunteer Army, and it carried out both political and military work, and the main figures were Kim Doo-bong, Choi Chang-ik, Han Moo, Mu Jeong, Pak Hyo-sam, and Pak Il-woo in the Korean Volunteer Army, and described in detail the organization, program,

[173] Ibid., p. 394.

activities, achievements, and people of the Cho Son Independence League and the Korean Volunteer Army.

The reality of the Korean Volunteer Army was first revealed in North Korea by Choe Chang-ik. In the Independence Sinbo, Choe Chang-ik revealed the origin of the Korean Independence League, its activities and development after its founding congress, the quality of the Korean Independence League as of the end of 1944, its revolutionary missions, and its history of evangelistic struggle.

Later, in North Korea, it was reorganized as part of the Tongsa by Choi Chang-ik. Choi Chang-ik in his 「History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle (1949) mentions that the Korean Volunteer Corps was established in 1938 in Wuhan, the district of the Kuomintang Party, and that it was moved to the Palogun district, and that the North China Korean Youth Federation, a new political center in the Palo-gun district, was established in 1941.

The fact that it was built in January was very important. However, Choe Chang-ik distorted his explanation by saying, "Inspired by the success of General Kim Il-sung's partisan troops in Manchuria, the Korean youth in China also rose up in a powerful anti-Japanese armed struggle," and described the actual activities of the volunteer army and the independence alliance in the section "General Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against Japan."

However, in August 1956, due to the sectarian incident, Choi Chang-ik and others were purged.

Since then, the history of the Korean Volunteer Army has disappeared from North Korean history books.[174] In her 1958 book The Struggle for the Liberation of the Korean People, North Korean historian Lee Na-yong accused "Choe Chang-ik and some other anti-Party factional elements of distorting history for their obscene sectarian purposes." In other words, Choe Chang-ik and others criticized the government for "not only concealing the poison of the faction that had been affected by the pre-liberation Korean labor movement, but also analyzing it as if it were the revolutionary tradition of the Korean people," while distorting and underestimating the tradition of the anti-Japanese armed struggle carried out by "the staunch communists led by Kim Il-sung." And Lee Na-young did not deal with the history of the Korean Volunteer Army in the same book.[175]

In addition, there is no mention that Kim Il-sung personally carried out the liberation of Korea, and the explanation of the liberation as "the decisive role of the Soviet Union" is different from the historical books published later.

> Foreseeing that only the Soviet Union and its heroic army could liberate the Korean people from the defeat of Japanese imperialism, he made every effort to further strengthen the international connection with the world's democratic forces in

[174] In Shin Sang-ok and Choi Eun-hee's book, they write that they saw Lee Na-young being held in a political prison camp.

[175] Yeom In-ho, 「The Independence Movement of the Korean Volunteer Army」, pp. 30～31.

> response to the urgent theocracy (presumably a conscious expression of the 88th Brigade). General Kim Il-sung's sober activities finally became a reality with the historic liberation of Korea on August 15 along with the end of World War II, which was brought about by the decisive role of the great Soviet army.[176][177]

The liberation of Korea was described as the role of the Soviet Union. In other words, "The Soviet army occupied the port of Unggi in Korea on August 13, and then destroyed the Japanese army in the Battle of Chongjin and entered Hamhung and Wonsan, and on August 14, Japan ~~surrendered unconditionally to the Soviet,~~ American~~, and~~ British Allies. On September 2, 1945, the signing of the unconditional surrender of Japan and Japan was held in Tokyo Bay. Japanese imperialism, the crippled enemy of the Korean people, was established from Korea by the great Soviet army and was doomed to its final defeat." There is no word on the fact that Japan surrendered unconditionally as a result of the U.S. dropping the atomic bomb, but the United States is the only one in North Korean history to be named along with the Soviet Union as a member of the Allied Powers.

[176] Historical Compilation Committee, History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle, pp. 400～401.

[177] Ibid., p. 435.

B. "Kim Il Sung's Strategy" (April 15, 1952, Rodong Sinmun)

"Kim Il-sung's Strategy" was published on four pages of the Nodong Sinmun as an article dedicated to the personality cult of Kim Il-sung during the 25 June War, and was published on the occasion of Kim Il-sung's 40th birthday, with Kim Il-sung's achievements in the armed struggle against Japan as its main content[178]. As can be seen from the title of "respected leader General Kim Il-sung," Kim Il-sung is called the leader and idolizes Kim Il-sung's deeds of the anti-Japanese armed struggle. The title was first used intermittently on February 8, 1948, at the founding ceremony of the Korean People's Army, when Choe Yong Keon, commander-in-chief of the Korean People's Army, asserted in a speech that "our People's Army has a greater loyalty and devotion to its people, to democracy, or to General Kim Il Sung, the leader and leader of the Korean people."[179]

However, in the wake of the war, the title of leader began to become common within the party.[180] Immediately after the war, he began to be called the "respected leader," and the cult of personality began in 1952 on the occasion of Kim Il-sung's 40th birthday. In the Rodong Sinmun newspaper an article by Pak Chong-ae, secretary of the Central Committee, titled "Comrade Kim Il-sung is the leader of the

[178] Rodong Sinmun, April 15, 1952.

[179] Lee Jong-suk, 「Study of the Workers' Party of Korea」, pp. 146～147.

[180] Interview with Jung Jin Chung.

Korean people," it can be seen that Kim Il-sung is positioned as the Stalin-level leader of the Soviet Union.

> Comrade Kim Il Sung is the leader of the Lenin-Stalin type of the Korean people, possessing all these noble qualities and characteristics: an accurate grasp of the historical tasks of the Korean working class and the historical laws of the development of society, a keen analysis of the circumstances and conditions of the revolution, revolutionary bravery, sensitivity to the new, boundless love and trust in the people, inseparable connection with the masses, burning hatred and hostility toward the enemy, and far-sightedness.[181]

You can see that Kim Il-sung is idolizing Lenin and Stalin as models. Be. It glorifies the achievements of the armed struggle during the Japanese period, democratic reform after liberation, the struggle against imperialism, and the development of the economy.

It emphasizes that Marxism-Leninism was used as a guideline for the struggle, and it can be seen that North Korea began to use Marxism-Leninism as a new governing ideology as early as 1952. It emphasizes proletarian internationalism, but does not use the word socialism at all, and uses the slogan of building a democratic and independent state and the idea of democratic reform. It is noteworthy that hostility towards the U.S. imperialists had already begun at this time, and there is no mention of the Juche idea yet, but rather Kim Il-sung is called an internationalist. "Kim Il Sung, who is loyal to internationalism ... We are educating our people in the spirit of ardent

[181] Rodong Sinmun, April 15, 1952.

love for the great Soviet Union, the liberator, and for the People's Republic of China and the people's democracies."

C. "History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle" (1958) and "History of Korean Translation" (1958)

On March 27, 1953, according to Cabinet Decision No. 57, the DPRK was appointed to the Historical Compilation Committee.

The Society was disbanded and the Institute of Joseon History was established with specialized laboratories for each era, and a system was established to enable professional historical research. The Institute of Korean History appears to have played a role in providing theoretical support for the historical legitimacy required for Kim Il-sung's subsequent rise to power.[213]

In May 1956, the Third Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea criticized the fact that the past study of the history of the Korean Workers' Movement and the history of the liberation struggle of the people and people had been forgotten or ignored, and decided to intensify the research and compilation of such research. In accordance with the spirit of the decisions of the Third Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, Lee Na-young serialized the first draft in the Democratic Chosun magazine in 1956. In March 1958, Lee Na-young published a book titled "History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle" with the same title as Choi Chang-ik's book. According to Lee Na-young, her book was written in order to resolve

the demands that were made at the December Enlarged General Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) in 1956 and at the first delegates' meeting.

> Lee Na-young said that at the last December enlarged plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK)

As emphasized at the First Party Delegates' Meeting, the work of educating Party members and cadres on the correct history of the Korean communist movement and socialist and patriotic education of the working masses is being raised as an important task.

Through the introduction of this book, we can examine the position of the North Korean academic community at the time on Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against Japan. Lee Na-young criticized that "Choi Chang-ik's research concealed the antidote of sectarianism that harmed the labor movement before liberation, and distorted and obliterated the revolutionary war system established by the staunch communists led by Kim Il-sung." His remarks like this are half

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213 Hwang Min-ho, 「Trends and National Movements of Korean Society in Manchuria under Japanese Empire 」」} (Seoul: Shin Seowon, 2005), p. 213.

This indicates that the sectarian struggle ended with Kim Il-sung's victory, and as a result, the narrative of the revolutionary tradition in North Korean academia began to be newly established around the activities of Kim Il-sung and his affiliates.

Beginning in the late 1950s, Lee Na-young, Hwang Jang-yup, and Choi Ung-chul began to publish a series of papers criticizing the work of Choi Chang-ik and Lee Chung-won, which were reflected in the 1958 publication of the Korean Syntax, the 1949 History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle, the 1949 History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle, and the 1961 publication of the History of the Modern Revolutionary Movement of Korea.

2 Historians purge the Yan faction after the August 1956 Sectarian Incident

It is distinguished from previous historiography in that it distorted history with a history of the anti-Japanese armed struggle centered on the main faction.

The two books, "History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle" and "History of the Korean Liberation Struggle (Below)," have in common that they interpret history from the perspective of Marxism-Leninist theory and socialism, and they differ from the previous historical books. "The invincible capability of the Cho Son People's Revolutionary Army is due to the fact that it has taken the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory and its tactics as the guiding principles of the struggle."[214]

The "History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle" is characterized, among other things, by the erasure of the coastal sect from history. In its preface, the "History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle" argues that during the past period, Choe Chang-ik and some other reactionary sectarians started from their own ugly

sectarian objectives and contributed a lot of misfortune and poison to the historical research work in this area, and distorted, underestimated, and obliterated Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against Japan. The emphasis on socialism was due to dissatisfaction with the living conditions after the 25 June War and

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[214] Historical Compilation Committee, 「History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle, (Pyongyang: Historical Compilation Committee, 1949), p. 439.

It seems to have come out as a countermeasure to the agitation of public sentiment. According to the testimonies of Jang Hak-bong and Kim Moon-wook,-in order to prevent ideological agitation among the people after the 25 June War, they strengthened their ideological education through socialism and began to reinterpret the history of the past from a socialist point of view.

2 The book also explained the March 1st Movement with socialist theory. In other words, he wrote that the significance of the Korean East Class is found in the fact that it has begun to enter the arena of political struggle for national liberation.[182] Considering that the Communist Party of Korea was founded in April 1925, it is difficult to understand that the March 1st Movement of 1919 was led by the idea of socialism. It is also[183] difficult to explain how the

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[182] Lee Na-young, The History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle (Pyongyang: Institute of Korean History, 1958), p. 242.

[183] Ibid., p. 278.

March 1st Movement was able to erupt in the whole country at once on the basis of socialist lines, as it itself points out that at the time of the founding of the Communist Party of Korea in April 1925, the factional struggle was so severe that only the leadership was decisive and the Party program and constitution could not be adopted . This book interprets the March 1st Movement as the beginning of the Korean working class entering the political struggle for national liberation.[184]

Beginning with the 1958 "History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle," North Korea began to fabricate the history of Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against Japan on a large scale and in earnest. The content of the manipulation is to steal the history of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army, which consists of 11 armies (a concept similar to our military fragmentation system), as Kim Il-sung's personal history. The anti-Japanese army of the Communist Party of China, founded in March 1934, was the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army, but by changing this name, Kim Il-sung has been falsely claiming that his unit is the Korean People's Revolutionary Army. It states, "In March 1934, the East Bay Anti-Japanese People's Guerrilla Army was the core and the guerrilla units operating in various parts of the Northeast were consolidated to form the Cho Son People's Revolutionary Army[185]." In fact, the Second Army of the

[184] Ibid., p. 242.
[185] Ibid., p. 354.

Northeast People's Revolutionary Army was established in March 1934, when the guerrilla divisions of the four prefectures were unified into the Independent Company of the Second Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army, and Zhu Jin was appointed as the president, and Wang Deok-tae was appointed to the position of Lieutenant General, a position under the 3rd Commander-in-Chief.[186] However, Kim Il-sung, who was only a three-way leader, manipulated history as if he were the commander of the 2nd Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army. It is noteworthy that he sharply criticized the Korean Communist Party as a justification for the purge of Pak Hun-yong and other members of the Southern Workers' Party. The History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle_(1958) sharply criticized the factionalism of the Korean Communist Party and its poisonousness. "After the first round of arrests of the Communist Party of Korea and the fourth round of arrests of the Communist Party of Korea in 1928, the Communist Party of Korea ceased to exist as an organizational force in 1928[187] as it was unable to maintain the Party organization ." While assessing the previous Communist Party of Korea as having a lot of factionalism, Kim Il-sung himself made a clear analysis of how to carry out the Korean revolution on the basis of Marxism-Leninism.

[186] Kang Ki-joo, A Study on the History of the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the Korean Nation in China, p. 209.

[187] Lee Na-young, The History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle, p. 206.

sir.[188]

Early North Korean historiography is full of errors in the facts themselves. There are many traces of hastily written without sufficient investigation of the facts. For example, Kim Il-sung wrote that in 1924 he followed his father to exile in China to Northeast Manchuria, where he entered and graduated from the First Superior Elementary School in Musong, and in 1926 entered Jilin Yukmun Middle School. He was arrested by reactionary warlords in 1929 and imprisoned in Jilin Prison, but after his release in 1930, he graduated from junior high school and went to Ando, where he personally organized and led the Hunglong Youth Association~~, while also~~ working as a secretary of the East Manchu Special District of the Communist Party.[189] There are many falsehoods due to a lack of data rather than intentional distortions. He entered the First Superior Elementary School in Musong, and after graduating, he entered Jilin Middle School in 1926, but did not mention the fact that he attended the Hwaseong Dormitory.[190]

[188] Ibid., p. 338.
[189] Ibid., p. 337.
[190] Institute of History, Academy of Sciences, 「Joseon Syntax」} (Pyongyang: Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences, 1958), p. 202.

D. History of the Modern Revolutionary Movement in Korea (1961)

This book can still be seen as a reflection of the urgent need for justification of the August 1956 sectarian incident. For example, he pointed out that the bourgeois intellectuals led the Korean Communist Party and engaged in a severe factional struggle, and referred to [191] the communists of the Korean Communist Party as sectarians, showing a very negative tone toward the Korean Communist Party before Kim Il-sung participated. Regarding the Communist Party of Korea, the proposition of Marxism-Leninism was used as a tool of factionalism to attack the opposition. They were classified as the Hwayo faction, the Seoul faction, and the Shanghai faction. Sectarians criticized such factional struggles as having confused the Party organizationally and ideologically, weakened Party discipline, and facilitated the pursuit of enemies against the Party. [225] After the dissolution of the Manchurian General Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea, a full-fledged socialist movement led by Kim Il-sung was distorted, and Kim Il-sung's Jilin period was defined as the beginning of a new communist movement, and he wrote that he joined the Communist Party in October 1931.226 The fact

[191] Institute of History, Academy of Social Sciences, History of the Modern Revolutionary Movement of Korea (Pyongyang: Historical Research Center of the Academy of Social Sciences, 1961), p. 204.

that the Communist Party of China was the Communist Party of China was abolished.

In the preface, it is stated that this book is a compilation based on the results of research accumulated by the historical academia while carrying out the tasks set forth at the Third Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea. It was written by 11 people, including Kim Seok-hyung, Kim Seok-dam, and Song Ji-young of the Institute of History of the Academy of Social Sciences, and the section on the anti-Japanese struggle in Manchuria in the 1930s was written by Song Ji-young and Kim Eul-chun.

> Lee Na-young's "History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle" (1958) was published in the third edition of the Workers' Party of Korea

The congress criticized the fact that the study of the history of the Korean workers' movement and the history of the national liberation struggle in the past was forgotten or ignored, and decided to intensify the research and compilation work on them, and pointed out that the book was published in accordance with the spirit of the decision of the Third Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea.

This book is described with a table of contents and contents that are quite similar to Lee Na-young's History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle. Like the previous book by Lee Na-young, the preface points out that this book was published in order to carry out the tasks set forth by the Third Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea.

It describes the national liberation struggle under the banner of Marxism-Leninism and records history from a socialist point of view, the same as the previous two books of 1958.

All of them.

This book describes in detail the nationalist anti-Japanese movement.

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225 Ibid., p. 205.

226 Ibid., p. 233.

This is a big difference from the complete deletion of later North Korean historiography. He introduced the Battle of Bong-o-dong in the 1920s, the Tonguibu in South Bay in August 1922 organized by the nationalists, the Counselors Department separated from Tonguibu and organized in August 1924, the Ministry of Justice in Namman, which was organized in January 1925 by merging more than 10 military groups including Tong's Department, and the New People's Department, which was organized in March 1925 by merging several nationalist military groups in North Manchuria. In the late 1920s, the Ministry of New People's Affairs in the North Manchurian area, the Ministry of Councilors along the Ablu River, and the Ministry of Justice in the South Manchurian area were active, and it was described as the Ministry of Justice having a broad base.[192]

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192 Institute of History, Academy of Social Sciences, □□History of the Modern Revolutionary Movement of Korea, pp. 202～203.

In the 1920s, they argued that the independence army was a simple nationalist army, an army that defended the interests of the landlords and property classes, and that the independence army movement, which was patriotic but led by a past-oriented and narrow-minded nationalist ideology, was weakened by the lack of active support from the people.[193]

> Compared to later historical books, Kim Il-sung made all the decisions.

It is characterized by a much weaker tone. For example, in the description of the Minsaengdan incident, it is vaguely described so that it is difficult to know where Kim Il-sung is.

> However, there is also a lot of distortion of history in this book. For example, the Soviet Union

In order to conceal the fact of the evacuation, the fact that they carried out small unit activities is strongly emphasized and even put on the title of the chapter of the book, and the fact of evacuation to the Soviet Union is reflected in history in a distorted form by stating that a large number of cadres were dispatched to the Soviet Union.[229]

E. "Comrade Kim Il Sung's Strategy" (1972)

This is a new history book that came out in 1967 during the purge of the Kapsanites and the promotion of the establishment of a monolithic system. At that time, North Korea defined the Unitarian Ideology as the Juche Idea. Since then, North Korea's ruling ideology

[193] Ibid., p. 203.

has been summarized in the following schema: Unitary Ideology = Tradition of Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle = Juche Idea. It is a vast 860-page history of Kim Il Sung. He wrote about Kim Il-sung and his history from his birth to 1972, and reinterpreted the history of North Korea with the Juche idea. If Lee Na-young's 1958 "History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle" interpreted North Korean history in terms of Marxism-Leninism, the Pharmacopoeia reinterpreted North Korea's history for the first time in terms of the Juche idea.

At that time, the Juche ideology was an ideology that was equated with anti-Daeism, so it is characterized by the fact that there are many contents that criticize sectarians. Criticism of sectarians appears everywhere.[230] Juche Ideology = Anti-Sectarianism = Anti-Sectarianism.

If the 1958 「History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle and the Korean Tongsa stated that the Soviet army had liberated Korea, the Pharmacopoeia completely erased this fact. From the point of view of the Juche idea, it is a shame that the liberation of Korea was achieved by a foreign power, so why did I distort history?

This book differs from other historical books in that the biographical years of Kim Il-sung are recorded in relatively small details. The content of the years of each event is distorted, but the years are correct. For example, in Ando, to the Star Wing

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[229] Institute of History, Academy of Social Sciences, History of the Modern Revolutionary Movement of Korea, p. 331.

[230] Workers' Party of Korea, Comrade Kim Il Sung's Strategy, p. 151.

The year of his participation is stated as April 25, 1932, and the year when Kim Il-sung returned to the Sowangcheong guerrilla base after being transferred to the Salvation Army and the Cho Son Revolutionary Army is described as January 1933, which is an accurate description.

It is interesting that while "With the Century" dealt only with the history of the anti-Japanese armed struggle, this book covers the history up to 1972. If "With the Century" is Kim Il-sung's memoirs, it is strange why it only deals with the part of the anti-Japanese armed struggle and not the later part of Kim Il-sung's career.

F. Joseon Warrior (1979~1992)

"Joseon Warrior" was designed to reinterpret the entire history of North Korea with the Juche ideology after the Juche ideology became the ruling ideology in 1972. If the 1972 book "The Strategy of Comrade Kim Il Sung" was intended to reinterpret Kim Il-sung's biography in terms of the Juche history, the "Joseon Warrior" is intended to reinterpret the entire history of North Korea in terms of the Juche idea.

The beginning of the reinterpretation of history based on the Juche idea was a special article on the Juche idea published in the April 1973 issue of Workers, the occasion of Kim Il-sung's 61st birthday. All eight

papers published in the April issue of Workers are related to the Juche idea. All of the papers published at this time used the September 1972 paper, which first contained the human-centered Juche idea, as the text, and reinterpreted the existing history and policies as the Juche idea centered on the masses of the people. The first paper is a general discussion of the Juche idea. In September 1972, Kim Il-sung wrote in his article, "In a nutshell, the Juche idea is the main cause of the revolution and construction, and the people who drive the revolution and construction. It is the idea that power lies with the masses of the people. In other words, the idea is that you are the master of your own destiny and that you have the power to create your own destiny." The article said, "This great idea put forward by the leader is a genius idea that, for the first time in history, clearly clarified the status and role of the masses in the revolutionary struggle and shed new light on the principles of the revolution."[194]

The second paper, titled [195] "The Great Patriotic and Revolutionary Family of the Respected Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung," asserted that Kim Il-sung's great-grandfather Kim Woong-woo, grandfather Kim Bo-hyun, grandmother Ri Bo-ik, father Kim Hyung-jik, uncle Kim Hyung-gwon, first brother Kim Cheol-ju, maternal grandfather Kang

[194] Ibid., p. 3.

[195] "The family of the respected leader Comrade Kim Il Sung is a great patriotic and revolutionary family man."

Workers, No. 4, 1973.

Don-wook, maternal uncle Kang Jin-seok,[196] and others were all revolutionary families. The thesis of this paper is that "only such a family can inherit the revolution from generation to generation, while the freedom and independence of the motherland, We can fight to the end for the cause of the working class and remain forever faithful to the revolution[197]."

Oh Jin-woo's thesis gave a [198]new explanation of the anti-Japanese armed struggle in the name of the Juche idea. It emphasized that the anti-Japanese armed struggle is a Juche-oriented line and that during the period of the anti-Japanese struggle, Kim Il-sung taught the masses of the people, who were the masters of the revolutionary struggle, to respect them and to be loyal servants of the people. Suh Kwan-hi's thesis 236 interpreted the so-called democratic reforms such as land reform as the Juche idea[199][200], Kang Suk-sung's thesis [201] explained the 1958 agricultural cooperativeization and

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[196] It is worth noting that the name of Kim Il-sung's younger brother, Kim Yong-ju, is missing from this, because there is a theory that Kim Yong-ju had a problem with his military power during the Korean War, and he is also a political enemy of Kim Jong-il.

[197] Ibid., p. 14.

[198] Oh Jin-woo, "The Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle Is a Glorious Revolutionary War Led by the Juche Idea,"

1973 No. 4.

[199] Xi Guan-ha, "The Brilliant Embodiment of the Juche Idea in the Implementation of the Democratic Revolution," □Workers□□}

[200] Year 4.

[201] Kang Suk-sung, "The Socialist Revolution in Korea Triumphed Under the Banner of the Juche Idea," □Workers□□ 1973 No. 4.

nationalization of the dog industry in the name of the Juche idea, and Kim Joo-young's thesis [202] interpreted the achievement of the reunification issue as the Juche idea. Kim Jae-bong's thesis [203]explained the meaning of the communist world revolution with the logic of the Juche idea of revolutionizing according to the actual situation of one's own country. As a result, North Korea has newly interpreted all its past history and policies under the thesis of the "Juche idea of human-centered theory," colored them with a single ideology, and even presented future policy tasks.

> The word Juche was first coined on October 23, 1955, when the Soviet Gang of Five

It was the first time it was used as a justification for a purge.[204] Nevertheless, North Korea is describing its history as if the Juche idea had existed from the beginning of North Korean history.

> In the 33 volumes of "Joseon History", the anti-Japanese armed struggle section is divided into 7 volumes.

It attaches great importance to the anti-Japanese armed struggle centered on Kim Il-sung. The most unusual thing about "Joseon Warriors" is that it distorts the landing of the Soviet Red Army at Unggi as if it had been done by Kim Il-sung's troops. It borrowed the

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[202] Kim Joo-young, "The cause of reunification of our people advancing under the banner of the great Juche idea is invincible," 1973 No. 4.

[203] Kim Jae-bong, "The Juche Idea is a Great Idea Reflecting the Aspirations and Demands of the World Revolutionary People," 1973 No. 4.

[204] See Seo Jae-jin, Ivan of Juche Thought} (Seoul: Pakyoungsa, 2006), p. 131.

form of the reminiscences of the Five Hundred Dragons (1968 reminiscences) who participated in the battle at that time and distorted it as if it had been done by Kim Il-sung's troops.[205] In order to establish the Juche idea, he tried to erase the traces of the Western Soviet Union. It is one of the most serious examples of distortion of history.

Around the time when the August Sect Incident of 1956 ended with the victory of Kim Il-sung's line, North Korean scholars pointed out the problems with the domestic communist movement in the 1920s and established the armed struggle against Japan led by Kim Il-sung as the true revolutionary tradition of North Korea. Later, this perception was further strengthened, and it is understood that it was extended to the Juche Academy, which grasps the Party, the people, and Leader Kim Il as a trinity.

G. History of Modern Joseon (1978 1st edition, 1983 revised edition)

Immediately after the completion of the 33rd volume of the History of Joseon (1979~1992), the revision of the "History of Contemporary Joseon" · A supplementary edition was published in 1983. It is also a reinterpretation of North Korea's modern history with the Juche ideology after the 1972 rule of the Juche ideology. For example, on

[205] Science Encyclopedia Publishing House, 『Joseon History 』}Vol. 22 (Pyongyang: Science Encyclopedia Publishing House, 1979),

April 25, 1932, he founded the Anti-Japanese People's Guerrilla Army in Ando, which he described as "a revolutionary army in the form of the main body."[242]

The "History of Contemporary Korea" also seems to be related to the historiographical approach to preparing for Kim Chong-il's succession. It is believed that Kim Il-sung led the anti-sectarian struggle in the 1930s in order to secure the legitimacy of the side-pruning movement, in fact, to distort it and use it for the political situation of the time.

This book is a very long and elaborate account of the anti-sectarian struggle than any previous history book. For the establishment of domestic politics for the succession of Kim Jong Il

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pp. 119, 124～126,

[242] Institute of History, Academy of Social Sciences, History of Modern Korea (Pyongyang: Institute of Social Sciences, 1978), pp. 61～62.

The facts were distorted by inserting fictional content that did not fit the situation of the time at all. By changing the rhetoric of the CCP's anti-people's struggle, he distorted history as if Kim Il-sung had led the anti-sectarian struggle. The CCP Party's promotion of the struggle against the people's livelihood was distorted as Kim Il-sung's anti-sectarian struggle. Kim Il-sung claims that he burned a bag of Minsaengdan documents, but here he describes himself as leading the anti-sectarian struggle. He made a lengthy critique of sectarianism and introduced for the first time the concept of a new generation of

Juche types. For example, in a speech delivered at the Communist Party Workers' Congress convened by Wangcheng on March 27, 1933, he asserted that "through the Party organizations and the public hearing organizations, a new generation of Communists from the workers and peasants and Juche-type Communists who have been trained directly and practically in an ideological and practical way have grown up quickly, and the organizational backbone of the Party has been reliably prepared," and that "the process of expanding and strengthening Party offices and public office organizations and cultivating a new generation of Communists was accompanied by a resolute struggle against sectarianism."

He wrote:[206]

He also criticized sectarianism within the communist movement. Kim Il-sung analyzed the origins of sectarianism in the communist movement of our country, and then comprehensively expounded the crimes committed by sectarian elements in history.[207]

> After the 1967 Kapsan purge in North Korea, Kim Il-sung's power was firmly established.

As the East Sea Sea and Juche ideology became the only ruling ideology in North Korean society, North Korean academia established a new leadership system that led to Kim Hyong-jik and Kim Il-sung in the history of the national movement during the Japanese period. In

[206] Ibid., p. 74.

[207] Ibid., p. 74.

this process, North Korea has often distorted historical facts in its descriptions and historical assessments of the people involved.[208]

In the 1949 North Korean history book, there is no mention of Kim Hyong-jik. The 1958 publication of the Korean Synagogue only says that Kim Hyong-jik was "an ardent patriot," and the 1961 publication of the History of the Modern Revolutionary Movement of Korea only says that he was "one of the ardent anti-Japanese fighters within the Ministry of Justice." However, after the publication of "The Indomitable Anti-Japanese Revolutionary Fighter, Kim Hyong-jik" in 1968, North Korea began to glorify Kim Hyong-jik's activities in more detail, and in "Joseon Warrior" and "History of Modern Korea," it systematized his activities in detail.[209]

According to North Korean studies since the 1970s, Kim Hyong-jik formed the Korean National Assembly through the P'yongyang Conference in 1917, and made efforts to disseminate advanced ideas and strengthen the armed revolutionary organization through the Cheongsu-dong Conference in 1918 and the Kwanjeon Conference in 1919. It also emphasizes Kim Hyong-jik's ideology as a support ideology, and evaluates his activities as having played a pioneering

[208] Hwang Min-ho, Trends and National Movements of Korean Society in Manchuria under Japanese Rule, p. 234.

[209] Ibid., p. 222.

role in changing the direction of the national liberation movement in Korea from a nationalist movement to a socialist movement.[210]

H. "With the Century" (1992~1998)

The most significant feature of the publication of the eight volumes of "With the Century" is that it was carried out under the general leadership of Kim Jong-il.[211]It can be seen that it is a historical work for the inheritance of Kim Jong-il. Each chapter of "With the Century" concludes with a clear reference to Kim Jong-il. At the end of each chapter, Kim Jong-il is mentioned, linking Kim Jong-il to the anti-Japanese armed struggle.

In addition, "With the Century" is also the first historical book to present the myth of Mt. Paektu.The [212] claim that the spirit was maintained southeast of Mt. Paektu was not found in North Korean literature until the mid-80s. It was in 1984 that "The Great Leader Kim Jong Il," which was named after Kim Jong-il's birthplace on Mt. Paektu, was published. It was in August 1988 that the historic building of Mt. Paektu on the west side of Mt. Sobaek was completed, and the mountain behind it was named Jeongil Peak and the concrete letters were inserted.[213]

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[210] Kim Han-gil, 『History of Contemporary Joseon 』} (1983, Seoul: Ilsongjeong, 1988), pp. 32～35.

[211] Haruki Wada, North Korea: From a Guerrilla State to a Regular Military State, p. 27.

[212] Haruki Wada, 『Kim Il Sung and the Manchurian Anti-Japanese War, p. 275.

[213] Ibid., p. 275.

Writing in the form of an autobiography of the century led to the inclusion of people in the state at the time, bringing many people back into history.

After the publication of "With the Century," North Korea's "History of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle" was forced to be rewritten. Compared to previous historical books, there have been many revisions to bring them closer to the facts. It includes the fact of evacuation to the Soviet Union and the activities of the 88th Brigade in the Soviet Union. The 10th volume of the 2002 revised edition of the History of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle, Kim Il-sung's memoir "With the Century," is an autobiography that appeared at the end of Kim Il-sung's life, but it dealt only with the period of the anti-Japanese armed struggle. After the anti-Japanese armed struggle, Kim Il-sung lived for another 50 years as the supreme leader of the North Korean regime before dying, but Kim Il-sung's achievements after the establishment of the regime were not discussed at all. The evidence that the myth of the anti-Japanese struggle is for the publicity of the regime is Kim Il-sung It is found in the fact that the memoirs dealt only with the anti-Japanese armed struggle. Among Kim Il-sung's roles, the one that had a greater impact on North Korean history was after he became the supreme leader after liberation, but he ignores all of this and deals only with the less important part of the anti-Japanese armed struggle in his memoirs. This is not logical in terms of the structure of the autobiography. The reason for this can only be

thought to be that Kim Il-sung's actions after liberation are acknowledged as a history of failure and nothing to show for it.

C. History of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle, Vol. 10 (1983, 2002~2005 Revised Edition)

It is a complete collection of works devoted to the anti-Japanese armed struggle along with "Comrade Kim Il Sung's Strategy" in 1972, and a history book published the year after the publication of "On the Juche Idea" in 1982. The meeting was introduced in detail in about 40 pages. In 40 pages, without any documentary evidence, the convening of the Ka-ryun Conference, the principles of the Juche idea proclaimed at the meeting, the revolutionary line of Juche presented at the conference, and the historical significance of the Ka-ryun Conference, especially the historical significance of the Ka-Ryun Conference, were discussed at length in 16 pages.

After Kim Il-sung's death, "With the Century" was published, it was supplemented with new materials and supplemented as a historical book, and many contents of Kim Il-sung's memoirs were added. For example, the Communist International stipulated the principle of one country, one party at the Sixth Congress in 1928, and the Oriental Propaganda Department of the International Communist Party notified the International Party of its decision on the issue of joining

the Communist Party of Korea in May 1930,[214] which contained many close to the facts, stating that the question of joining the Communist Party of China and serving as members of the Chinese Party had been raised to the Korean Communists in Manchuria.

However, North Korea has still distorted history to a great extent. Published in paperback

The history of the anti-Japanese struggle was expanded into 10 volumes, and too much fiction and fiction was included. For example, in the preceding History of the Pre-Revolutionary Movement in the modern era, it was stated that Kim Il-sung joined the Communist Party in October 1931, but unlike the previous description, this book states that Kim Il-sung did not join the Communist Party, but formed the first Party organization, the "Construction Comrades," on July 3, 1930 at the Jinmyeong School in Karyun.

The "History of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle" also describes the process of national liberation as the liberation of the country by Kim Il-sung's troops by force through a combined operation with the Soviet army. Not a single Korean soldier participated in the Soviet army's advance into the Korean peninsula, according to the testimony of Chung Sang-jin, a former Soviet military special sergeant who participated in the battles for the occupation of Unggi and Chongjin at the time.[215]

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[214] Science Encyclopedia Publishing House, 『History of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle』 Vol. 1 (Pyongyang: Science Encyclopedia Publishing House, 2002).

[215] Interview with Jung Sang-jin, (October 13, 2006).

In this way, the "History of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle" does not write history, but compiles a table of contents of a fictional history in order to idolize Kim Il-sung, and according to this table of contents, it describes history as if it were a novel, and it can be seen as using the method of re-dramatizing various facts from "With the Century."

2. Distortion of Historical Facts and Distortion of Historical Books

In this section, we examine the reality of the distortion of history in the history books case by case. The description of events in different historical books is differentiated between those that are similar and those that are different, and only when unusual changes are noted, are specifically noted.

A. Youth and Participation in the Ministry of the People (1926~1931)

(1) Distortion of the background of the transfer from Hwaseong Uisook to Jilin Middle SchoolHwaseong Uisuk is a two-year military-political school established by the Ministry of Justice and Justice by nationalists for the purpose of training cadres for the independence army, and the students are mainly independent soldiers. However, after Kim Hyong-jik's death, Kim Il-sung's father, Kim Hyong-jik's colleagues, admitted Kim Il-sung to Hwaseong Ui-sook in June 1926, but because he was too young to adapt, they

transferred him to Yukmun Middle School in Jilin in January 1927, just six months later. However, North Korean history books state that Hwaseong Ui-sook was transferred to Yukmun Middle School because of the nationalist ideology and the old military drills that smelled like old Korea and the history of the world revolution based on the history of the Joseon Dynasty and the history of the bourgeois revolution[216].Also, according to the "Biography of Comrade Kim Il Sung", it does not make sense that Kim Il Sung stood there in the Hwaseong Lodge and expounded and propagandized Marxism-Leninism to the students[217]. Kim Il-sung was about 10 years younger than the students at the Hwaseong School at the time. And Kim Il-sung came into contact with Marxism-Leninism at Jilin Yukmun Middle School.

(2) · Distorting the fact of the formation of the alliance North Korea claims that Kim Il-sung formed the League of Imperialists ~~on October 17, 1926, but there~~ are many contradictions in the timing. It is difficult to understand why Kim Il-sung entered Hwaseong Uisook in June 1926, but in just four months, he formed an alliance of overthrow and imperialism with people who were 10 years older than him.

[216] 「History of the Anti-Japanese Revolutionary Struggle, p. 113.

[217] Workers' Party of Korea, 「Comrade Kim Il Sung Strategy, p. 20.

According to the testimonies of Professor Park Chang-wook and Professor Nam Im-oh of Yanbian University · Dong

Meng is an organization of the Ministry of Justice and the Left formed by Yi Jong-rak after leaving the Ministry of Justice around 1929~1930, and the claim that Kim Il-sung formed it is a distortion that hijacks the achievements of others as his own achievements. It is understandable that Kim Il-sung participated in the group, but it does not make sense that it was formed on the initiative of Kim Il-sung.[218]

Haruki Wada also denied North Korea's claims. The alliance was formed in 1926.

It is argued that it should be considered to have been formed in 1929 rather than formed. Shin Ju-baek also denies the position of North Korean historians. Shin Ju-baek is critical of the North Korean historiography that relies solely on Choi Hyung-woo's "海外朝鮮革命運動 事" (Vol. 1) (Donghwa History of the Korean Language, 1946) to insist on the 1926 theory. He believes that the term "other imperialism" cannot be derived in view of the situation of the times, the trends of socialist movements (e.g., the reconstruction faction and the anti-imperialist alliance, the reconstruction faction and its sympathizers in the people's ministry), and the trends of the nationalist movement in the period of 1926. According to him, some of the left-leaning youth in the country's civil service, For example, Lee Jong-rak, Choi Chang-gal, Kim Won-geun, and Kim Il-sung worked

[218] Interview with Professor Chang Wook Park, Yanbian University, (April 2004, June 2006).

together in the South Korean Youth League, which was formed in February 1929, and gradually moved to the left, criticizing the Ministry of the People, opposing the ML faction, and maintaining a familiar attitude with the reconstruction faction. From about the mid-1930s, Li Chong-lak and others not only broke with the reconstruction faction because they disagreed with the reconstruction faction on the issue of joining the Chinese Communist Party, but from August 1930 onwards they maintained an attitude of openly opposing the Ministry of the People. In August 1930, on the occasion of the Executive Committee and the Congress of the Korean Revolutionary Party, the Ministry of the People was divided into two camps. The left wing of the People's Ministry formed the Provincial Command of the Korean Revolutionary Army Gilgang (September 1930), which was renamed the Eastern Revolutionary Army in the spring of 1931.[219] At this time · The alliance was formed in the late 1929 or early 1930s by a group of young people in the Ministry of the People, led by the left-leaning Yi Jong-rak, who criticized the Ministry of the People and opposed the ML faction, while maintaining a political attitude of maintaining friendly relations with the Reconstruction faction. In fact, the documents of the Manchurian Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China at the time[220]

[219] Kim Il Sung, With the Century, Vol. 2, pp. 390～391.

[220] Xin Jubai, 『History of National Movements in China in the 1920s~30s, p. 302 Reprinted in footnote 48.

indicate that the "League of Overthrow Imperialism," headed by Li Chong-rak, was formed in late 1929 or early 1930.

The Joseon Warrior still claims that a new national liberation movement began with the formation of the imperialist alliance (a.k.a. the alliance) in 1926 after the overthrow of Kim Il-sung, and that the Korean People's Revolutionary Army was formed at the Karyun Conference in June 1930 and a new policy was adopted for the Korean revolution.[221]

(3) Distorting the Facts of the Founding of the Juche Idea at the Karyun Conference North Korea said that Kim Il-sung was the "course of the Korean revolution" in the Karyun meeting in June 1930.

In his speech, he claimed to have declared the Juche revolutionary line and policy regarding the Korean revolution and claimed to have founded the Juche idea for the first time.

All of them.[222] The History of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle (2002) claims that Kim Il-sung convened the Karyun Conference and carried out historical events such as the founding of the Juche idea, the line of the anti-Japanese armed struggle, and the policy of founding the Party, and wrote a lengthy 52-page article, but Chinese

[221] Encyclopedia of Science Publishers, 16, pp. 54～70.

[222] Workers' Party of Korea, Comrade Kim Il Sung's Strategy, p. 53~54.

scholars testified that there was no literature or evidence.[223] Since 1972, when the Juche Idea was decided to replace Marxism-Leninism, it can be seen as a fabrication of North Korea's entire history in order to interpret and reconstruct it in terms of the Juche Idea. In other words, it [224]can be seen as an attempt to manipulate history by going back to the past in order to assert that "the line of armed struggle against Japan declared by Comrade Kim Il Sung was a consistent and accurate revolutionary line with the great Juche idea that the Korean people themselves should take responsibility for it and complete it independently."

In June 1930, when Kim Il-sung was released from prison in Jilin, expelled from Yukmun Middle School, and wandered around with nowhere to go, he went to find his brother, Yi Jong-rak, whom he had known when he was a student at Hwaseong Hostel, and joined Yi Jong-rak's leftist group of the People's Party. At that time, Kim Il-sung had been ideologically introduced to Marxism-Leninism for less than a year from Sang Wol, who had been assigned to Yukmun Middle School in 1929. It was a time when I was learning Marxism-Leninism at the Women's Students' Association organized by Pastor Sohn Jeong-do. It is difficult to understand that Marxism-Leninism was founded at a time when it was just beginning to be learned, a new idea called the Juche idea.

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[223]Interview with Changwook Park~~,~~ Imoh Nam~~, and~~ Binhong Choi, Professors at Yanbian University, April 2004.

[224] Workers' Party of Korea, 「Comrade Kim Il Sung Strategy, p. 56.

What is even stranger is that in 1930, Kim Il-sung founded the Juche idea.

If anything, it is the fact that from October 1945, when he began his term as North Korea's supreme leader, until 1955, the expression Juche or the Juche idea was never uttered by Kim Il-sung. In fact, the first time the word Juche was used was in 1955 as a justification for the elimination of the Soviets. On the morning of October 23, 1955, when Kim Il-sung was convened to purge the Soviets of five (Vice Premier Pak Chang-ok, Pak Yong-bin, Director of the Party Committee's Organizing Department, Ki Suk-bok, Vice President of the Korean Army University, Chung Chong-jin, Vice Minister of Culture and Propaganda, and Chun Hwan-hyuk, Counselor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Kim Il-sung criticized him at a meeting of the Political Committee of the Party Central Committee held at the Cabinet office and dismissed him from his position. A reporter from the Rodong Sinmun also interviewed on the spot, and from the next day, the word Juche began to pour out in the Rodong Sinmun. The fact that the Juche idea was born for the first time on the spot was testified by the Minister of Culture and Propaganda, Chung Sang-jin, who was one of the five members of the Soviet faction.[225]

(4) Distorting the Facts of the Founding of the Korean Revolutionary Army North Korean historical books, such as "History

[225] Interview with Chun Sang-jin, former Vice Minister of Culture and Propaganda of North Korea, (May 2004 and October 2006).

of the Anti-Japanese Revolutionary Struggle" and "With the Century," state that the "Korean Revolutionary Army" was founded by Kim Il-sung on the initiative. After the formation of the first Party organization, the Korean revolution was founded as the first project to prepare for the armed struggle. The Korean Revolutionary Army was an independent army unit established and operated by the nationalist-affiliated Ministry of the People in South Manchuria, and was commanded by Yang Se-bong. The Ministry of the People was a nationalist-affiliated organization formed on April 1, 1929 by a former member of the Ministry of Justice, and in May 1929 the Ministry of the People established its own armed force, the Korean Revolutionary Army. It was organized into 10 companies of 30 people in one company. Around the Manchurian Incident in September 1931, four companies It has been reduced because of the departure of the left wing of the People's Party. The Korean Revolutionary Army, which is said to have been founded by Kim Il-sung in North Korea, is the Kanggang Command of the Korean Revolutionary Army, which was established by Yi Jong-rak when he resigned from the Ministry of People's Affairs, and it is possible that Kim Il-sung, who was a follower of Lee Jong-rak, was active here.

In "With the Century," Kim Il-sung claims to have founded the "Korean Revolutionary Army" and describes it at great length. According to North Korean historiography, since Kim Il-sung did not have the knowledge and experience in waging an armed struggle at that time, he brought in Yi Jong-rak and Kim Won-woo, who were

members of the Independence Army under the Ministry of People's Affairs, to secure members and to receive experience in armed struggle. Cha Kwang-so was a person who worked for the Independence Army in the Tonghua, Huinam, and Kanseo areas, and Lee Jong-rak was in the 1st Company of the Independence Army under the Ministry of Justice in Goyusu, and then came to Hwaseong Uisook to study. He introduced himself as a member of the[226] This is a gross distortion of the facts. When Kim Il-sung was expelled from Jilin Prison in May 1930 and from Yukmun Middle School, he went to visit Lee Jong-rak, a senior whom he had known from his time at Hwaseong Prison, who was a company commander of the Korean Revolutionary Army in Goyusu. At this time, Kim Il-sung followed Lee Jong-rak in the role of squad leader in the Korean Revolutionary Army. By the way, in "With the Century", Kim Il-sung founded the Korean Revolutionary Army.

[226] Kim Il Sung, With the Century, Vol. 2, pp. 71～72.

He distorted it by taking the late Lee Jong-rak as a subordinate.

By the way, the "History of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle" does not even mention this level of fact.

It states that on July 6, 1930, he convened a meeting of party and public officials for the formation of the Korean Revolutionary Army at the Goyusu Sangwang School in Yitong County and proclaimed the formation of the "Korean Revolutionary Army."[227] This is an example of distorting the history of nationalism as Kim Il-sung's own.

Due to the arrest of Yi Jong-rak in January 1931 and the dissolution of the hard-line command of the Korean Revolutionary Army led by Yi Jong-rak, Kim Il-sung fled the country to avoid arrest. If Kim Il-sung had led the Korean Revolutionary Army, there would be no reason for him to leave this place and take refuge in East Bay. Kim Il-sung moved to East Bay in early 1931 and joined the Chinese Communist Party in October 1931. If Kim Il-sung founded the Korean Revolutionary Army, it cannot explain the fact that he returned to Ando, where his mother lived, in early 1931 and joined the Chinese Communist Party

(5) Distortion of the motives and background of the move from Jilin to East Bay Kim Il-sung's move from Jilin to East Bay was a major change in Kim Il-sung's life. If he had been exposed to

[227] Encyclopedia of Science Publishing House, 『History of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle』 Vol. 1, 298.

Marxism-Leninism during his junior high school years in Jilin, it was because as soon as he moved to East Manchuria, he became embroiled in the political situation in East Manchuria, where he was waging an armed struggle against Japan after the Manchurian Incident broke out on September 18, 1931. However, North Korean history books describe the movement to East Bay as if it had been carried out for a premeditated purpose. "In 1931 I moved to the East Bay area in order to clearly grasp the serious situation caused by the factional elements in Jilin, overcome the left-wing adventurism consequences of the factional elements, and lead the struggle of the masses correctly so that it could continue to grow and develop," it states.[228]

> But in fact, Kim Il-sung's movement to Ando, East Man, was carried out in the Jilin area.

He escaped from the Communist hunt and fled to his mother's home in Ando.

> Kim Il-sung was released from prison in Jilin in May 1930 after Lee Jong-rak

For about half a year, he was active in the leftist group of the nationalist-affiliated People's Ministry led by Yi Chong-rak in the Gilgang Command of the Korean Revolutionary Army, but because Yi Chong-rak was arrested by the police in January 1931, the KPA

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[228] Institute of History, Academy of Social Sciences, History of the Modern Revolutionary Movement of Korea, p. 233.

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Gilgang Command was destroyed, and Choi Chang-geol rebuilt it under the name of Sehwa Army, and later renamed it the Dongbang Revolutionary Army, and on May 3, 1931, the fact was notified to all sides. However, since Choi Chang-geol was also kidnapped and imprisoned, the organization of the Joseon Hyuk Myeonggun Gilgang Command was extinguished. Moreover, in Jilin Province, the Chinese authorities and the nationalists who colluded with them were harshly hunting down the Communists.[229] Around this time, Kim Il-sung found it difficult to endure the situation in Jilin at the time and took refuge in Ando, where his mother was.

B. Period from Joining the Communist Party of China to the Third Dynasty (1931.10~1935)

(1) Concealment of Affiliation with the Chinese Communist Party

North Korean historical books tried to portray its membership in the "Communist Party" as "the Communist Party" as if it were [230] an independent unit of the "armed guerrilla corps of Kim Il Sung General" or the "Korean People's Revolutionary Army" rather than a member of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army.

The 1958 History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle and the 1958 Korean Tongsa stated that he had joined the Communist

[229] Haruki Wada, 『Kim Il Sung and the Manchurian Anti-Japanese War』, pp. 64～65.

[230] Lee Na-young, The History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle, p. 388.

Party in October 1931, but concealed the fact that he had joined the Communist Party of China and distorted the facts to make it appear as if he had joined the Communist Party of Korea.[231]

The History of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle (2002) also revised the previous historical description and stated that Kim Il-sung established the "Construction Building-dong Branch" as the first Party organization in Karyun on July 3, 1930.[232]

However, Kim Il-sung, who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1931, was not in a situation to run another private organization, and the anti-people's livelihood struggle that began in October 1932 was not in a situation where he could risk his life to build and run the party because the nationalist tendencies of the Korean communists were arrested and punished in a witch-hunt style. However, North Korean librarians conceal these policies and policies of the Chinese Communist Party, distorting them as if the anti-Japanese armed struggle in Manchuria was carried out under the leadership of Kim Il-sung.

(2) Concealment of the fact of the anti-Japanese struggle led by the Chinese Communist PartyChina's anti-

[231] Lee Na-young, History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle, p. 338; □Korean Syntax□□, p. 203.

[232] Encyclopedia of Science Publishing House, □History of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle □} Vol. 1, 267. p.

Japanese armed struggle in Manchuria is fought by the Chinese Communist Party and the Northeast Port

It was led by the Japanese Army, but North Korean history books cover up all this fact. In addition, North Korean history books do not mention that the unit in which Kim Il-sung operated was part of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Army. In the 1949 history book, the unit was written as "Kim Il Sung General Armed Guerrilla Army,"[233] and after that it was all written as "Cho Son People's Revolutionary Army." Lee writes that Kim Il-sung founded the Cho Son People's Revolutionary Army in 1934.[234]

> The anti-Japanese armed struggle at that time was carried out under the command of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Chinese Communist Party was also under the command of the International Communist Party in Moscow. Take, for example, the directive given by Wei Zhengmin, secretary of the CCP Joint Manchurian Special Committee and lieutenant of the Second Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army, who went to Moscow in February 1936 to report on the work situation to the CCP delegation to the International Communist Party. Wei Zhengmin had brought with him the spirit of the Seventh Congress of the International Communist Party and the instructions of the

[233] Lee Na-young, The History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle, p. 388.

[234] Ibid., p. 354.

CCP delegation to the International Communist Party, and in order to convey it, a banquet meeting of the cadres of the main leadership of the 2nd and 5th armies of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army was held in Beihudu. This is the so-called North Walnut Conference. At this meeting, Wei Zhengmin conveyed the resolution on the anti-fascist front established at the Seventh Congress of the International Communist Party and the instructions of the CCP delegation on the cancellation of the CCP Manchurian Provincial Committee and the establishment of the Four Provincial Committees of the People's Republic of China: South, East, Gil and North. They also reported on the exchanges between the International Communist Party and the CCP delegation on a series of issues raised over the anti-Japanese struggle in the Northeast. In accordance with the spirit of the Seventh Congress of the International Communist Party and the instructions of the CCP delegation to the International Communist Party, the meeting discussed the issue of further implementing the strategy and policy of the Party's anti-Japanese national united front, the establishment of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Army, and the development of the anti-Japanese guerrilla war. They also studied and decided on the issue of the 2nd and 5th armies operating in solidarity with each other, and the policy and mission of the 2nd

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Army's main force moving to the south to open up new guerrilla zones and develop the anti-Japanese guerrilla war.[235]

> However, North Korean history books do not mention the existence and role of the Chinese Communist Party.

He is not in a hurry and is writing history in the role of Kim Il-sung alone. When it is difficult to express that the subject of the action is Kim Il-sung, the sentence is written in passive voice without a subject. For example, "The left-wing adventurist was criticized at the East Manchurian Party Membership Conference convened in Wang Qing County in the spring of 1933. At the meeting, many left-wing adventurist biases that were manifested during the campaign were criticized, and the issue of intensifying the pre-reunification campaign was discussed[236]." Criticism of left-wing adventurism refers to the policy of the Chinese Communist Party's January 26, 1933 directive on the United Front tactics. However, he wrote history in a way that neither put forward the Chinese Communist Party as the main body nor claimed that Kim Il-sung led it. In other words, it is a very peculiar historical technique that describes history in a passive voice. It describes in a very vague way the subject of organization and command of the anti-Japanese movement.

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[235] Choi Sung-chun, The History of the Yanbian People's Anti-Japanese Struggle (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1999), p. 260.

[236] Institute of History, Academy of Social Sciences, 「History of the Modern Revolutionary Movement of Joseon」, 242.

From the 1972 "Campaign of Comrade Kim Il Sung," there was a tendency to distort history as if Kim Il-sung himself was the general leader of the anti-Japanese armed struggle in Manchuria. There are many places that portray Kim Il-sung's Juche ideology as the ruling ideology of the CCP, as if Kim Il-sung had played a role as the current leader even at that time. For example, the Grand Outer Conference (February 24 ~ March 3, 1935) and the Yoyō Yong Conference (March 21, 1935) held by the 2nd Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army in East Bay were both meetings that were attended by Yu Chung-min as the chief secretary of the special committee in Dongman, and they were described as being held by Kim Il-sung[237].

It also states that "the political organs, Party organizations and public hearing organizations organized in the guerrilla zone vigorously organized and carried out political and ideological education work in order to firmly arm their members with the great revolutionary idea of Comrade Kim Il Sung and the Juche-oriented revolutionary line and strategy and tactics that embody it."[238]

(3) Distortion of the Facts of the Convening of the Mingwol District MeetingIn the history of the CCP's armed

[237] Lee Na-young, History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle, p. 370.

[238] Workers' Party of Korea, 「Comrade Kim Il Sung's strategy」, pp. 110～111. p.

struggle against Japan, the meeting of the Mingwol District Conference in December 1931 is a meeting of great significance. This is because it was a meeting that resolved the anti-Japanese armed struggle at the level of the Manchurian Provincial Committee in accordance with the instructions of the Communist Party of China against the Manchurian Incident. It is recorded in Chinese literature that this meeting was presided over by Dong Changying, secretary of the East Manchurian Special Committee. Dong Jang-ying had just been appointed as a special secretary in November. [239] North Korean historiography claims that Kim Il-sung delivered a speech at the meeting titled "On Organizing and Developing an Armed Struggle Against Japanese Imperialism," and [240] distorts the historical meeting of the Communist Party of China (CCP) as being organized by Kim Il-sung personally. "History of Modern Korea" is also written by Kim Il-sung in 1931

[239] Haruki Wada, Kim Il Sung and the Manchurian Anti-Japanese War, p. 85.
[240] Workers' Party of Korea, Comrade Kim Il Sung Strategy, p. 77.

In December, he convened a meeting of the Myeongwol District and delivered a historic speech titled "On Organizing and Carrying Out an Armed Struggle Against Japanese Imperialism."[241]

In "With the Century," Kim Il-sung describes the Myeongwol-gu Conference and held it for 10 days.[242]

(4) Distortion of the founding date of the first anti-Japanese armed unit and distortion of the founding date of the North Korean armyNorth Korea has various questions about the founding date of Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese armed forces.

Theories are presented, but the facts are all distorted. Lee Na-young's History of the Korean People's Struggle for the Liberation of the Korean People (1958) claims that Kim Il-sung formed the first ranks of the anti-Japanese guerrilla army in Ando County in the winter of 1931.[243] Since the winter of 1931 was after October 1931, when Kim Il-sung joined the CCP, if Kim Il-sung founded the anti-Japanese guerrilla army, there should be a record in the Chinese Communist Party literature, but there is no literary basis for it. Lee Na-ying goes on to describe that on April 25, 1932, guerrilla groups

[241] Institute of History, Academy of Social Sciences, History of Modern Joseon, p. 59.

[242] Kim Il Sung, With the Century, Vol. 2, p. 244.

[243] Lee Na-young, The History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle, p. 342.

from the four counties of Dongman (Wangcheng, Yanji, Hunchun, and Huarong) were united to form the East Manchurian Anti-Japanese People's Guerrilla Army. North Korea claims that this was the first truly revolutionary and popular armed formation in the long history of the Korean people. [244] Currently, North Korea considers it the founding day of the Korean People's Army.

However, this is not the case. In April 1932, Kim Il-sung came to Ando.

The first unit to be organized in the West was not the "Ando Guerrilla Army", but the Right Command Corps.

It's a 'Star Unit'. The Separate Squad is a political operative. Since the Salvation Army has a disorderly military discipline and is prone to surrender or defect, the CCP organizes a separate squad and dispatches it to the Salvation Army to unite with the guerrilla forces of the CCP to fight against Japan.[245]In Lee Na-young's "History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle," there is a passage that suggests that Kim Il-sung's troops actually played an active role as a "separate unit."

"The staunch Communists, led by Marshal Kim Il Sung, strengthened their militant links with the Chinese people from the first day of the anti-Japanese guerrilla struggle. During this period,

[244] Ibid., p. 342.

[245] Interview with Prof. Chang-Wook Park and Prof. Im-Oh Nam, Yonbyon University, (April 2004, June 2006). [283] Lee Na-young, The History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle, p. 345.

there were anti-Japanese units in the northeast, such as the "Anti-Japanese Salvation Army," which was composed of some units of the Northeast Army that opposed the Japanese imperialists' invasion of Manchuria, and the "Volunteer Army," which was organized mainly by peasants, while the anti-Japanese guerrilla forces under the leadership of Leader Kim Il-sung dispatched political agents (separate units) from among their ranks to wage a joint struggle with them. As a result, it was possible to exert a political influence on the guerrilla units of the Eastern North Army and to ensure coordinated operations with them."[283]

> North Korean historiography shows that from parts of Kim Il-sung's guerrilla army to the Salvation Army

It is described as if it was dispatched, but in fact the separate unit was the entire Kim Il Sung Corps. There is no record in Chinese literature of the establishment of a guerrilla army in Ando at that time. Also, if you are an Ando guerrilla unit, you will not be able to move to the Yang Se-bong unit, which is a Korean nationalist unit in the south. Only with the approval of the East Bay Special Military Department could the troops be moved.[246]

The Detachment was an organization that infiltrated the Salvation Army and armed it with ideology, but it was often turned away. There is a reference to this in the "Campaign of Comrade Kim

[246] Interview with Prof. Chang-Wook Park and Prof. Im-Oh Nam, Yonbyon University, (April 2004, June 2006).

Il Sung." For example, in the spring of 1932, he described a visit to the headquarters of the Anti-Japanese Army in Ando.

"The Commander of the Anti-Japanese Forces, who was openly hostile to the Korean Communists, agreed to wage a joint struggle against the Japanese in spite of his mature insight and thorough anti-imperialist revolutionary spirit, who analyzed the complex political situation with keen insight and made clear judgments.... In response to Kim Il-sung's speech, commanders and soldiers joined Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese guerrilla forces and fought bravely under his leadership."[247]

However, in fact, he did not receive consent from the Chinese Salvation Army Corps, so he was dismissed as a Korean. So Kim Il-sung took a separate squad to visit Yang Se-bong, a Korean-nationalist member of the Korean Revolutionary Army.

Leaving Ando, he passed through Musong and arrived in Tonghua in June. On the call

It was to show solidarity with Yang Se-bong, the commander of the Korean Revolutionary Army, who was based there. In other words, Kim Il-sung sought to join the Korean nationalist army, not the Chinese Salvation Army at that time. Yang Se-bong, a nationalist who had worked with Kim Il-sung's father, Kim Hyong-jik, and his colleague's son came to him and suggested that they join the solidarity struggle, but Yang Se-bong refused to do so, saying that

[247] Workers' Party of Korea, 「Comrade Kim Il Sung Strategy, p. 87, p. 92.

nationalism could not be in solidarity with communism. Yang Se-bong rejected Kim Il-sung, saying that nationalism had a defeated party but did not kill people. This was in reference to the killing of the Communist-affiliated independence soldiers, General Kim Chao-jin, and others. Kim Il-sung came back to Sosaha's mother, and in January 1933 he moved to the Chinese Communist Party's guerrilla base in Wangcheng.

> North Korea's history book says of this, "It appeared in the South's phone call.

On the long march to return to the Wangcheng guerrilla base, they overcame many difficulties and trials, standing in their way at every step." [248] North Korea calls this the "South Manchurian Government," but in fact, it is an expression that reflects the wandering period when Kim Il-sung's detachment roamed around being barred from the door wherever it went. Regarding Kim Il-sung's actions during this period, Haruki Wada believed that Kim Il-sung was not acting in accordance with the decisions of the CCP, but that he was acting independently based on his own judgment. [249] According to Professor Kwon Lip of Yanbian University, as an organization of the CCP, it is not allowed to visit the nationalist-affiliated Korean Revolutionary Army without the Party's approval. In other words, the "Ando Guerrilla Army," as

[248] Ibid., p. 95.

[249] Haruki Wada, Kim Il Sung and the Manchurian Anti-Japanese War, p. 94.

North Korea claims, has never been created. The guerrilla forces that existed in Dongman were the Yanji County Guerrilla Army, Huarong County Guerrilla Army, Wang Qing County Guerrilla Army, and Huchun County Guerrilla Army, which were established in each county unit, and these four guerrilla units were merged and reorganized into the East Manchurian Guerrilla Army, which was the forerunner of the 2nd Army of the Northeast North Korean Coalition Army. After all, North Korea's claim that April 25, 1932, is the founding day of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army (KPA) is based on distorted facts.

(5) Distorting the fact of the existence of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army That the Korean People's Revolutionary Army was organized by Kim Il Sung and that it was Kim Il-sung's guerrilla army is at the heart of North Korea's anti-Japanese partisan myth. North Korea claims that "the Korean People's Revolutionary Army was established in March 1934 by uniting the guerrilla units active in various parts of the Northeast with the East Bay Anti-Japanese People's Guerrilla Army as its core."288 This is the [250] same time that the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army of the Communist Party of China was founded. In other words, it was a distortion of the Northeast People's

[250] Kim Il Sung's Strategy, Rodong Sinmun, April 15, 1952.; Institute of the Academy of Sciences, P. 212.

Revolutionary Army as the Korean People's Revolutionary Army. The initial name of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army was the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army, but Kim Il-sung changed this name and called his unit the Korean People's Revolutionary Army.[251]The Second Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army was established in March 1934, and the guerrilla divisions of the four counties were unified into the Independent Company of the Second Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army, with Zhu Jin as president and Wang Deok-tae as president. Kim Il-sung was appointed to the position of lieutenant, a position under the third general.[252] However, Kim Il-sung, who was only in the third rank, fabricated history as if he were the commander of the 2nd Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army. It distorted the history of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army and the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army into the history of Kim Il-sung.

It is true that the Koreans in Manchuria had a strong sense of national autonomy. However, it was not easy for us Koreans who had emigrated to Manchuria to realize national autonomy because of the opposition of the Chinese. In order to realize national autonomy, the People's Livelihood Brigade was organized, but it

[251] See the description of the process of the establishment of the 11 Northeast Anti-Japanese Research Groups above.

[252] Kang Ki-joo, A Study on the History of the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the Korean Nation in China, p. 209.

was severely suppressed and suppressed by the CCP and quickly disbanded. The organization of the Minsaengdan once became a source of anger, and the execution of nationalist-minded people by driving them to the Minsaengdan for about five years is the Minsaengdan Incident or the Anti-Minsaengdan Struggle Incident. It lasted until February 1936, when the Communist International issued a ban on the struggle against the people's livelihood. In such a situation, Kim Il-sung's organization and activities of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army is a historical song that ignores the situation of the times.

This claim that the Korean People's Revolutionary Army is Kim Il-sung's own army

It is the core of the mythologization of the anti-Japanese armed struggle and the greatest distortion of history. In other words, North Korea and Kim Il-sung are transforming the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army into the Korean People's Revolutionary Army. In China, the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, which was jointly founded by Chinese and Koreans and fought in unity, was fabricated as Kim Il-sung's own achievements and history.

It is true from all records and testimonies that Kim Il-sung was a member of the 6th Company of the 2nd Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army. However, North Korea claims that Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese armed activities were carried out as a separate organization from China's Northeast People's Revolutionary Army

or the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army. In March 1934 he organized the Korean People's Revolutionary Army and claimed to have been active in that organization ever since.

In his memoirs in 1960, Lim Chun-chu, a participant in the East Man Anti-Japanese Struggle, claimed that the "Korean People's Revolutionary Army" was "formed in March 1934 on the basis of the East Man Korean People's Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army."[253] According to Kim Il-sung's memoirs (3) published in 1992, the "Korean People's Revolutionary Army" was reorganized under the leadership of the Korean Communists in March 1934, at the same time that the 2nd Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army was established. In fact, the independent division of the 2nd Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army is called the Korean People's Revolutionary Army.

In fact, the claim that the Korean People's Revolutionary Army was organized to wage an anti-Japanese struggle is ridiculous in light of the situation at the time. In East Manchuria, where Kim Il-sung is said to have been active, the days were spent in the Minsaengdan Incident between 1932~1936. More than 500 participants in the Korean armed struggle were executed on charges of slaughter. Minsaengdan refers to those who advocate for the autonomy of Korea as Koreans. It was impossible for the Korean

[253] Lim Chun-chu, Reminiscences of the Period of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle (Pyongyang: Workers' Party of Korea Publishing House, 1960), pp. 63～64.

nation to maintain an anti-Japanese force alone in the East Bay area at that time. Kim Sung-ho, a professor of history at Yanbian University, said that all the historical documents of the CCP that he collected do not contain any record or fact that the Korean People's Revolutionary Army was founded separately from the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army in 1934.

It was argued that it was.[254]

If the Second Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army was the Korean People's Revolutionary Army, who was responsible for the "struggle against the people"? Did Kim Il-sung himself execute more than 500 Korean anti-Japanese militants?

In the spring of 1934, when the struggle against the people's livelihood was in full swing within the East Manchurian Party organization and the anti-Japanese guerrilla zone in China, and the equation of Korean nationalism = factionalism = people's livelihood was completely equated, it was impossible to organize a single national unit of the Korean people, called the Korean People's Revolutionary Army.

All of them.[255]

> The people who led the anti-people's livelihood struggle were sent from the Manchurian Provincial Committee of the CCP.

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[254] Kim Sung-ho, A Study on the 1930s Yanbian Minsaengdan Incident □} (Seoul: Baeksan Archives, 1999), p. 531.

[255] Ibid., p. 532.

The anti-people's struggle was led by the CCP, and Kim Il-sung himself was suspended from his position as a lieutenant in the 3rd and 3rd divisions of the 2nd Army under suspicion of the DPP, and then fled to the 5th Army's Jubojung unit with the help of Jong Jong-un and Wang Yun-sung. This is distorted in North Korea's history as the "First North Korean Expedition." It is as if Kim Il-sung sent troops to North Korea to support Jubojung. It also contradicts other statements recorded in Kim Il-sung's memoirs (4). The memoirs describe the situation after his meeting with Wei Zhengmin of the Communist Party of China, who returned in February 1936 from his participation in the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party in Moscow:

> … The International Party did not send us mere spiritual support, support along the line. He even gave us some countermeasures that could help us to move forward with the Korean revolution vigorously in the future, and expressed our support for our actions. One of them was to reorganize the anti-Japanese guerrilla forces (Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army), which had been waging a joint struggle in alliance, by dividing them into Korean units and Chinese units. … Since the mid-1930s, the Korean Communists have been successfully developing the anti-Japanese armed struggle by forming an anti-Japanese coalition with the Chinese Communists and organizing and carrying out a joint struggle under the banner of anti-Manchurian resistance. Under the new situation, the fact that the units of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army advance to the border areas and concentrate on the Korean revolution cannot weaken the

Chinese people's joint struggle with the anti-Japanese armed units.
It was.[256]

The first paragraph of Kim Il Sung's memoirs is an accurate description of the facts. The Koreans in East Manchuria fought by forming an anti-Japanese coalition jointly with the Chinese, and Kim Il-sung was the commander of the 2nd Army and the 6th Company of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army. However, he conceals the fact that he is a member of the 6th Company of the 2nd Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, and in the second paragraph he describes his unit as an independent unit of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army and fought jointly with the Chinese units.

If the units of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army had already been organized in 1934, why did the CCP representative issue an order from the Communist International to reorganize the anti-Japanese guerrilla units, which had hitherto been united and waged a joint struggle, into national units? Regarding this issue, Haruki Wada said, "If we say that the forerunners of the 2nd Army's 6th Company had the mind to fight for the independence of Korea and the Korean revolution, and that they were formally the units of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, but in terms of their main official and content they thought they were the Korean

[256] Kim Il Sung, With the Century, Vol. 4, pp. 246～248.

People's Revolutionary Army, it would not be possible. It can be said that the Cho Son People's Revolutionary Army was a dream in the hearts of these people."[257]

(6) Concealment and manipulation of facts related to the Minsaengdan At that time, the Minsaengdan issue in the East Bay area was a ridiculous incident like a witch hunt in the Korean anti-Japanese militant community. Nearly 560 Korean anti-Japanese militants were executed on suspicion of being members of the Minsaeng Gang. Kim Il-sung could not help but be involved in various ways in this matter. In this regard, North Korea is distorting the facts in three aspects.

First, Kim Il-sung suffered a lot of pain around September 1933 when he was accused of being a member of the People's Liberation League.

In 1935, when the second arrest order was issued, Zhong Zhongyun (Zhong Zhiyun, correspondent of the Manchurian Provincial Committee of the Central Qingdan, and secretary of the CCP's Wang Qing Special Committee) and Wang Yunsheng (who later served as the head of the Propaganda Department of the Wang Qing Special Committee, the special secretary of Hunchun, the political commissar of the 4th Tön of the German Lip Division, and the

[257] Haruki Wada, Kim Il Sung and the Manchurian Anti-Japanese War, p. 141.

political commissar of the 4th Company of the 2nd Army) took refuge in the Jubozhong unit of the Fifth Army in Beiman.

> However, nowhere in North Korea's history books is Kim Il-sung hating the people's livelihood

The fact that he suffered from righteousness was concealed without mentioning it. When Kim Il-sung was ordered to be arrested, Jong Jong-un and Wang Yun-sung sent Kim Il-sung to North Korea's main security unit, which is called the First North Korean Expedition, but it describes the situation in a completely different way. The "Chosun Tongsa" did not explain why they decided to go to the North Manchu Expedition, but they were counterattacked by the Japanese main army, but they were successfully repelled.

> "In October 1934, the People's Revolutionary Army crossed the Luya Territory and reached the North Bay area. Such an expedition was the first and the first trial of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army in the course of guerrilla warfare. ... The revolutionary army units that had advanced into Yong'an province achieved their objectives and by January 1935 they had left some units behind and reorganized them into East Manchuria."[258]

Second, despite the fact that Kim Il-sung was not allowed to speak out against the anti-Mintu because he was accused of the Minsaengdan at the time, the North Korean history book states that

[258] Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences, Volume II, p. 217.

Kim Il-sung very actively criticized the leftist error of the anti-Mintu from the standpoint of the Juche line. In other words, the North Korean history book states that Kim Il-sung, in his speech at the Rhubarb Foreign Conference, "comprehensively exposed and criticized the national chauvinists (referring to Chinese cadres) and sectarian segregationists (referring to Korean cadres) who made up the majority, for violating the Juche line of the Korean revolution and committing treacherous and destructive maneuvers[259]." The February 1935 Grand Outer Conference was held to discuss the issue of people's livelihood in East Bay. It was a high-ranking cadre meeting of the Communist Party of China, but Kim Il-sung was not eligible to attend because he was not a cadre. However, it describes the meeting as being convened by Kim Il-sung and claims that it was held in accordance with Kim Il-sung's firm Juche line.[260] The meeting was held to discuss the issue of the Minsaengdan, and the Minsaengdan issue was an issue of the Chinese accusing Koreans of being Japanese spies because the Koreans insisted on the autonomy of the Korean people, but it is ridiculous to say that Kim Il-sung himself insisted on the Juche line on the spot in a situation where he was accused of the Minsaengdan. North Korea's "Comrade Kim Il Sung's Secret Campaign" makes such a far-fetched claim that it is

[259] Workers' Party of Korea, Comrade Kim Il Sung's Strategy, p. 151.
[260] Workers' Party of Korea, Comrade Kim Il Sung Strategy, p. 150, p. 154.

doubtful whether the writers were aware of the situation at the time.

Third, one of the major causes of the Minsaengdan incident was the conflict between the Korean guerrilla members and the CCP cadres at the time, but North Korean history books conceal this causal structure and shift the blame to the Korean militants' ideology. It is a method of historical writing by an ancient land book to conceal the fact that Kim Il-sung was a member of the CCP unit. From this point of view, the Korean anti-Japanese fighters who participated in the anti-people's struggle are described in a very negative way. For example, it is possible that he harbored hostility toward a Korean such as Ri Song-il, who served as the chairman of the Sookban Committee, and demanded punishment.

North Korea pointed out that "factionalists such as Kim Song-do (ML) and Ri Song Il (Hwayo faction), who had infiltrated the party's cadres, committed the criminal act of killing many staunch revolutionary fighters by branding them as members of the people's welfare group."[261] The CCP should be blamed, but it is taking a stance of shifting the blame to the Korean guerrilla cadres who were found to be unresponsible. Instead, it writes about the Korean people at that time, "The sectarians, blinded by the lust for power and status, could not distinguish between the cunning

[261] Institute of History, Academy of Social Sciences, ed., The History of the Modern Revolutionary Movement of Korea, p. 265.

policies of the Japanese imperialists and the destruction and dissolution of the people, and they fell prey to their machinations and carried out the struggle against the people's livelihood in a left-leaning manner."[262]

Fourth, although North Korean history books state that Kim Il-sung criticized the anti-people's struggle, it conceals the fact that Kim Il-sung played an active role in the anti-people's struggle, such as serving as an interpreter for Chinese cadres in the struggle. For example, there is a testimony from a participant in the anti-Japanese armed struggle that in March 1935, Kim Il-sung interpreted a speech by the CCP's Chung Zheng Zheng at a rally on the day of the transfer of the head of the Sukban Committee in East Manchuria, who was designated as the head of the Minsaengdan. In an interview conducted by Professor Nam Im-oh about the participants of the anti-Japanese armed struggle, Kim Ha-yoon testified on July 27, 1981. These two old men were from the village where Wang Chengtuan was, and the village where Wang Chengtuan of Kim Ilsung lived. Even now, when I go to the village, there is a stele on the tree at the site of the house of Tönbu, and I testified that this place was renamed the "Command Site Site" in the north. Kim Ha-yoon, an old man who worked as a gatekeeper at the "Revolutionary Children's School" at the time, said of Kim Il-sung, "He is a well-known person. He speaks Chinese well, so when Ri

[262] Workers' Party of Korea, Comrade Kim Il Sung Strategy, p. 147.

Song-il was judged as a minsaengdan, Kim Il-sung stood as an interpreter." Ri Song-il, who was the chairman of the East Man-sukban Committee at the time, was cornered in the People's Prison, tried and shot.

(7) Distortion of Facts as Convener of the Grand Outer Conference and the Yo Yong ConferenceAs discussed above, North Korea stated that Kim Il-sung convened the Grand Outer Conference and gave a speech, and as a follow-up meeting, a meeting was held to discuss the direction of the execution of the results of the Grand Outer Conference. The Yoyeong Conference, which was convened by Wei Chung-min, secretary of the East Manchu Special Committee, was also a meeting to implement the results of the meeting and to discuss whether the Dongman guerrilla base, which had fallen into a crisis due to severe subjugation, should be maintained or abolished and the area of operation should be moved, but it is ridiculous to say that Kim Il-sung convened such a meeting. On this occasion, Kim Il-sung was finally appointed to the rank of lieutenant of the 2nd Army, 3rd Company, and 3rd Division. It makes no sense that Kim Il-sung convened such a meeting and presided over it. It is true that Kim Il-sung attended the meeting. At the meeting, Kim Il-sung expressed his position on the incident and made remarks on the problems of the anti-people's union struggle. The contents of the interview were made with Oh Pyong, a Gil Dong Soon Si-won whom he met

when he was in North Korea to escape the arrest order on suspicion of violating the people's livelihood. In other words, Kim Il-sung learned from Oh Pyong that the essence of the problem of the struggle against the people's livelihood was the left-leaning error of the Communist Party of China and that Oh Pyong's viewpoint was the same, and from the perspective of Oh Pyong, Kim Il-sung was able to raise the issue of the anti-people's livelihood struggle and make a statement that the CCP could sympathize with. Regarding this story, North Korea's campaign against Comrade Kim Il Sung "He insisted on the Juche line."[263] At the Yoying Conference, it was decided that the 2nd Army of the East Bay of Sanhae was divided into the North Bay and the South Bay and dispersed and moved to the Guerrilla Zone, which had been almost destroyed by the Japanese imperialists at the time, and accordingly, Kim Il-sung's 3rd Army was again deployed to the area of the 5th Army in the North Man. North Korea's history books describe this decision as being led by Kim Il-sung.[264]

(8) Distorting the Facts of the Existence of the South Walnut SocietyAn important watershed in the anti-Japanese struggle of the Korean people in Japan was the Seventh Conference of the Communist International Conference held in July 1935. In order to unite the nations and expand and reorganize their armed

[263] Ibid., p. 154.

[264] Ibid., p. 156.

forces, they strengthened the united front among the nations and proposed a solution to end the issue of the Korean people's livelihood as part of its policy. The content of the solution, known as the "New Policy," was to allow autonomy for the Koreans in Gando, to establish the Korean Independence Party, and to establish the Korean Armed Forces. As the issue of the people's livelihood was caused by the conflict between the Chinese and the Koreans caused by the Japanese imperialists, allowing the Korean people to govern themselves would have accommodated the nationalist demands of the Koreans. This is because it will strengthen the united front of the anti-Japanese struggle and solve the root of the problem.

> The reason why such a solution came about at the Seventh Communist International Conference was because of the role of Opyong.

It is estimated that Hal was large. Wu Ping (real name Yang Song) worked as a patrol officer in the Gildong district around September 1934, and in May 1935 he organized the Gildong Special Committee and served as its secretary, and in September of that year, he was appointed as a member of the CCP delegation to Communist International. Ever since he grasped the essence of the Minsaengdan issue, Wu Ping has consistently put forward forward-looking arguments for the implementation of the national autonomy of the Korean people in Gando, and while in Moscow as a member of the CCP delegation to Communist International, he

actively implemented the policy of the CCP anti-Japanese National United Front and made important contributions to the development of the anti-Japanese revolution in the Northeast.[265] As a result of these activities, the new policy toward the Korean people in Japan was decided in 1935 and became the occasion for the establishment of the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Region in September 1952 after liberation. The person who conveyed this policy of the Communist International to Dongman was Yu Zhengmin. It was in February 1936 that Wei Zhengmin, as the secretary of the East Manchurian Special Committee, took the results of the Grand Outer Conference and the Liaoying Conference, participated in the Communist International Conference, and arrived in the 5th District of Jubozhong in North Manchu with the decisions of the Communist International Party. Here, Wei Chong-min met with Zhu Bozhong on February 5~6, 1936 to convey the new policy and discuss the situation in East Manchuria. This is the famous Northern Walnut Society.

However, North Korean history records that Kim Il-sung convened the South Waldu Conference, a meeting of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army's military and political cadres, in

[265] 黑龍江黨史資料, (Vol. 7, 1986), pp. 161～166; Kim Sung-ho, ⍰A Study on the 1930s Yanbian Minsaengdan Incident⍰, reprinted in p. 183.

Namhudu for a week from about February 27, 1936[266][267], and instructed on a new policy.[268] Early North Korean writings mentioned that Kim Il-sung was the son of the Seventh Congress of Communist Nations[269], but later historiography states that Kim Il-sung convened the South Walnut Conference and made the decision. The turning point in the interpretation of history in order to establish the main body ideology is the distortion of the North Walnut Conference into the Southern Walnut Conference. Since the North Walnut Conference is the delivery of the decision of the Communist International Party to Dongman, the main body of the anti-Japanese struggle is the Communist International, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, whereas the distorted history of the establishment of the Juche ideology in North Korea is that Kim Il-sung suddenly convened a meeting of the military and political cadres at the head of the South Lake and decided on a new course of struggle.

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[266] It was written by Wei Zhengmin, Wang Deotai, and Zhu Bozhong, and none of the surviving Chinese texts mention the Southern Hunut Conference. Hsinchubaek, 『History of the Korean National Movement in Manchuria 1920~

[267] See n. 446.

[268] Workers' Party of Korea, 『Comrade Kim Il Sung Strategy, p. 164.

[269] Institute of History, Academy of Social Sciences, History of the Modern Revolutionary Movement of Korea, p. 279.

"『With the Century』" describes Kim Il-sung as having met with Yu Chung-min in mid-February at South Walnut, and[270][271] there is such a possibility. It is recorded that on February 9, 1936, Wei Chung-min, who left North Hudu in Yongan County, met Wang Deok-tae, the commander of the 2nd Army, and Yi Hak-chung, the political chief, who had left about 10 days before him, at Akmok, and immediately after that, they met with the Western Detachment of the 2nd and 5th Armies. It is possible that Kim Il-sung, who was a member of the Western Detachment at this time, also met with Yu Chung-min, but this cannot be regarded as a meeting of the southern walnut meeting. 308 In fact, it is presumed that a messenger delivered a message to Kim Il-sung, who was stationed at Namhudu, to withdraw from Bukman, and to assemble at Mihonjin in Dongman, as a decision at the meeting of the Northern Walnu Conference, which was attended by the commanders of the 2nd Army, including Wei Chung-min, Ju Bo-jung, and Wang Deok-tae. Kim Il-sung received the news and conveyed it to the members of the 3 Tön of the 2nd Army, and moved the troops to Mihonjin to carry out the instructions of the Northern Walnu Conference.

> In accordance with the instructions of the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party, the people of the East Bay

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[270] Kim Il Sung, With the Century, Vol. 4, p. 238.

[271] 崔燎原, 王德泰抗聯 2 軍, 吉林教育出版社, 1994, p. 98; Reprinted in Xinju Bai, The History of the Korean People's Movement in Manchuria 1920~1945, p. 447.

In order to unite the tribes and expand and reorganize the armed forces, the 2nd Army was brought out to Mihonjin in Dongman, and Kim Il-sung was also moved to Mihonjin. Regarding this, North Korean historiography asserts that "in order to implement the policy of military-political struggle set forth by Kim Il-sung at the South Waldu Conference, the main forces of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army advanced from the northern Manchurian Government to the Changbaek district on the Yalu River from the end of 1935~spring 1936 from the North Manchurian Government through Akmok to Musong[272]." However, the unit that Kim Il-sung entered in August 1936 was formed at the Mihonjin Conference held in early March, and it was the Mihonjin Conference that decided to advance to Mt. Paektu.

The Comrade Kim Il Sung Campaign asserts that "Comrade Kim Il Sung's strategic policy set forth at the South Walnut Conference has become an immortal torch that illuminates the road ahead of the Korean revolution[273]." It claims that the announcement of the decision made at the Seventh Communist International Congress in July 1935 was the policy that Kim Il-sung decided independently, and claims that it was the origin of the Juche idea in the anti-Japanese armed struggle.

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[272] Lee Na-young, The History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle, p. 381.
[273] Workers' Party of Korea, Comrade Kim Il Sung Strategy, p. 170.

(9) Distorting the Facts of the Conveners of the Unhonjin Conference and the Donggang Conference The Mihonjin Conference was a meeting held before March 8, 1936, in which the Party and military cadres of the East Bay gathered to implement the decisions made at the Seventh Communist International Congress in East Man, and was presided over by Yu Chung-min, Secretary of the East Manchurian Special Committee.

C. The main contents of the meeting were to reorganize the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army into the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, to establish a third company in the Second Army, to appoint Kim Il-sung as president, to establish a new third company to operate in the border areas between the DPRK and China, to end the struggle against the people's livelihood and to establish the Fatherland Liberation Association. The results of the meeting are documented on March 8, 1936[274]. However, North Korea describes the meeting as if it were presided over by Kim Il-sung.[275] It states that after the South Hudu Conference, in order to bring about a great upsurge of the revolutionary movement on a nationwide scale, the Korean People's Revolutionary Army (KPA)

[274] "Letters from Wei Min-sheng and Wang Deok-tae to the Peacock Committee and Comrade Yun Song: On the Organization of the Second Army and the Party's Organizational Problems," (March 8, 1936), ed. Kim Woo-jong, Historical Archives of the Inhang Japanese History of Northeast Region Korea, Vol. 8, p. 269.

[275] Workers' Party of Korea, Comrade Kim Il Sung Strategy, p. 171.

troops marched to Mount Paektu when they arrived at Minhonjin in the early spring of 1936 and took important steps to reorganize the units of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army there.[276]

The Donggang Conference was held on May 1, 1936, and was a meeting of the 2nd Army's general-level cadres presided over by Wang Deo-tae, the commander of the 2nd Army. At this meeting, the action plan of the 2nd Army was finalized in detail among the resolutions of the USC, and the construction of a new guerrilla zone by advancing the 1st and 3rd companies to the area of Mt. Paektu and the construction of the Korean Incapacitance Association in Korea were also discussed.

However, North Korean history records that Kim Il-sung presided over the Donggang Conference and proclaimed the 10-point program of the Fatherland Liberation Society (May 5, 1936) ~~and decided~~ to publish it in March and January.[277] In fact, the 10-point program of the Fatherland Liberation Association was adopted at the Hari Conference held in South Manchurian in June. It is the policy of the Fatherland Liberation Association to build a united front by uniting regardless of differences in rank, gender, position, age, religion, etc. For Koreans, the Fatherland Liberation Party actually means solidarity between the communist line and the

[276] Ibid., pp. 171～172.

[277] Institute of History, Academy of Social Sciences, 『History of Contemporary Joseon, p. 103.

nationalist line of the South. The 10-point program of the Fatherland Liberation Association, March and January, were all led by Lee Dong-kwang, secretary of the Namman Provincial Committee.

C. President of the 6th Company of the 2nd Army (March 1936~October 1940)

(1) Concealment of facts about the process of appointing the commander of the 6th Company of the 2nd Army Kim Il-sung served as a lieutenant in the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army as the 3rd Lieutenant of the 2nd Army's Independent Company

Then, in early March 1936, he was appointed president of the 3 companies of the 2nd Army (from June, 6 companies of the 2nd Army) when the 3rd Company of the 2nd Army was newly established at the meeting of the American Marriage Council. In the midst of the tragedy of the Second Army's civilian massacre in the East Bay area, when most of the Korean cadres were executed, Kim Il-sung survived and was selected as a high-ranking commander. The process of Kim Il-sung's becoming the president of the second and third companies was a very important event and a turning point in Kim Il-sung's life, but North Korean biographies obscure all these facts. This is to portray Kim Il-sung as the leader of the anti-

Japanese guerrilla army from the very beginning immediately after the Manchurian Incident in 1931, and to describe it as if Kim Il-sung founded the anti-Japanese guerrilla army by himself and has been in charge of the command and commander since then.

> However, in the fourth volume of "With the Century", a new division, the 2nd Army 3rd Company,

There is a technique about it.[278] It described the formation of a new division by incorporating the People's Livelihood Corps into the 20-member unit. That was the first Kim Il-sung unit. If the previous unit established on April 25, 1932, and the Korean People's Revolutionary Army (KPA), founded in March 1934, were created by Kim Il-sung himself, there is no reason to leave them alone and create a new unit to operate in the Mt. Paektu area. It is a self-contradictory historiography that proves that the new division, the 3rd Company of the 2nd Army, was the first of its own.

(2) Distortion of the fact that it is the 6th Company of the 2nd Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army and the name of the unitThe unit to which Kim Il-sung belonged when he was active in Manchuria was the 6th Company of the 2nd Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, which is a unit of the Chinese Communist Party. However, North Korea distorted all the historical books to say that Kim Il-sung had an

[278] Kim Il Sung, With the Century, Vol. 4, p. 321.

independent army and party organization independent of China. Therefore, there are many historical narratives that do not fit the pulse of the description of the situation at the time, and there is no causal connection. If you don't know these facts, you will experience great confusion in reading North Korean history books. For example, North Korea uses the names of the DPRK People's Revolutionary Army, the DPRK-China Combined Forces, and the DPRK Son People's Revolutionary Army interchangeably. These are all contradictions committed by trying to describe Kim Il-sung's troops, which acted as the Northeast Port's Japanese Coalition Army, as if they were independent units.

In the 1958 Chosun Tongsa, an early historical book, the anti-Japanese struggle in Manchuria was claimed to be the sole achievement of Kim Il's military unit, but the final section, "The Historical Significance of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle," points out that the anti-Japanese united front was waged against the international revolutionary forces, that is, the Soviet Union and China.

> The historical significance of the anti-Japanese armed struggle lies in the fact that it victoriously ensured the struggle of the Korean people against Japanese imperialism by forming a solid front with the international revolutionary forces, and also that this struggle was carried out as part of the national liberation movement of the peoples of the international revolutionary movement and other colonial and semi-colonial subordinate countries. From the very first day, the armed

> struggle against Japan led by the Korean Communists was carried out under the auspices of the Soviet Union's successes in a long line of relations with international forces and in contact with the Chinese Communist Party. At the same time, the Korean Communists consistently defended the Soviet Union in the course of the armed struggle and formed a united front against the Chinese people against the Chinese people against any common enemy.[279]

Later recognition of the united front with China and the united front with the Soviet Union

This is different from when the Juche idea was established.

While referring to the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, Kim Il-sung

There are also parts that describe him as if he was in command as the commander-in-chief. For example, the 1st Route Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army (a unit that combines the 1st and 2nd armies) was reorganized into a three-area army after the surrender of Chung Bin, the commander of the 1st Company of the 2nd Army, and the 1st Army was reorganized into a 3-area army, with the 1st Army being the 1st Army and the 6th Company of the 2nd Army having the largest number of survivors, and the remaining units of the 2nd Army being reorganized into the 3-Sector Army. Kim Il-sung, of course, was in charge of the two-way army. However, they are creating confusion by falsely describing history as if Kim Il-sung's troops were a three-fronted military

[279] Institute of History, Academy of Sciences, 「Korean Syntax」, p. 274.

system, and by stating that Kim Il-sung commanded the two-way and three-frontal armies.[280] "At that time, Marshal Kim Il-sung commanded the 2nd and 3rd frontal armies, and from the beginning of 1940 he was in charge of all the units operating in the East and South Manchurian areas," he wrote.[281] This is close to the truth. This is because by the last stage of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, almost all the other commanders of the 1st Route Army, such as Yang Jung-woo and Wang Deok-tae, were killed. However, it should be pointed out that the problem is that Kim Il-sung distorted the entire Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army from the beginning without revealing such facts.

In Kim Il-sung's 「memoirs, "With the Century," there is a section that clearly describes the name and size of the troops. In other words, in the seventh volume of Kim Il-sung's memoirs, The Arduous March, he wrote, "I decided to divide the two armies into several directions and move with the seven regiments. However, the commanders who participated in the caucus meeting were all opposed to me going with the Seventh Regiment. … In the end, we decided to split the army in three directions. The command ordered the Inspector Company and the Machine Gun Platoon to go out in the direction of Gajaesu through Cheongbong Ying, and the Fifth Regiment of the 7th Regiment to advance and operate in the

[280] Institute of History, Academy of Sciences, 「Korean Syntax」, p. 258.
[281] Ibid., p. 258.

Shanggang District area of Changbai County, and the 8th Regiment and the Independence Battalion to operate in the Donggang area of Musong County." [282] It accurately describes the name, size, and formation of Kim Il-sung's troops. However, here it is also distorting the facts in that it conceals the fact that Kim Il-sung was the commander of the 2nd Frontier Army and portrays the situation as having given instructions to the 2nd Frontier Army from among all the battalions.

(3) Distortion of facts related to the Fatherland Liberation Association The Fatherland Liberation Party is an important point in the history of the anti-Japanese struggle. It was decided at the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party in July 1935 and was delivered to Dongman by Yu Chung-min, who participated in the meeting, in the March 1936 Unmarried Conference. In order to strengthen the tactics of reunification among the nations, the Communist regime instructed Koreans to form their own party, but in Dongman, it was replaced by the Korean Liberation Association in consideration of the special circumstances of Dongman. The Korean Liberation Association was organized at the Hari Conference in June 1936. The Hari Conference was a meeting presided over by Wei Chung-min in order to convey the new policy of the Seventh Communist International Conference to South Man.

[282] Kim Il Sung, With the Century, Vol. 7 (Successive Editions), p. 159.

It was at this meeting that Wei Zhengmin met for the first time with Yang Zhengwu, the head of the 1st Army in South Man. As a result of the meeting, the South Bay Special Committee and the East Bay Special Committee were merged into the South Manchurian Special Committee.

> Through a resolution titled "The Revival of Korean Dukes" at the Hari Conference,

For the first time, it was decided to organize the "Fatherland Liberation Association," and for the first time, the name of the organization was decided. This resolution was made by the person of perjury, but it was judged to be a resolution based on the discussion of the meeting.

All of them.[283]

The two documents, dated June 10, 1936, "Declaration of the Association for the Liberation of the Fatherland in Korea" and "The Ten Programmes (Draft) for the Liberation of the Fatherland in Korea, Japan, and Japan," were prepared by the Hari Conference. The declaration has three signatures as promoters: Oh Sung-ryun, Eom Sung-yeong, and Lee Sang-jun. Oh Sung-ryun is Jeon-gwang's real name, and Lee Sang-jun is Lee Dong-kwang's real name. It is presumed that Eom Myung-yeong was Eom Pil-soon, who was the head of the 1st Army's logistics department and was the highest-ranking Korean in the 1st Army. These three are Namman, and the

[283] Haruki Wada, North Korea: From a Guerrilla State to a Regular Military State, p. 143.

foundation is Jeon Kwang[284]. In East Man, intellectuals were expelled during the People's Livelihood Incident, so there was no one to participate. And since the Fatherland Liberation Rally is intended to expand the united front of the Korean nation by merging the Communist line of East Man and the Nationalist line of South Man, it is naturally to be carried out by the South Man in the South Manji area.

> In North Korea, it is said that the Korean Liberation Association was organized at the Donggang Conference.

This is not true. Since Kim Il-sung did not attend the Hari Conference, the door took this into consideration and distorted it to mean that the Fatherland Liberation Association was organized at the Donggang meeting attended by Kim Il-sung. The Donggang Conference is a high-level executive meeting of the two armies, and the issue of the formation of the Fatherland Liberation Society, which is aimed at working with Koreans, is an issue that should be pursued at the level of the CCP Party.

However, North Korean history books claim that Kim Il-sung even wrote the program of the Fatherland Liberation Society. It conceals the fact that the Fatherland Liberation Association was a decision made by the Seventh Communist International Congress, and claims that it was the policy proposed by Kim Il-sung at the Yoying-gu Conference in the spring of 1935.[285] It is true that it was Kim Il-

[284] Ibid., p. 145.

[285] Ibid., p. 378.

sung who dispatched political operatives from the Changbaek region to organize the Fatherland Liberation Society. The first person to be dispatched was Kwon Young-byeok, the head of the organization department of the 6th Company, and then Jang Jeong-yeol, the youth manager of the 6th Company, and Je Je-sun, a farmer, were dispatched to do the work.

The March and January editions of the organ of the Fatherland Liberation Association are described as having been published by Kim Il-sung, but[286] the actual publisher is Lee Dong-kwang. In particular, the DPRK states, "The program of the Fatherland Liberation Society is a revolutionary program drawn up by applying Marxist-Leninist strategic tactics in the 1930s to the present situation of our country and the development of the Korean revolution, and it rallied communists in the country to unite the revolutionary organizations to expand and strengthen the genuine communist core for the founding of the Party."[324] The Fatherland Liberation Association is a united front organization of nationalism and communism in the South, and it is a distortion of the facts to claim that it is a communist mobilization organization.

In the first issue of March 1, the number of anti-Japanese fighters from the three companies of the 2nd Army is described as about 90,

[286] Workers' Party of Korea, 「Comrade Kim Il Sung Strategy, p. 189. [324] Ibid., p. 377.

according to a North Korean history book.[287]It is a document that testifies to the size of the 2nd Army's 3rd Company at the time.

(4) Exaggeration of the Battle of Bocheonbo and concealment of policy failures The Battle of Bocheonbo is considered important enough to be regarded as a symbolic example of Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against Japan in North Korea. The reason for this was the first time that the 2nd, 4th, and 6th companies of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army joined forces in accordance with the new policy of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, and Kim Il-sung's name became known in Korea due to the extensive coverage of the Dong-A Ilbo and Chosun Ilbo at the time.

The Battle of Bocheonbo itself was a battle with no major casualties, except for the symbolic meaning of being the first time a Japanese police were invading Korea, but after that, it was followed by a chase by the Japanese police, leading to the Battle of Kansambong, and the Japanese suffered heavy losses.

Since it is a battle that North Korea attaches great importance to, there are just as many exaggerations and distortions about the Battle of Bocheonbo. First of all, it was an operation by the combined forces of the 2nd and 4th companies of the 1st Army and the 6th Company of the 2nd Army (Kim Il-sung's troops), but it was

[287] Workers' Party of Korea, Comrade Kim Il Sung Strategy, p. 197.

distorted to make it appear as if it was an operation of Kim Il-sung's troops alone.[288]

North Korean history books claim that Kim Il-sung gathered a crowd of people and gave a speech at the Battle of Bocheonbo. "Our brothers and sisters, who were oppressed and despised, hugged each other and shed tears of emotion and joy while avoiding the eyes of the Japanese police," and "gave a historic speech in which he appealed to the cheering people to rally for the freedom and independence of the country."[289] It is not true that he gathered the villagers together during the battle and gave a speech.

C. The Battle of Bocheonbo was an incident in which they attacked the village of Bocheonbo in just one hour, set fire to the residence and major government offices, and captured food and old military goods before fleeing. At the time, the Dong-A Ilbo of June 5, 1936 reported that the residents were terrified. It was reported that "the incident caused panic among more than a thousand residents."[290]

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[288] Institute of History, Academy of Sciences, 「Korean Syntax」, p. 247.

[289] Historical Compilation Committee, History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle, p. 389; Workers' Party of Korea, Comrade Kim Il Sung, p. 213.

[290] "Centered on the rim zone of Changbaek County's 20 districts, Kim Il-sung joined the 1st faction of Kim Il-sung, a government minister who had been looting, arsoning, intimidating and assaulting since last year, and the 1st faction of Choe Hyun, the leader of the government who had been active for decades in the rim zone of the alternative of Pyongbuk, about 100 of the 300 elite troops broke into Seonhye-myeon Bojeon-ri, Gan-gun, under the cover of late night at about 11 o'clock on the night of the 4th, and divided into two factions, one of which attacked the Bocheon Bo station, and the other one cut telephone lines in various places, and set fire to the post office,

Regarding the allegation that Kim Il-sung gave a speech to the people,

The person who testified that it was completely different from the thread was Kang Wee-ryong, the head of the machine gun squad of Kim Il-sung's unit. Kang Yu-ryong was a friend of Kim Il-sung at the time of the anti-Japanese armed struggle, and he was the one who accompanied Kim Il-sung when he went from Manchuria to Primorye.

C. He served as the head of the judiciary in Yanbian until 1962, and then went to North Korea, and when he saw that the Bocheonbo Battle Hall was a great battle, he said that it was not true, and that he was sent to Haeju for labor reform.[329]

Kim Il-sung did not give a speech, but the members of the corps distributed leaflets. North Korea states that the leaflets distributed at the Battle of Bocheonbo are "Kim Il-sung, commander of the North Korean Expeditionary Force of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army," but this is not true. In fact, it is a Chinese sentence called "Commander of the North Korean Expeditionary Force of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, Kim Il Sung." There is a haunt.[330]

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the cotton office, the forest reserve office, etc., and surrounded the villages of about 100 people on the first side, and looted them at will, and escaped to the alternative in an hour. More than a thousand people in Bocheonbo Village

In addition, North Korean historiography describes the Battle of Bocheonbo as a very successful battle. In fact, the Battle of Bocheonbo had the propaganda effect of a domestic vacuum, but the actual result of the battle was very devastating.

C. It was the occasion for the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army to be crushed. After the Battle of Bocheonbo, the Japanese authorities desperately launched a subjugation. Chang Bai County's Motherland Light

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The villagers staged the so-called second incident that caused panic". Donga Ilbo, June 8, 1936.

329 Interview with Professor Chang Wook Park, Yonbyon University, (April 2004).

330 Workers' Party of Korea, Comrade Kim Il Sung's Strategy, p. 212.

The organization was almost destroyed with 739 arrests, and Kim Il-sung's troops were forced to make an "arduous march" under the relentless pursuit of the Japanese army. In addition, the 1st Company President, Jung Bin, surrendered, and the 1st Route Army's General Yang Jung-woo was killed, causing great damage and eventually being forced to flee to the Soviet Union in the fall of 1940.

(5) Distorting the Meaning of the Arduous March

The Battle of Bocheonbo served as an opportunity to further tighten the reins of the subjugation campaign against Japan, which started the Sino-Japanese War (July 7, 1937), and

the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army fell into great difficulties after that. The situation became even more difficult when the 1st Route Army's commander-in-chief, Yang Jung-woo's right-hand man, surrendered. This is because the military's organization and strategy have all been exposed. After the arrest of Cho Kwang in the Battle of Bocheonbo, he lost his popular base in Changbai, and in 1938, Musong, From the end of 1938, Kim Il-sung's troops, which were active in the Imgang and Monggang areas, were pursued by the Japanese punitive forces and had to move to Changbaekhyeon on an arduous march. This is because the encirclement narrowed to the point where Yi Jong-rak encouraged Kim Il-sung's grandmother to surrender. For 100 days between December 1938 ~ March 1939, they escaped the pursuit of the Japanese army and moved from Monggang County to the northern border area along the Yalu River, which is called the "Arduous March."

North Korean history books only emphasize the "arduous march" and conceal the fact that the strategic failure at the Battle of Bocheonbo led to the arduous march. North Korean historiography states that "the members of the People's Revolutionary Army fought with all their might in order to unconditionally accept and implement Kim Il-sung's line, policy, orders and instructions[291]

[291] Institute of History, Academy of Social Sciences, □History of Modern Joseon, p. 133.

unconditionally" and "As communist fighters who fought resolutely on the road of revolution in the face of such adversity, He grew up to be a warrior of steel."[292]

Even now, North Korea is invoking the hardship march that was inevitable due to past policy failures as if it were a great legend and urging the people to celebrate the "arduous march" caused by the current economic difficulties.

(6) Distorting the facts of the Southern Losers' Conference and the Sohalba Colony

After the surrender of the 1st Route Army in June 1938, the 1st Route Army was reorganized into three armies at the 2nd Seniors' Conference in July by Political Commissar Wei Chung-min and Army Commander Yang Jung-woo. Kim Il-sung did not attend the Second Presbyterian Conference. On this date, November 25, 1938, Kim Il-sung met Yang Jung-woo, the commander of the 1st Route Army, who was moving in the direction of Hari, in the southern lozenges and received the decision of the 2nd Workers' Conference, and formed the 2nd Route Army.[293] The South Losers' Conference, which North Korean history books claim, was the result of Kim Il-sung, who received the results of the seniors' conference, and

[292] Ibid., p. 133.

[293] Shin Ju-baek, A Study on Kim Il-Sung's Manchurian Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Movement, p. 182.

delivered orders from within his own unit. However, North Korea states that Kim Il-sung convened a meeting of the South and decided to reorganize the troops into the Forward Army.[294] In a similar way, North Korean historiography states that Kim Il-sung decided to turn the meeting into a small unit by convening the Sohalba Colony. In fact, around the middle of March 1940, Wei Chung-min held the Second Dudo-ryu Conference in Dudo-ryu, Hwazhen County, and decided on the activities of small units and the movement of armed units to the areas of small and medium-sized countries. Kim Il-sung was informed of this policy in early July when he met with Yu Chung-min. However, North Korean history books describe this as if it were a decision made by Kim Il-sung on his own initiative. It states that "in order to meet the great event of the liberation of the country in a prepared manner, a new course of struggle has been proposed."[295]

D. Soviet Camp Period (October 1940~September 1945)

(1) Concealment of the fact of evacuation from the Soviet Union North Korean historiography concealed the fact of Kim Il-sung's evacuation to the Soviet Union and his activities in the 88th

[294] Ibid., p. 131.
[295] Ibid., p. 331.

Brigade, and [296] in the face of fierce criticism from Chinese and South Korean historiography, Kim Il-sung's memoirs, "With the Century," published after Kim Il-sung's death, described the evacuation to the Soviet Union for the first time.[337]

The History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle (1958) distorted the fact that Kim Il-sung continued guerrilla activities while staying in Manchuria, and in order to distort the facts, he stopped the activities of the battalions and switched to the activities of the small units. At an emergency meeting of the Party Committee of the People's Revolutionary Army held in Sohalva in August 1940, it was decided to switch from large-unit activities to small-unit activities in order to preserve their capabilities under the difficult situation, and on the basis of this resolution, the transition to small-unit activities began in 1941[297].In addition, the "History of Modern Korea" describes Kim Il-sung's troops as if they had actually conducted military drills in Manchuria.He [298] concealed the fact of his crossing in the Soviet Union and described the military training in the Soviet Union as if it had been conducted in Manchuria.

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[296] Lee Na-young, The History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle, p. 388. [337] Kim Il Sung, With the Century, Vol. 8, p. 60.

[297] Lee Na-young, History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle, p. 427.

[298] Institute of History, Academy of Social Sciences, History of Contemporary Joseon, p. 147.

However, after Kim Il-sung's death, Kim Il-sung's memoirs were published as "The Century and the More"

French Language, Vol. 8 corrected this fact. It states that he entered the Soviet Union at the invitation of the International Party.

> Two liaisons from the International Party came to visit us. They said that the person who sent them was General Ryushenko of the Far Eastern Military Command, and that he was going to convey in the name of the International Party that he was invited to participate in a conference convened by the International Party in Khabarovsk in December 1940. They also simultaneously conveyed the International Party's directive that all anti-Japanese armed units operating in Manchuria should move from large battalion activities to small unit activities, establish bases in Yuandong (Primorye), and enter as soon as possible so that they can recover and reorganize their forces.[299]

In fact, Kim Il-sung's troops began moving to the Soviet Union in August 1940.

She menstruated around October 23. It describes the situation before and after the menstruation of Seo Soon-ok, who accompanied Kim Il-sung and the Soviet Union, as follows.

> "In August 1940, Kim Il-sung, Kang Wee-ryong, and 16 of us left for the Soviet Union. Before entering the Soviet Union, they held a wedding ceremony between Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-sook in a mountain valley in Hunchun, and they sang revolutionary songs and held a rock. After Kim Il-sung, Kang

[299] Kim Il Sung, "With the Century," vol. 8, p. 51.

> Yu-ryong and 16 other guerrilla fighters entered the Soviet Union, Comrade Kim Il-sung dispatched Kang Yu-ryong and another comrade to instruct the Soviet frontier fighters to arrest them. So we were arrested and put in a tunnel prison."[300]

By the way, the evacuation of Kim Il-sung's troops to the Soviet Union without permission without instructions from higher units

There is evidence that it was done in the At that time, Ju Bo-joong, who received a report on the situation of the 1st Route Army, learned that Kim Il-sung, Seo Chol, and Kim Il had violated Yu Chung-min's decision and all the troops had escaped, leaving behind Wei Jeong-min, the commander of the 1st Route Army. In April, when Ju Bo-jung departed for Manchuria to rescue Yu Chung-min, he arranged for Kim Il-sung to carry with him the following letter (dated March 12, 1941) addressed to Wei Chung-min in connection with Kim Chae-chung, the head of the Third Route Army. It proves that Kim Il-sung fled to the Soviet Union without the CCP's instructions.

> "No matter how difficult it is, no matter what the reason, it is wrong for Kim Il-sung and Comrade Yoon Jun-san's troops to menstruate. This error is not the agitation of the revolutionary position as a whole, nor is it the loss of the direction of the

[300] Interview with Prof. Chang Wook Park and Prof. Kwon Lip; Shin Ju-baek, □A Study on Kim Il-sung's Manchurian Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Movement□□}p. 183.

whole. The fault lies in completely deviating from the General Headquarters of the First Route Army, neglecting the possible conditions for the struggle for the support of the guerrillas, and adopting an opportunistic method of cross-border without recognizing the whole environment and without fully seeking ways to overcome the difficulties. This is an unforgivable wrong. Kim Il-sung and his subordinate comrades are consciously admitting their mistakes. According to the rules, Kim Il-sung, Ma Deok-san (Kim Il-il), and Ri Bok-nok must be severely punished. We offer you. You will take proper action." (東北地區革命歷史文件匯集), 甲 61 券, p. 107)[342]

(2) In addition to Kim Jong-il's birth on Mt. Paektu, the details of Kim Jong-il's birth were described for the first time. "Kim Jong Il was born in Paektu at dawn on February 16, 1942." It is stated.[343] North Korea's claims are not true. "With the Century" describes the fact that Kim Il-sung moved to the Soviet Union in August 1940. However, in "With the Century," there is no description of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-sook working as a small unit in Manchuria in February 1942, when Kim Jong-il was born. The only time Kim Il-sung went out to Manchuria was between April 9 ~ August 29, 1941 to find a perjury citizen. On February 16, 1942, when Kim Jong Il was born, neither Kim Il Sung nor Kim Jong Sook were in Wondong, not on Mount Paektu.

In the section titled "Cultivating the Roots of the Revolution" in the eighth volume of The Century, the birth of Kim Jong-il is described, but the description of Kim Jong-il's birth in Paektu-yeong

is very simple and lacks realism. This is because they fabricated what was not true into fiction.

(3) Falsification of the Facts of the Manchurian Small Unit Activities North Korean historiography tries to justify the fact of Kim Il-sung's evacuation to the Soviet Union by claiming that he continued his activities in Manchuria after his evacuation to the Soviet Union. The succession version of "With the Century " sets the chapter "Days of Small Unit Activity" and states that "large-scale fights were of course avoided in order to preserve their capabilities. Instead, mass politics

342 Haruki Wada, North Korea: From a Guerrilla State to a Regular Military State, p. 57.

343 Kim Il Sung, With the Century, Vol. 8, p. 298.

and reconnaissance activities," he wrote, listing the details of the reconnaissance activities.[301] Although the Soviet 88th Brigade had sent a small unit to reconnaissance, Kim Il-sung had only been sent to Manchuria once from April to August 1941 on a mission to find and bring back to the Soviet Union the lone Wei Zheng Min in Manchuria under the direction of the 88th Brigade. However, Kim Il-sung could not find Yu Jeong-min and returned to Primorye in

301 Kim Il Sung, With the Century, Vol. 8, pp. 179～205.

August, because Yu Chung-min had already been killed in March of that year.

However, in order to avoid the Soviet Union being attacked by Germany and Japan, the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Treaty was signed in April 1941, which prohibited the Communist troops from clashing with Japan in Manchuria.

(4) Concealment of the Facts of the Battle of Fatherland Liberation by the Soviet Union Early North Korean historiography shows that the Japanese Empire was defeated by the great Soviet Army.

The facts of the liberation of Bang and Korea were described truthfully.[302]

> When the Soviet army entered the war against Japan and launched a battle that dealt a decisive blow to the Japanese imperialists, the Korean People's Revolutionary Army advanced toward Korea with the Soviet army under the leadership of Marshal Kim Il Sung. The war against Japan was brought to a swift end by the heroic advance of the great Soviet army. ... In August 1945, the powerful Soviet army

[302] Ibid., p. 433. [346]
Ibid., p. 438.

> defeated the Japanese Kwantung Army and liberated Korea.[346]

> Early historiography clearly stated that the subject of liberation was the Soviet army. this one

is a point that distinguishes it from later historical books. The purge of historian Lee Na-young is likely to have raised this issue as an issue. He emphasized that Kim Il-sung was firmly grounded in the line of international revolutionary struggle. In particular, he wrote that Kim Il-sung's struggle always gained invincible strength in strengthening ties with the great Soviet Union.[303] It is ironic that North Korean history books do not mention Kim Il-sung's participation as a member of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, but emphasize his ties with the Soviet Union. This can be seen as a disproof of the fact that Kim Il-sung was appointed supreme leader by the Soviet Union.

In 1949, the historical book "History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle" described the Soviet army as the sole battle, but in 1958, the "Korean Tongsa" wrote that Korea was liberated together with the Soviet army. "When the Soviet Army's campaign against Japan began, the Korean People's Revolutionary Army gathered its small teams and with renewed and irrepressible strength participated in a fierce battle to defeat the Japanese

[303] Kim Il Sung, With the Century, Vol. 8, p. 269.

Kwantung Army on the border and liberate Korea[304]." The problem is that this is the whole part. Not a word is said about the units that participated in the battle and the circumstances of the battle. In fact, if Kim Il-sung's troops had participated in the battle for the liberation of Korea, it would have been enough to compile dozens of books, but since it was not a historical fact, it was treated as a single line on the door.

The History of the「Modern Revolution of Korea, published in 1961, states:

> On August 9, 1945, the historic Soviet campaign against Japan began. The Korean People's Revolutionary Army launched combat actions in parallel with the Soviet army. The Korean People's Revolutionary Army, in parallel with the Soviet Army, carried out combat actions in a vast area from the North and East Bays to the country, through the East Bay to the South Sea of North Hamgyong Province, through the Changchun area and the landing operations in the areas of Xinju, Unggi, and Chongjin, and developed a clear advance on the East Sea coast of North Korea as the main offensive direction. On August 10, Unggi and Najin were liberated, followed shortly by Wonsan.[305]

Strangely, it is described as having managed to get out of Khabarovsk to Ungi Nazhin in just one day and repulse the Japanese army. The Battle of Bocheonbo is described in detail in 12 pages,

[304] Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences, 「Korean Syntax」, p. 438.
[305] Ibid., p. 338.

but there is only one page on the far more important Fatherland Liberation War. There is no content at all.

The most recent book, 「The History of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle, is a long 136-page book with only one line about the Soviet army, as if Kim Il-sung's Korean People's Revolutionary Army had defeated the Japanese army and liberated Korea.

> The Japanese imperialists, who suffered a decisive blow both at home and abroad due to the fierce advance of the front-line units, the active disturbance of the armed insurrectionary organizations including the small units, teams, the Party and the Fatherland Liberation Association, the People's Armed Battalion and the People's Armed Forces, and the massive anti-Japanese uprising of the entire people, declared their unconditional surrender on August 15, Juche 34(1945), just one week after the Korean People's Revolutionary Army launched its final attack.[306][307]

It is also interesting to note that "With the Century" uses a completely different technique than the absurdly distorted techniques of other historical books. "With Three Flags" is close to the fact that Kim Il-sung had no role in the liberation war. It is the only North Korean historical document that reveals Kim Il-sung's failure to participate in the Fatherland Liberation Battle.

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[306] Science Encyclopedia Publishing House, 「History of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle」, Vol. 10 (Pyongyang: Science Encyclopedia Publishing House, [307]), pp. 135～136.

> Whenever I look back on the period of the final decisive battle, I regret that the main forces of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army, which had been preparing for the Fatherland Liberation Operation for many years at the training base in Soryon, were not able to carry out the battle as originally planned. While our units were engaged with the Japanese on the northern border, we were directing the operations of the front-line units and leading the air and amphibious squadrons to make final preparations for the sortie to Korea. However, our land squadron had to go out to the airfield in a car and then return. The reason why things turned out so badly was that the Japanese surrendered so suddenly. It was hard to imagine that a powerful enemy called Japan would raise its hand just one week after the start of the war.[308]

In fact, the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, and Japan surrendered unconditionally. However, this fact is not described anywhere in the history books of North Korea and is concealed. It cannot disclose the fact that the United States, the country of the enemies of heaven and earth, liberated North Korea

> Testimony of a senior officer who participated in the operation as a special sergeant in the 25th Army of the Soviet Far Eastern Army

According to the Korean People's Liberation War, not a single Korean soldier participated in the Fatherland Liberation War, and as a Korean, he felt ashamed of the Soviet people.352

[308] Kim Il Sung, With the Century, Vol. 8, p. 463.

In fact[309], when the Japanese were defeated and the Khabarovsk 88th Brigade was disbanded, Kim Il Sung and his cadres moved to their new assignments.

Ju Bo-jung was ordered to go to the Northeast, Kang Sin-tae was ordered to go to Yanbian for the autonomy of the Korean nation in Manchuria, Kim Kwang-hyup was ordered to go to the Mokdan River, and Kim Il-sung was ordered to go to North Korea.[310]

(5) Concealment of the fact of the interview with Stalin Kim Il-sung went to Wonsan on September 19, 1945 aboard the Soviet fleet Pukachev.

There is a fact that he went to Moscow to meet Stalin before entering the port, but this has been concealed from North Korean history books. There is testimony that just before Kim Il-sung entered North Korea from the 88th Brigade, he was selected by the Soviet authorities as the new leader of North Korea. Ivan Ivanovich Kobanenko (72 years old and living in Moscow in 1993), former deputy head of the international department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, who was adjutant to Marshal Vasilevsky, then commander-in-chief of the Soviet Far Eastern Army, testified for the first time about Kim Il-

[309] Interview with Chung Sang-jin, former Vice Minister of Culture and Propaganda of North Korea, (October 13, 2006).

[310] Interview with Prof. Kwon Lip, (June 2006).

sung's selection process. According to him, on August 24, 1945, the Soviet Union, which won the war against Japan, was a candidate for leadership for the early settlement of the Soviet Union in North Korea. It is said that in early September 1945, Marshal Vasiliev, the Commander-in-Chief of the Far Eastern Army, received an urgent instruction from Stalin to send Captain Kim Il-sung of the 88th Reconnaissance Brigade, which had been recommended by the Far Eastern Army, to Moscow, and sent Kim Il-sung from Khabarovsk to Moscow on a special transport plane of the Soviet Army. [311] Commander Balsilevsky, who had received Stalin's instructions to send Kim Il Sung to Moscow, placed a transport plane on standby at a military airfield near Khabarovsk and summoned Captain Kim Il Sung of the 88th Reconnaissance Brigade. It is said that two agents of the KGB's Far Eastern Headquarters were directed to Moscow, and the meeting between Stalin and Kim Il Sung lasted for four hours, including a meal. After the meeting, Stalin proposed Kim Il-sung as a candidate for the supreme leadership of North Korean politics and instructed the Soviet army to actively support him.[312]

Soviet documents as well as testimonies of Soviet officials at the time confirm that Stalin interviewed Kim Il-sung. Between late August and early September 1945, when the Soviet Army

[311] JoongAng Ilbo Special Reporting Group, ⍰Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Seoul: JoongAng Ilbo, 1993), p. 202.

[312] Ibid., pp. 202～204.

established its headquarters in P'yongyang, Stalin instructed Marshal Aleksander Vasilevsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Far Eastern Army, to "recommend a Korean leader who will lead North Korea in accordance with the will of the Soviet Union," and the Soviet Far East Army examined Kim Il-sung, and the Russian Ministry of Defense still has a record of the examination. As a result of the examination, the General Headquarters of the Soviet Far Eastern Army recommended Kim Il Sung to Stalin. The recommendation reads: "Steadily receiving training in Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. Mentally well-equipped."

After receiving the letter of recommendation, Beria rated it as "good" and reported back to Stalin.

> Gri, who was the head of the intelligence and political operations department of the General Headquarters of the Soviet Far Eastern Military District.

According to the recollections of Reserve Colonel Gori Mecler, immediately after reading Beria's report, Stalin summoned Kim Il Sung to Moscow for a private interview with him. In response, Kim Il-sung uttered "Yes, yes" with an expression of desolation, and Stalin was satisfied.[356]

However, in the eighth volume of With the Century, Kim Il-sung's visit to Moscow is described in a very distorted manner, but it is very noteworthy because North Korea's official documents prove that he visited Moscow before entering the country on September 19, 1945.

> One day before the campaign against Japan, I went to the mosque with the Allied commanders. When I went to the meeting convened by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, I saw that all the responsible officials of the front commands involved in the war against Japan, including Meretskov and Stikovrul, were already there. I met Commander-in-Chief Waselevsky there. We supported the Fatherland Liberation Operation Plan based on our Air and Amphibious Warfare Act. …
>
> During our stay in Moscow, we visited Lenin's Mausoleum and visited the Museum of History. We visited famous battlefields related to the defense of Moscow and watched the movie "Chabayev" again. A few days later they took us to Judanov. At that time, Zhudanov was a member of the Politburo Committee and secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Zhudanov said that he would meet with envoys from the East on the commission of Stalin and praised the anti-Japanese armed struggle that we had been conducting. He said that he had heard a lot about the Korean partisan Kim Il Sung through Stalin and Stikov, and that he was glad that he looked much younger than he had heard.
>
> What he meant was that Stalin had a different interest in our activities.[357]

Both the date and the content are unreliable, but before entering the country on September 19

It can be seen that Kim Il-sung's visit to Moscow is an obvious fact.

Lee Sang-jo, who served as ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Lee Moon-il, Kim Il-sung's chief adviser

[356] Dong-A Ilbo, 5 Issues Revisited in the Five-Year History of Independence 5: Kim Il-sung was examined by the Soviet military □□, September 12, 2004.

[357] Kim Il Sung, With the Century 8 volumes, pp. 450～451.

According to testimonies, the Soviet leadership at the time did not know much about the activities of the Communists far from Moscow, but the decision of Zh Danov, the Kremlin's second-in-command, who was close to Stikov, commander of the Far Eastern Military District, to send Kim Il-sung to Stalin played a decisive role.[313]

3. Types of distortion of history

A. Turning the Achievements of Others into Your Own Achievements

As we have seen so far, in North Korean history books Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese armed struggle

The distortion of history can be divided into several types, but the most important type of distortion is the distortion of the history of China's Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army into the history of Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against Japan. In other words, he distorted the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) into Kim Il-sung's party organization, and distorted the achievements of the

[313] Lee Ki-bong, ed., Testimony: Lee Sang-jo, Former Deputy Chief of Staff of the North Korean People's Army (Seoul: Book Publisher Il, 1989), p. 58.

Chinese Communist Party and its key military officials, Wei Zhengmin, Zhu Bozhong, and Yang Jong-woo, as his own achievements. It is a distortion of Kim Il-sung's portrayal of the anti-Japanese armed struggle in Manchuria as if he had overseen it from the beginning of 1931 to the liberation of the country. This is shown in the following diagram.

Table <IV.-1> Facts about the Leaders of Historical Events and Distortion of North Korean Historical Books

Historical events	Actual Facts	Distorting North Korean Historical Books
The main body of the Manchurian anti-Japanese armed struggle	Communist Party, Northeast People Myeonggun / Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army	Kim Il-sung Korean People Myeonggun
Commander of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army	Jungwoo Yang	Kim Il-sung
· Founder of the Alliance	Lee Jong-rak, 1929~1930	Kim Il-sung, 1926
The convener of the Mingwol District Meeting, 1931, 12: Resolution on the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle	Dong Man Special Secretary Dong Chang	Kim Il-sung
shipbuilding Commanding the establishment of the Ming Army	Lee Jong-rak, Yang Se	Kim Il-sung
Lateral Meetings - Discussion on the issue of the people's livelihood	Dongman Special Secretary Jeongmin	Kim Il-sung

yoOf ward council - Decision on North Bay Expedition	Jeongmin	Kim Il-sung
DongningCastle Pitch Command	Bulletin	Kim Il-sung
North Walnut Society -unificationNew Policy	Confirmation of the decisions of the Seventh Communist International Conference	Kim Il-sung
Unmarried Meetings - Decision on new policy in East Bay	Jeongmin	Kim Il-sung
Fellowship - 2nd and 3rd companies decided to advance to Mt. Paektu	Wang Deok-tae, 2nd Army Commander	Kim Il-sung
Establishment of the 2nd Army 6th Company	Decision of the Seventh Communist International Conference, Unmarried Progressive Conference	Kim Il-sung
motherland Rehabilitation Organization	Decision of the Seventh Communist International Conference	Kim Il-sung
Senior Citizens' Conference/Southern Losers' Association - Reorganized into a Forward Army	Jeong Min Jeong, Jung Woo Yang	Kim Il-sung
Dudoryu Conference/Sohalva Colony - Soviet Union	Jeong Min Jeong, Jung Woo Yang	Kim Il-sung
88th Brigade Cross Dresser	Bulletin	Kim Il-sung
Liberation of Korea To	25th Army of the Soviet Far Eastern Army	Kim Il-sung Korean People Myeo nggun

B. Concealment of Actual Facts

North Korean history books are real about Kim Il-sung's activities in Manchuria

There are many cases of concealment of the facts. The most important of these is the fact that Kim Il-sung joined the Chinese Communist Party in October 1931. Early history books described him as joining the Communist Party, but more recent history books concealed this and established a new party. This is because it is difficult to explain that Kim Il-sung joined the Communist Party of China and not of Korea in terms of the Juche idea.

In addition, North Korean history books completely conceal the fact that Kim Il-sung joined the Chinese Communist Party and was under the command of the Chinese Communist Party. Kim Il-sung's 6th Company of the 2nd Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army was commanded by the Communist Party of China, but it was never announced. Kim Il-sung distorts history by creating an independent army, the Korean People's Revolutionary Army, and waging an independent armed struggle against Japan.

North Korean history books are thorough about Kim Il-sung's involvement in the struggle against the people's livelihood

It is concealed. As revealed in the testimony of Kim Ha-yun, a participant in the anti-Japanese armed struggle at the time, Kim Il-sung concealed the fact that he helped the Chinese leaders by interpreting the trial of the DPP in the case of the anti-Japanese armed struggle. North Korea's historiography only describes Kim

Il-sung as actively working to criticize and correct the problems of the anti-people's livelihood struggle.

North Korean historiography also shows that Kim Il-sung during the anti-Japanese armed struggle during the failed operation

There is no mention of various cases. For example, after the Battle of Bocheonbo, many members were sacrificed to the harsh extermination of the Japanese army, but they did not mention any such negative facts. Kim Il-sung's army once had about 200 members, but by the time they fled to the Soviet Union, only about 18 remained. Judging that Kim Il-sung's greatness would be undermined, he did not mention any cases of failure.

C. North Korean historiography concealed the fact that Kim Il-sung fled to the Soviet Union. He concealed the fact that he had fled to the Soviet Union and distorted it by changing his strategy to small-unit activities in Manchuria. In the eighth volume of the successive edition of Kim Il-sung's memoirs, "With the Century," published after Kim Il-sung's death, it is stated in the chapter "Contacted by the International Party" that Kim Il-sung entered the camp because the International Party invited Kim Il-sung's troops to the Soviet Union.[314]

North Korean history books also concealed Kim Il-sung's activities in the nationalist-affiliated Ministry of the People's Republic as a youth. Kim Il-sung's school, Hwaseong Ui-suk, was

[314] Kim Il Sung, With the Century, Vol. 8, p. 49.

established by the nationalist-affiliated Ministry of Justice (the predecessor of the Ministry of People's Affairs), and Kim Il-sung attended Jilin Yukmun Middle School, which he attended on a scholarship funded by the Ministry of the People. After his release from Jilin Prison, he worked with the youth of the Ministry of People, Li Jong-rak and others.

North Korean history books are based on nationalism in Manchuria other than socialism.

The history of the anti-Japanese struggle by the Liberation Army and the Korean Revolutionary Army was concealed, and the history of the Korean Volunteer Army, which was active in the provinces until 1945, was also concealed.

In summary, North Korean historical books concealed or erased all facts that had a negative meaning toward Kim Il-sung's personality cult and the establishment of the Juche idea.

C. Fictitious manipulation of facts that do not exist

Another type of distortion of history in North Korean historiography is the manipulation of facts that do not exist into reality. The most important of these was that Kim Il-sung founded the "Korean People's Revolutionary Army" to wage an armed struggle against Japan in Manchuria, and in August 1945 he defeated the Japanese army and liberated Korea. It is a distortion of facts that do not exist as if they exist. The Korean People's Revolution is the name of a military that never existed. North

Korea's first history book, the 1949 History of the Korean National Liberation Struggle, did not mention the name of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army, but a history book published in 1958 stated that Kim Il-sung's army was founded in 1932.

North Korean history also shows that Kim Il-sung convened the Karyun Conference, and at that meeting,

It is claimed that he gave a speech that founded the Juche idea. He delivered a speech titled "The Course of the Korean Revolution," which was the first presentation of the Juche idea.

Another important thing that distorted facts that do not exist in North Korea into facts that exist

The incident is the South Walnut Conference. It was the North Hoodu Conference held in February 1936 that conveyed a new policy for resolving the issue of people's livelihood and encouraging the Korean nation to fight against Japan in order to strengthen the unified front of the anti-Japanese struggle among the nations in the Communist International Federation. This had a great impact on the combat order and strategy of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army in East Bay at the time, and in order to include this in North Korea's history books, Kim Il-sung forcibly convened the South Walnut Conference and manipulated it to make it appear that he had decided on such a policy.

The most important fiction is that Kim Il-sung has falsely distorted history as if Kim Il-sung had been involved in the anti-Japanese armed struggle since 1931 and finally advanced into

the country on August 7, 1945, and received the unconditional surrender of the Japanese imperialists on August 15, even though Kim Il-sung never participated in the battle for national liberation. Kim Il-sung crossed into the Soviet Union in October 1940 and remained under the control of the 88th Brigade of the Soviet International Red Army until his return on September 19, 1945.

D. Fabrication and glorification of facts

One of the types of distortions that North Korean historiography has done about Kim Il-sung's activities in the anti-Japanese armed struggle is the glorification and fabrication of facts. For example, Kim Il-sung attended the Huazhen Sook for about six months and then moved to Jilin Yukmun Middle School purely because of his young age. Hwajeon Uisook was a military warfare school for cadres of the Independence Army, which was not suitable for Kim Il-sung, who was only 15 years old. He was introduced to Marxism by meeting Sang Yue at the school, but it is glorified as if he had deliberately changed schools to learn Marxism.

As for the migration from Jilin to East Man, North Korea has also glorified the facts. It's distorting. In Jilin, there was a lot of tension between nationalists and socialists, and Kim Il-sung could not stand it, so he fled to Ando, where his mother was. However, as soon as he came to Dongman, the September-180,000 Incident broke out and

Dongman was quickly embroiled in a war with Japan, and Kim Il-sung joined the anti-Japanese armed struggle for the first time. However, North Korean history books also distort the facts as if they had come to East Bay to organize an armed struggle against Japan.

According to North Korean histories, Kim Il-sung joined the Chinese Salvation Army in April 1932 with 15~16 members of a separate unit and tried to carry out political operations, but when he was denied access to the country, he went to Yang Se-bong, the commander of the Korean Revolutionary Army, who was active in the past, but was still rejected as a communist. However, North Korean history books glorify Kim Il-sung as having carried out joint operations from the Old Korean Army to the Korean Revolutionary Army.

North Korean history books place Kim Il-sung as April 1932 when he founded the armed forces and use it as the anniversary of the founding of the current Korean People's Army, but this is not true. The unit founded by Kim Il-sung was the 3rd Company of the 2nd Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, which was newly established under the direction of the Communist International. He was appointed as the first president of the three companies, and the existing members and the members who had been banned from the Minsaeng Corps were combined to create the 2nd and 3rd companies. It was in March 1936 that a meeting was held to decide on the establishment of three companies in the second army.

North Korean history books show that Kim Il-sung and the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army fled to the Soviet Union.

The 88th Brigade, which was established under the ubiquity of the Soviet Far Eastern Army, is glorified as an international coalition created by Kim Il Sung. Since it is a combined unit of the Soviet Army, the Chinese Army, and the Korean Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, it has the character of an international coalition army, but to call it the United Nations Army founded by Kim Il-sung is a gross distortion of the facts.

North Korean historical texts describe Kim Chaek (head of the political department of the 3rd Army's 4th Division) and Choe Yong-gun as having been Kim Il-sung's subordinates from the beginning of the anti-Japanese armed struggle. In fact, Kim Il-sung first met them in the reorganized 88th Brigade after they fled to Soryon. Both Kim Chaek and Choe Yong-gun were active in the North Korean Three Route Army, so they cannot be related to Kim Il-sung. In addition, Choi Yong-geon was the highest-ranking Korean in the 88th Brigade. After coming to North Korea, Kim Il-sung was established as supreme leader, and Choe Yong-gun came under Kim Il-sung's subordinate, but before that, Choe Yong-gun was older than Kim Il-sung and held a higher position.

Chapter

Ruling Ideology of the Anti-Japanese Actua

As we have seen, the history of the anti-Japanese armed struggle is distorted and glorified.

It became a myth. This myth has become the governing ideology that defines the values, ideas, and moral standards by which North Koreans live in the present. ~~This is because it uses enormous political,~~ economic~~, and~~ social resources to pursue research, and based on this, it conducts intensive and systematic education and learning for all residents. Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against Japan became the alpha and omega of North Korea's ruling ideology. This chapter examines how the myth of the anti-Japanese armed struggle developed into a governing ideology.

1. Background and Process of Governing Ideology

A. The Beginning of the Ideology of Rule of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle by the Soviet Military Government

Kim Il-sung's experience in the anti-Japanese armed struggle is used politically in North Korea

It was started by the Soviet military government. As pointed out above, the Soviet military government chose Kim Il-sung as the supreme leader of North Korea among various political factions and political leaders in North Korea after liberation and sought the justification and justification for this in the anti-Japanese armed struggle. Under the pretext that a man who fought with guns

against the Japanese army should become the leader of a liberated Korea, the Soviet military government supported Kim Il-sung.

> At this time, the intention of the Soviet military government was to be domestic, communist or nationalist.

It is a justification presented for the purpose of It should be seen as an intention to exclude Cho Man-sik and Park Heon-young. This is because there were countless people besides Kim Il-sung who waged armed struggle against Japan, and there were many people who preceded Kim Il-sung in age and economy. For example, there were Choi Yong-geon and Kim Chaek of the Manchurian faction, Mu Jung and Kim Doo-bong of the coastal faction, and many others. However, like Kim Il-sung, they came to Korea from their activities in China, and because their political roots were weaker than those in the country, they were easier to check than the domestic faction.

The Soviet military government used his experience in the anti-Japanese armed struggle as the basis of its legitimacy to uphold Kim Il-sung as supreme leader and to grow the partisans, the Kim Il-sung faction, into a mainstream force. It was the Soviet military government in the early days of the North Korean regime that began to transform the distorted legend of the anti-Japanese armed struggle into power.

B. After the Korean War, Kim Il-sung's personality cult began to control people's discontent

In the early days of the anti-Japanese armed struggle, Kim Il-sung was among the other power elites.

It was used as a justification for being the supreme leader, but it was not imposed on the common people in the form of a ruling ideology. However, as the people's lives were devastated by the 25 June War and the power struggle between political factions intensified, Kim Il-sung's power was challenged, and social control and ideological education began in earnest.

At that time, due to the social discontent that prevailed after the June 25 War, the ruling ideology

In order to intensify, the experience of the anti-Japanese armed struggle began to be mobilized at the social level. It was not just for the sake of Kim Il-sung's personality cult, but in order to control the people's discontent, they began to publicize that Kim Il-sung was a person who had fought against the Japanese army and that his achievements were great.[360]

Since the 25 June War, there has been a growing dissatisfaction among North Koreans over the destruction caused by the war, economic hardship, and skepticism about Kim Il-sung's leadership. Jang Hak-bong testified about the social dissatisfaction at the time as follows:

> After the war, the people's living conditions gradually deteriorated, and when they became extremely poor, they divided the Western Korean people into sects, and made them think that the coastal faction and the Soviet faction were different peoples and enemies. Life became increasingly poor, and the common people expressed their dissatisfaction with the policy. Many complained and were arrested at the time. After the war in 1953, in the 54~58 years before I defected, most of the intellectuals were ideologically prepared and had common sense. Most of them died, and they were sent to concentration camps. Mt. Paektu, Sent to a timber felling. Knowing for sure that many people had died in preparation for the war and that the war had failed, there was bound to be discontent. The general ideological trend of the white provinces was profound, and they opposed the policies of the national government, and in spite of these antipathies, they could not show any signs of disapproval. Errands, the propagandists said. So when they were captured, they were separated from their hometowns and sent to concentration camps for a few dozen miles.[361]

In 1955~1956, many people were killed, imprisoned, and sent to concentration camps, and in 1958 it was further strengthened. In the mid to late 1950s, North Korea was more like a communal organization because socialism had already taken root. The pattern of group work, the mode of living in the group, was taking root. That is why the people are either rising up in an organized manner or against the policy of the country.

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[360] Kim Moon-wook (Defected North Korea in 1964, Ph.D. in Engineering, Dean of the University of Uzbekistan, living in Tashkent) in Turbo, (June 2005).

361 Jang Hak-bong (Principal of Kim Chaek Military Academy, Soviet who returned to the Soviet Union in 1958, Tashkent Ge
Interview, (June 29, 2005).

I couldn't deal with it. There was no disapproval, but discontent was increasing. During the three years of the war, they were exhausted, their lives were destitute, and their control had become so great that they came to oppose the policy. It is said that the imprisonment of the people led to the death of the people, and the loss of trust in Kim Il-sung's prestige. Jang Hak-bong testified that he himself became dissatisfied after the war. When he was discharged from the army and many people were sent to the army, he said that his faith in him had dropped. Believing that the policy was wrong, he asked Moscow to return in 1957 and eventually returned to the Soviet Union.

At this time, the main ideological education contents were Marxism-Leninism, socialism, and the anti-Japanese armed struggle. Through the Congress of Workers' Enthusiasts and the Congress of Enthusiasts of the Democratic Youth Party, ideological education and ideological reinforcement were actively promoted. Marxist-Leninist philosophy and dialectical historical materialism were taught, and propagandists argued with each other to praise Kim Il Sung.362

In particular, immediately after the war, in order to shift the blame for the failure of the war, the government launched a struggle against the power elite such as Pak Hun-yong, Lee Seung-yup, and

other members of the Southern Workers' Party. And he killed potential rivals like Permit by faking suicide.

Until then, it was said that it had not yet bothered the citizens. Citizens

It has been harassed since the August sectarian incident. It is said that after the purge of the opposition power elite in the August sectarian incident, the work of sorting out the opposition from among the general population began.

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362 Interview with Kim Moon-wook.

C. After the August Sectarian Incident, the Period of Strengthening the Ruling Ideology of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle

The frenzy of power struggle in North Korea began with the August 1956 sectarian incident. After the war, the Soviets and the coastal faction competed with each other for the personality cult of Kim Il-sung, but the attempt led by the coastal faction to overthrow Kim Il-sung led to the Kim Il-sung faction being exposed and resulted in the purges of all ~~of them. Because of the 25 June War, North Korea~~ strengthened the influence of China rather than the Soviet Union, which led to the August sectarian incident caused by the coastal faction, and when the coastal faction and the Soviet faction were eliminated, the Manchurian faction gained power and launched a drive to turn the anti-Japanese armed struggle into a state ideology. From this point on, the Juche idea and the anti-

Japanese armed struggle began to be combined into the ideology and the history of that idea, and it was established as the governing ideology.

After the August sectarian incident, Kim Il-sung purged the rival factions and carried out ideological tests and purges targeting the entire population. It intensified the ideological struggle, carried out the propaganda and centralized guidance of the Central Party. This is how he described the situation at the time:

> He couldn't go to college and couldn't speak, so he asked me to review the matter. The Central Party Central Leadership convened an emergency meeting without any notice, abruptly interrupted the lecture, and selected 1~2 representatives to denounce them and shoot them on the spot. The public shooting was to be attended by all the citizens of the district. The public shooting was the climax of the Central Party House. We criticized each other, but now it's childish and despicable. There is even a saying that goes like this: He said that he made his own rice big and other people's rice small in the evening, and accused him of stealing rice after the meal shift. The more accusations he made, the more he was recognized as a person who was loyal to the Party and the system.

The strategy of Kim Il-sung's associates in the personality cult of Kim Il-sung was to claim that "the people support Kim Il-sung." Every day of the week, a meeting of enthusiasts was formed in which the people said that they supported Kim Il-sung. He wrote an anthology of Kim Il-sung, a study group on his works, and a history of the anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle, and began to idolize Kim Il-sung and deify Kim Il-sung. At the same time, it strengthened

the non-intelligence community. One in four was a high-minded person. I was always there at school, in the people's class, and at work. It was the Ministry of Social Security that put this together. Since the early 1960s, so-called passes have been created. From then on, even if you wanted to get out of Nampo from Pyongyang, you had to have a certificate to buy a ticket. The head of the people's class made sure that when there were guests in the people's class, they would report to the governor of the city or the municipal security department.

The idolization of Kim Il-sung was made as propaganda for the anti-Japanese partisan struggle. Jang Hak-bong expressed this by saying, "Han Seol-ya wrote a lot of nonsense in the first period." This is what Han Seol-ya is saying about her novel "History". In addition, Cho Ki-chan's epic poem 'Mt. Paektu' was written at this time. These were the vanguards that supported the Kim Il-sung regime to the end.[315]

Previously, the anti-Japanese armed struggle had been used as a justification for Kim Il-sung to be the supreme leader among the power elite, but the anti-Japanese armed struggle was not used as a subject for political education among the general population. The reminiscences of the participants of the anti-Japanese armed struggle began to be published around 1959. As the Juche idea

[315] Chung Chu (Criticized Kim Il-sung's personality cult while studying in the Soviet Union and defected to the Soviet Union, Kazakh National University) Wed) Interview, (May 2004, October 2006).

began to be combined with the anti-Japanese armed struggle, it began to rapidly become a political instrument. It can be seen as a way to legitimize Kim Il-sung's power as a way to control the discontent of the people. In other words, Kim Il-sung was a man who waged armed struggle, and his achievements were highly publicized.[316]

According to Kim Moon-wook's testimony, the mobilization of the people to support Kim Il-sung did not happen when he entered university in 1959, but from 1961 onwards, he studied the history of the revolution of the anti-Japanese struggle for two hours every day after his university lectures.[317]

D. Completion of the Ruling Ideology of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle for the Inheritance of Kim Jong Il's Power

It can be said that the anti-Japanese armed struggle was completed as North Korea's ruling ideology at the time when Kim Il-sung's partisan faction was purged in 1967 to seize the monopoly of power composed entirely of Kim Il-sung's partisans, and the succession system of Kim Chong-il was formalized at the Sixth Party Congress in 1980.

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[316] Interview with Kim Moon-wook (Defected from North Korea in 1964, Ph.D. in Engineering, Dean of the University of Uzbekistan). (July 1, 2005).

[317] Testimony of Kim Moon-wook.

In order to establish this historically, "Joseon Warrior" (1979~1992) 33

The volume is complete. The anti-Japanese armed struggle did not simply remain as history, but came to be ideologically divided into the historical roots of the Juche idea. In this way, the equation of Juche idea = Kim Il Sung idea = revolutionary idea = idea of anti-Japanese armed struggle came to be established. The anti-Japanese armed struggle has taken on an ideological and theoretical shell. These efforts appear to be related to preparations for Kim Jong-il's succession.

C. North Korean history books are presumed to distort the facts that Kim Il-sung led the anti-sectarian struggle in the 30s in order to secure the legitimacy of the side-pruning movement and use it in the political situation of the time. It describes the anti-sectarian struggle at greater length and detail than any previous history book. In order to reorganize domestic politics for Kim Chong-il's succession, he distorted the facts by inserting fictional information that did not fit the situation of the times at all.

The most significant feature of the publication of "With the Century" is that it was carried out under the general leadership of Kim Jong-il.[318] It can be seen that it is a historical work for the inheritance of Kim Jong-il."With the Century" Each chapter mentions Kim Jong-il in the concluding section. At the end of each

[318] Haruki Wada, North Korea: From a Guerrilla State to a Regular Military State, p. 27.

chapter, Kim Jong-il is mentioned, linking Kim Jong-il to the anti-Japanese armed struggle.

In addition, "With the Century" is also the first historical book to present the myth of Mt. Paektu and states that it was born on Mt. Paektu.The [319] claim that the spirit was maintained in the southeast of Mt. Paektu was not found in the North Korean literature until the mid-1980s.

2. Contents of Governing Ideology: Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle as a Justification for the Cult of Personality

One of the most important aspects of the formation of an image for the cult of personality of Kim Il-sung in North Korea is that Kim Il-sung led the struggle against Japan. In fact, the testimonies of North Korean defectors have revealed that the reason why Kim Il-sung is recognized as a great leader is because he was "a national hero who liberated the country from Japanese imperialism by fighting a long struggle to the end," and many people testify that they consider this to be a historical fact. It is to recognize that Kim Il-sung regained the stolen country through the armed struggle against Japan.

[319] Haruki Wada, 『Kim Il Sung and the Manchurian Anti-Japanese War, p. 275.

Despite the very difficult conditions, they fought against the Japanese imperialists and succeeded in the battle, driving out the Japanese and liberating North Korea. It was also pointed out earlier that although Kim Il-sung had a history of anti-Japanese struggle, many of the facts were exaggerated and distorted.

Nonetheless, North Korea distorted and exaggerated Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese partisan activities and used them as the most important material for Kim Il-sung's personality cult. North Korea used a variety of institutional resources to create a basis for its leader's legitimacy by highlighting the achievements of Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese partisan activities. Kim Il-sung himself seems to find his legitimacy in the anti-Japanese armed struggle. What is most often mentioned in his speeches is his experience of the anti-Japanese armed struggle.

> The struggle for the founding of the Party became more serious as the anti-Japanese armed struggle unfolded. The anti-Japanese armed struggle was a sacred war of liberation for the salvation of the nation of the country, a most active struggle for the victory of the noble communist ideal, and a glorious struggle for the establishment of a revolutionary party of the working class. The anti-Japanese armed struggle opened a decisive new phase in the struggle for the founding of the Party. In the flames of the anti-Japanese armed struggle, we were able to build up the organizational framework of the founding of the Party on a large scale, firmly realize the unity

and unity of the Communist ranks and build a solid mass foundation for the founding of the Party.[320]

Kim Il-sung mentions the anti-Japanese armed struggle many times in his speeches, but let me give you one more example before Kim Il-sung began his full-fledged cult of personality in 1949. In a speech he gave about the People's Army.

It is very important to cultivate the glorious revolutionary traditions established during the period of the anti-Japanese armed struggle. In the dark days when the exploitation and oppression of the Japanese imperialists reached its extreme and the skies of the country were covered with misfortune, the true communists of the DPRK launched the heroic anti-Japanese armed struggle in 15 stars with arms in their hands in order to save the fate of the country and nation. The anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters bravely overcame all kinds of difficulties and difficulties without fear of prison or guillotine with the sole intention of liberating the country, fought unflinchingly against the robbers and Japanese imperialists, defended the nation's incision to the end, and glorified the honor of the country. Even today, they are fighting with all

[320] Kim Il-sung, "The Historical Experience of the Construction of the Workers' Party of Korea ," (Lecture Transcript on the occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the Founding of Kim Il-sung Advanced Party School, May 31, 1986), Kim Il-sung's Writings 40 (Pyongyang: Chosun Road Dongdang Publishing House, 1994), p. 6.

their might for the freedom of the people and the reunification and independence of the country.[321]

In Kim Il-sung's speeches, the one that is most often mentioned on any topic or issue is the "anti-Japanese armed struggle." He found the basis for all his policies and judgments in the experience of the anti-Japanese armed struggle. The fact that Kim Il-sung's personality cult in North Korea was promoted on the subject of the anti-Japanese armed struggle can be seen as a reflection of Kim Il-sung's perception.

3. Methods of Governing Ideology: The Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle as a Frame of Reference for North Korean Social Behavior

A person who lives in the present by reproducing the anti-Japanese partisan activities of the past in the present

It allows them to reminisce about the past and endure the difficulties of the present. It also created a common emotional sphere between Kim Il-sung and the North Korean people, making the unconditional loyalty to the leader, which had been emphasized since the mid-to-late 1960s, a social topic. The 12 volumes of

[321] Kim Il-sung, "The People's Army Must Be Strengthened and Developed into a Modern Regular Armed Forces," (Speech at the Military Officers' Conference of the 655th Military Unit of the Korean People's Army, July 29, 1949), Collected Works of Kim Il-sung 5 (Pyongyang: Workers' Party of Korea Publishing House, 1980), p. 206.

"Reminiscences of Anti-Japanese Partisan Participants," which began to be published in 1959, were the most important political textbook for the North Korean history association at the time. This textbook has been repeatedly studied in various workplaces, schools, and political courses in the form of lectures, research discussions, and appreciation meetings. Through this study, the anti-Japanese guerrilla army was imprinted on the public as the bearer of the revolutionary tradition and as the epitome of the communist. And in this process, the masses were required to learn the communist characteristics of the guerrilla battalions that appeared in the reminiscences and to embody them in reality. In other words, the masses were required to learn and practice the ideology, the will to fight and the methods of fighting of the unitary guerrillas.[322]

> The intention of this political study is to address the difficult reality of the "period of the anti-Japanese armed struggle."

Just as the anti-Japanese guerrilla groups in the West fought an armed struggle to protect the country, the current North Koreans should defend the country and follow their leaders with the same spirit. In other words, the difficulties of reality are still better than in the past, and in order to maintain the reality, we have to fight external enemies and internal agitators. The means used to glorify the past and share an emotional bond with it are cultural arts such

[322] Lee Jong-suk, 『Study of the Workers' Party of Korea』, pp. 291～292.

as movies and novels. The backgrounds and subjects of North Korea's cultural and artistic works used for such purposes are fully or partially utilized in the era of the anti-Japanese struggle and the era of Japanese imperialism.

Important as a means of cultivating the personality of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in North Korea

One of the places that plays a role is the Kim Il-sung Revolutionary Thought Research Institute. Just as there are churches in Christianity that worship God, there are Kim Il-sung revolutionary thought laboratories in North Korea to study Kim Il-sung's teachings and hold various political rallies.[323] The Kim Il-sung Revolutionary Thought Research Laboratory is set up in every province, town, and province unit, as well as in enterprises, cooperative farms, schools, and military units. The best one in the best position, in the center of every unit, is installed in the water. The building of the Kim Il-sung Revolutionary Thought Research Institute is built according to the standard design prescribed by the Party, so most of the buildings have a similar shape. In the main hall of the laboratory, a plaster or portrait of Kim Il-sung is placed on the front altar, and a red carpet is laid in the center leading to the altar. It is the holiest place in North Korea, and you can't even cough in it. It's a place where you can't even make small talk.

[323] See Kim Byung-ro, Religiosity in North Korean Society: A Comparison of the Religious Styles of Juche and Christianity (Seoul: Tongil Institute, 2000).

> Here you will find Kim Il-sung's teaching poems, writings, and materials for the study of revolutionary traditions.

It is equipped with materials necessary for the study of the revolutionary history of the United States. It mainly holds intensive lectures, studies, and discussions on Kim Il-sung's ideology. In addition to learning activities, various events such as oath-taking meetings and allegiance letter delivery meetings are held. The Kim Il-sung Revolutionary Thought Study Room is a place to worship Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, as well as a place to meet Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.372

> North Korean defectors who came to South Korea were inspired by the South Korean church and North Korea's Kim Il-sung revolutionary ideology.

He says he doesn't like going to church because the lab is so similar.

4. Consequences of Governing Ideology

By using the anti-Japanese armed struggle as its governing ideology, North Korea was able to build a firm charisma of Kim Il-sung among the North Korean people. Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese activities and his actions after coming to power were also exaggeratedly publicized, and he built an image of an absolutely infallible leader with the title of Commander-in-Chief.

> The leader is the supreme leader who unites the working masses in the overall revolutionary struggle for independence with extraordinary foresight, noble communist virtues, infinitely wide tolerance and outstanding leadership ability, and is a true leader of the people who enjoys the unfailing trust and respect of the people with absolute authority and prestige through his extraordinarily rich and multifaceted experience and immortal achievements accumulated in the administration of the revolutionary struggle.[373]

Leader is not defined as an institution, but as Kim Il-sung's personal

It is a list of things that should be evaluated as abilities and achievements. In this respect, it can be seen that the leader is not an institution, but a concept to shape Kim Il-sung's charisma. The meaning of leader as defined in the Political Dictionary is as follows:

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372 Ibid., pp. 100, 104.

373 Social Science Publishing House, "Leadership System," The Juche Thought Bulletin 9, p. 35.

> The leader of the working class knows better than anyone else the legality of the historical development, the urgent needs of the times, the historical task of the working class, the reciprocal relations between the class forces, the environment in which the revolutionary struggle is conducted, and the way to carry out the revolution, and is far-sighted, represents the interests of the masses most thoroughly, embodies their aspirations and demands most accurately, possesses abundant experience and scientific leadership skills tempered in the long and arduous revolutionary struggle, and has a high

> authority and absolute confidence among the people that cannot be undermined by anything by virtue of their devoted service to the revolutionary cause of the working class and the immortal deeds they have accumulated before the country and the people. Political Leader
> All of them.[324]

With regard to the leader thus defined, the principle of unconditionality and absoluteness

He prescribed obedience and worship. These are the Ten Principles of the Establishment of Unitarian Thought. The "Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Unitary System," announced in 1974, is the North Korean version of the Ten Precepts, which has become the political precept of the daily lives of the North Korean people. The contents of the Ten Principles include the principle of sacrificing one's life to transform the whole society with Kim Il-sung's revolutionary ideas, absolutizing Kim Il-sung's authority, harmonizing Kim Il-sung's teachings, and strictly adhering to the principle of non-discipline in the implementation of Kim Il-sung's teachings. The tenth precept is that "the revolutionary cause pioneered by the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung should be inherited and completed from generation to generation," meaning that the 10th commandment applies equally to Kim Jong Il. Another feature of the idolization of Kim Il-sung is the realization of the uniqueness of Kim Il-sung's leadership. It has built an image that

[324] Ibid., p. 324.

there is no alternative leader other than Kim Il-sung. To this end, first of all, they falsely rewrote the history of Kim Il-sung's family line by saying that Kim Il-sung's family was the only one who fought for the independence and independence of the nation. For example, from the sinking of the Sherman ferry that Kim Il-sung's great-grandfather Kim Ngu-woo sank, to the period of upheaval in the modern era, the March 1st Movement, anti-Japanese partisan activities, the founding of the country, the victory in the 25 June War, the victory in post-war reconstruction, the industrialization of socialism, the great construction of socialism, the revolution leading up to the succession structure, and the continuous revolution, are all described as the achievements of Kim Il-sung, Kim Il-sung, and Kim Jong-il alone. This excluded all ordinary people, and excluded the role of China and the Soviet Union, and only the Kim Il-sung family and Kim Il-sung became the leaders and subjects. There is no mention of any aid from China, the Soviet Union, or Eastern Europe in the post-war reconstruction and administration, and everything was done under the leadership of Kim Il-sung. Kim Il-sung spearheaded socialist industrialization in the 1960s and socialist construction in the 1970s, and North Korea became a powerful socialist state. There is no mention of the participation of the people in the March 1st Movement, nor is there any mention of the declaration of the 33 members. Kim Il-sung was the leader and the main actor who contributed to the creation of all historical values in the entire course of history, including Kim Il-

sung's family, himself, and his sons, in order to become the greatest ruler in North Korea. Apart from Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, there is no alternative leader, and the family is building the image of the only family of leaders.

> In North Korea, the personality cult of Kim Il-sung can be seen as a success. Came to South Korea

This is evidenced by the fact that even North Korean defectors consider Kim Il-sung to be a great leader. However, the success of the cult of personality is not the success of the North Korean regime.[325]

[325] For a detailed analysis of this, see Seo Jae-jin, 「An Evaluation Study on the Effect of North Korea's Personality Cult and Political Socialization」 (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 1993)

Chapter

On the myth of Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese Comparative Assessment

Korea Institute for National Unification

1. Evaluation Criteria

A. Universality vs. Uniqueness

There are two myths about North Korea's armed struggle against Kim Il-sung. The second is the myth that the armed struggle was the most important national independence movement in the national independence movement during the Japanese period, and the second is the myth that Kim Il-sung led the anti-Japanese armed struggle and as a result, Korea was liberated from Japanese imperialism.

North Korea's myth is based on arbitrary and distorted historical facts. According to Kang Man-gil, the national liberation struggle was steadily carried out during the 36 years of the Japanese colonial era, and the March 1st Movement can be said to be the most brilliant national liberation movement. This is not only due to the large number of participants or the fact that the scale was nationwide, but there is another important reason. It was a move that exposed to the whole world that the Japanese imperialists' propaganda that the Korean nation would be favored by Japanese rule was false. In addition, the governors of the Shanghai Provisional Government, including Zhao Soang, the head of the Foreign Ministry, made efforts to ensure that our independence was decided at the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Conference.[326] As

[326] Lee Hyun-hee, "The Liberation Movement of the Provisional Government of the Korean People," ed., Korean History Research Association (Seoul: History of Knowledge Industry, 1987), p. 538.

a result, when Japanese imperialism was defeated in World War II, the Allied Powers decided at the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Conference that the Korean peninsula should be separated from its territory and made independent after Japan's defeat.[327]

> In contrast to this view, North Korea is concerned that Kim Il-sung is engaged in an armed struggle with Japan.

and drove the Japanese from the Korean peninsula. That couldn't be further from the truth. As we have seen, Japan's retreat from the Korean peninsula was due to the unconditional surrender of the United States by dropping an atomic bomb on Japan, and the rout of the Japanese army by the American and Soviet forces that advanced at the same time. At this point, Kim Il-sung had no role in the 88th Brigade near Khabarvsk and was stranded by Soviet troops, and on September 19, more than a month after liberation, he returned to the port of Wonsan aboard the Soviet fleet.

> To make it possible to objectively view Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against Japan

My point of view was aptly presented by Shin Ju-baek. He said that one of the great characteristics of the anti-Japanese movement during the Japanese period was the vastness of the area of struggle, the second was the variety of methods of struggle, and the third was that the resistance

[327] Kang Man-gil, □Our History in the 20th Century□□} (Seoul: History of Creation and Criticism, 1999).

of the Korean people under Japanese occupation continued for a long time by a large number of people, both at home and abroad.[328]

The various methods of the anti-Japanese movement were not chosen but rather due to external conditions.

It is stipulated in the United States. The anti-Japanese movement was widely carried out in Korea, Manchuria, China, the Old Age, Japan, and the Americas, and the anti-Japanese movement in overseas areas was greatly influenced by how the anti-Japanese movement was treated by the national or local governments in the region. In other words, the choice of an area by an anti-Japanese activist was not merely a geographical choice of the space of activity, but also an expression of the will to wage an anti-Japanese struggle based on a certain method of struggle or a certain theory of movement.[329] The methods of the independence movement that our ancestors tried were also very diverse, and the conflicts between the various lines and lines were based on the main objective situation and were a product of the times. It was not a question of passivity or aggressiveness in the struggle, or of success or failure, but of the influence and adaptation of environmental conditions.

Taking these facts into account, the Provisional Government Orthodoxy and the orthodoxy of the anti-Japanese armed struggle should be seen as they are. Kim Il-sung put forward the logic that the only thing that mattered was that he had taken up arms and engaged in

[328] Xin Jubai, □□History of National Movements in China in the 1920s~30s, p. 7.
[329] Ibid., p. 171.

armed struggle, and that Rhee Seung-man's diplomatic independence activities were a game of play.

Armed struggle is important, but so is diplomacy. The reason why Japan was defeated and Korea was able to gain independence was because the great powers recognized the legitimacy of the independence of Korea in the Cairo Declaration. Armed struggle is not the only thing that matters, but diplomatic efforts are also important. Because of the importance of these two methods, the controversy over the methods of the Revolutionary War continued for a long time, and factions were divided over them.

> In October 1919, Ahn Chang-ho attended a conference of the League of Nations to be held in the United States.

He noted that the military, diplomatic, financial, cultural, food-san, and reunification movements must be carried out simultaneously in order to complete independence.[330]It is also important to develop the livelihood (self-governance, education, industry) of our compatriots living in China. Only then will armed manpower be reproduced.

Kim Il-sung's Hwaseong Sook was also established by the nationalist Ministry of Justice. In order to wage armed struggle, a base is needed, and in order for the base to develop into a form of self-government, there must be a political organization that develops military funding, administration, education, and industry.

> The anti-Japanese armed struggle was also carried out by a large number of people in various regions.

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[330] Xin Jubai, □History of National Movements in China in the 1920s~30s□□, p. 210.

It unfolded over a period of time. The genealogy of the anti-Japanese armed struggle in the 1930s can be divided into four main categories. In Manchuria, there are the Korean Revolutionary Army and the Korean Independence Army as nationalist lines, and the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army (6th Company, Kim Il Il) as the communist line. Last name). There are Korean volunteers in China, and they entered North Korea after liberation and formed a coastal faction. Numerically, they are far more numerous than Kim Il-sung's partisans. Only Kim Il Sung's unit did not use the name of our national army. This is because they were organized and acted as part of the Chinese army. In terms of armed struggle, Kim Il-sung's troops are a very small part. There is some controversy over whether it was part of the national movement, and Kim Il-sung's Six Companies of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army were units under the command of the Chinese Communist Party.

B. Armed Struggle vs. Diplomacy

The strategy of the Revolutionary War differed slightly depending on the time, region, and organization. price

Immediately after the March 1st Movement, the national activists of the old age were based on the theory of the war of independence based on the theory of diplomacy, and they sent a representative to the Paris Peace Conference (January ~ June 1919) to expose the Japanese imperialist aggression and raise the issue of Korean independence. The Gando Han Chinese Independence Declaration Movement proposed a

three-stage policy of the independence movement just before the March 1st Movement, recruiting about 10,000 troops from Noryong, Manchuria, and Korea to enter the country to induce U.S. intervention in the Japanese imperialists' rule of Korea and submit a petition to the Paris Peace Conference. Ahn Chang-ho of the Provisional Government actively continued the protest movement and propaganda activities, while strengthening its diplomatic power and insisted on gaining the support of a majority within the League of Nations and gaining recognition of independence. Since it is difficult to win a frontal victory against the enormous military power of the Japanese imperialists, the position is that we should do our best to fight and reap diplomatic benefits from it, since it is not enough to crush the Japanese imperialists.[331]

Lee Dong-hwi's theory of the status of a belligerent group is close to the theory of armed struggle. The argument for belligerents is that they are recognized as qualified organizations as members of the nations (nations) that participated in the anti-Japanese coalition war. Those who actively practiced the theory of armed struggle in the East Manchurian region were Hong Beom-do and Kim Il-sung.

> As such, there is a serious conflict between each group about the methods of the independence movement.

To this extent, both the theory of diplomacy and the theory of armed struggle were meaningful and important.

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[331] Xinzhubai, □□History of National Movements in China in the 1920s~30s, p. 21.

C. Military Government vs. Civil Administration

A conflict similar to the conflict between the theory of armament and diplomacy is the conflict between the theory of military administration and the theory of civilian administration. In 1920, the strong suppression by the Japanese imperialists, represented by the Kyongsin Incident, led to a shift from the nationalist movement in Manchuria to a strategy that placed greater emphasis on civilian affairs than on military administration. The organization established along these lines is the Ministry of Unification of Korea.[332] The reasons why the nationalists have prioritized the stability of the Korean community rather than military activities, such as the Ministry of Unification of Korea, are as follows. First, in the heightened anti-Japanese atmosphere immediately after the March 1st Movement in 1919, Japanese imperialism

Contrary to the mood of immediately fighting for independence through armed struggle, the nationalists changed their strategy to prepare for a long-term war of independence during the period of the Korean Unification Administration.

Second, the fact that the nationalists had no choice but to think this way is objective

It was because of the enemy conditions. After 1920, the Independence Army units were attacked by the Japanese and retreated from the East Manchurian region, and although they were again active as armed units,

[332] For a detailed discussion of the Ministry of Unification of Korea, see Shin Ju Bai, □□1920~30s Chinese Region National Rhyme Verb □, p. 50.

they were not as strong as before. In addition, the Korean community became fearful of the activities of supporting the independence army again in the wake of the strong suppression by the Japanese imperialists represented by the Kyungsin Incident in 1920. Contrary to the claims of the nationalists, the issue of Korean independence was ignored at the Washington Conference. As a result, Koreans gradually lowered their expectations for independence, and voluntary military funds were not collected well in the Korean community.

In response to these changing conditions, the tendency to engage in long-term anti-revolutionary warfare became more and more established by the mid-1920s. The nationalists who were active in Manchuria adopted republicanism as the ideology and operating principle of the organization, and as a way to realize this, they stabilized the Korean society through the promotion of food production and education.

I was in the middle of nowhere.[333]

However, the Ministry of Unification of Korea did not last long and was divided due to the conflict between the civilian and military administrations. It was reunited into the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Councilors, and the Ministry of New People, but the conflict continued over whether to prioritize armed struggle or autonomy (people's livelihood).

[333] Shin Ju Baek, 「History of the Korean National Movement in Manchuria 1920~1945」pp. 108～110.

From the beginning, the Ministry of Justice clearly secured administrative supremacy over the military, and based on the principle of separation of the three powers, it placed emphasis on securing a stable foundation for the Korean community, that is, on self-governance. On the other hand, there was a serious conflict between the members of the Councilors and the Ministry of New People's Affairs over whether to prioritize armed struggle or to stabilize the Korean community through self-governance.

2. Comparison of the activities of the armed struggle

A. Comparison of the Korean Volunteer Army and the 6th Company of the 2nd Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army

Two groups that waged armed struggle on the communist line of our nation

is the Anti-Japanese Coalition Army in Manchuria and the Korean Volunteer Army in North China.

The Korean Volunteer Army was active in North China Province (Inner Province) and the Anti-Japanese Coalition Army

The 6th Company of the 2nd Army was active in Manchuria. The Korean Volunteers were people who had emigrated from Korea for the anti-Japanese struggle, and the 6th Company of the 2nd Army was mostly residents of the Yanbian area. Although the 6th Company of the 2nd Army was almost destroyed around 1938 and fled to the Soviet Union in August 1940, the Korean Volunteer Army is a unit that succeeded the pulse of the Korean people's anti-Japanese armed struggle by starting

the anti-Japanese armed struggle in October 1938. The Korean Volunteer Army is also socialist, and the 6th Apostles of the 2nd Army are also socialist.

The number of Korean volunteers is estimated to be around 1,000 at the time of liberation in August 1945. There are about 200 people in the 6th company of the 2nd Army. The number of Koreans in the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, which includes the 1st to 11th armies, is higher. During the 14-year anti-Japanese struggle from September 1931 to June 1937, more than 100,000 Koreans participated in the war, and tens of thousands of Koreans devoted themselves to the country. According to the statistics of the Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture Civil Affairs Bureau, there are 3,500 heat deaths in Yanbian Province, of which 3,026 are ethnic Koreans.[334]

The 6th Company of the 2nd Army emerged as a major player in history in North Korea under the new name of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army, while the history of the Korean Volunteer Army was erased from the history of North Korea.

The level of knowledge and military level of the members of the Korean Volunteer Army was very high. The vast majority of the original volunteers were intellectuals who had received higher education from the Hwangpo Military Academy, the Central Military Academy, the Korean Revolutionary Cadres School, and the Sun Yat-sen University.

[334] Interview with Choi Sung-chun (Head of Party Research Laboratory in Yanbian, China), (May 2004).

There were also students from the United States, Japanese students, and graduates of the French School in Shanghai, as well as Kim Hak-moo, Kim Hak-chul, Cho Ju-min, Moon Jeong-il, and Jeon Yong-seop, who studied at Nanjing Central University or Guangdong Sun Yat-sen University and received military education at the Central Military Academy, and Ri Jung-ho, Kim Chang-man, Ri So-min, Kim Chang-je, Choi Kye-won, and Lim Jin, who graduated from Sun Yat-sen University and studied military at the special class of the Shengja Military Academy in Jiangxi Province. Those who received repeated higher education were Korean, Chinese, Japanese, English, Lore, and French, who usually spoke two, three, and four languages, and because they had received education and military training in the scientific and cultural knowledge of the current era, and because of their military qualifications, almost all of them were able to grow into excellent military commanders or political businessmen.[335]

On the other hand, the fighters of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army were largely uneducated. After more than 500 leaders of the armed struggle in Dongman were executed in the Minsaengdan incident, Kim Il-sung received an unusually high school education, and with the exception of a large number of cadres, most of them were uneducated from peasant backgrounds. The members of the Korean Volunteer Army had a strong anti-Japanese will and a strong national consciousness.

[335] Kang Ki-joo, A Study on the History of the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the Korean Nation in China, p. 135.

C. There were Kim Won-bong, Shin Ak, Ryu Ja-myung, and Kim Seil, who had been fighting for a long time after organizing the Righteous Brigade in November 1919 in order to wash away the shame of the exiled country with their own hot blood, Han Ban, who was arrested by the Japanese imperialists and imprisoned for eight years while working underground in Korea after being dispatched by the International Communist Party, Jang Ji-kwang, who was sentenced to seven years in prison for fighting for righteousness from the age of 18, Seok-jeong, who was imprisoned for six years for attempted murder while attempting to assassinate the Governor General of Korea in Seoul, and anti-Japanese militants who had been working for independence movements or underground work in Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin for a long time. Those who have a long history of anti-Japanese struggle and have gone through various trials, He had a burning desire for revenge against the Japanese imperialists, an ardent love for his own people, and an ironclad determination to achieve the victory of national independence and national liberation without fail. 386

The members of the 6th Company of the 2nd Army were also full of anti-Japanese will and national consciousness. In particular, many of the members of the 6th Company of the 2nd Army were residents of Manchuria, so they carried out the dual task of achieving the independence of Korea and the independence of China.

The Korean Volunteer Army continued the war until 1945, but the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army was almost destroyed. The surviving members fled to the Soviet Union. Kim Il-sung fled to the Soviet

Union with 16 men in October 1940 and returned to North Korea after liberation. Chinese cadres acknowledged that the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition had been completely defeated.[387] Most of the leaders of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army were killed. Only the life of Ju Bojung survived. Kim Il-sung's immediate superior, Commander of the Second Army, Wang Deok-tae, died in May 1939 in Monggang County. Yang Jung-woo, the commander-in-chief of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, died on February 20, 1940, and when Yang Jung-woo was killed, Wei Chung-min was replaced by Wei Chung-min, but Wei was killed in action in March 1940. The commander of the 3rd Route Army, Cho Sang-ji, was also killed in action in February 1942. Kim Il-sung's guerrilla warfare at Mt. Paektu was one of the factors that allowed him to survive without dying. The Anti-Japanese Coalition Army

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386 Ibid., p. 135.

387 Seo Dae-sook, A Study on the History of the Korean Communist Movement, p. 265.

Because the troops fought in the vast fields of Manchuria, they were easily exposed to Japanese air and were easily killed, and many were killed.

After crossing into the Soviet Union, with the help of the Soviet Union, in July 1942

It was organized as the Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, and it was called the 88th Special Brigade of the International Red Army under the Soviet Army. By this time, there were about 600 Soviet, Chinese, and Koreans

in total, and 150 of them were Koreans.[336] Considering that the Korean work group consisted of 290 men within the International Brigade just before liberation, the number of Koreans increased to about 300.
All of them.[337]

B. Comparison of the Armed Struggle in Manchuria: Nationalism and Socialism

The characteristics of Korean socialists in Manchuria are that they joined the Chinese Communist Party and

He was a member of the Chinese Communist Party. This is where it differs from the nationalist line. The armed activities of the nationalist movements, namely the Korean Reichspurt Army and the Korean Revolutionary Army, waged an independent armed struggle. The armed struggle in the name of the two armed battalions ended in 1933 and 1938, respectively, but the main forces of the two armed units did not give up the anti-Japanese movement and continued to fight until the end.[338] The nationalist line also formed a united front with the Chinese Nationalist Party, but maintained its own government and military organization.

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[336] Yeom In-ho, 「The Independence Movement of the Korean Volunteer Army」, (Seoul: Nanam Publishing, 2001), pp. 341～343.

[337] He estimated that among the 290 men were not only partisans of the former Anti-Japanese Coalition Army who had fought in Manchuria, but also Koreans of Soviet nationality who had joined the camp guards. Shin Ju-baek, 「History of the Korean National Movement in Manchuria, 1920～1945」, pp. 489～490.

[338] Xin Jubai, 「History of National Movements in China in the 1920s~30s, p. 132.

While the Korean Revolutionary Army and the Korean Independence Army waged armed struggle under their own names, the socialists joined the Chinese Communist Party. The reason why North Korean history books have created the fictitious name of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army (KPA) and written its history is because of this difference from the nationalist line. Socialists joined the Chinese Communist Party and worked in the Chinese Communist Party's guerrilla corps under the "double duty" of supporting the Korean revolution while first achieving the Chinese revolution in Manchuria. They believed that it was not in the interests of the Koreans in Manchuria to work for the independence of Korea in Manchuria and that by carrying out a double duty, the Japanese imperialists could be driven out of Manchuria in order to create favorable conditions for Korean independence.[339]

The Korean Revolutionary Army and the Korean Independence Army, which operated with an independent command system, also waged armed struggle in solidarity with the Northeast Volunteer Army of the Chinese Nationalist Party. This was because they were able to effectively counter the powerful Japanese imperialists and receive weapons, ammunition, and medicine. In particular, the Korean Revolutionary Army actively waged a joint struggle not only with the Northeast Volunteer Army but also with the First Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army. At the same time, for the sake of Korea's

[339] Ibid., pp. 164～165.

independence, it dispatched its members to the country and tried to lay an organizational foundation for not only one-time activities such as the struggle to raise funds for the army. This was not seen in the activities of the Korean partisans of the Chinese Communist Party until 1935, and it was an attempt to link the armed capabilities of Western Manchuria with the anti-Japanese masses in Korea. The 6th Company of the 2nd Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army worked in Changbai County, China, and Kapsan County, South Hamgyong Province, to form the Korean Fatherland Liberation Association in Manchuria. The Battle of Bocheonbo in June 1936 is also a representative example.[340]

It is true that the Korean socialists in Manchuria joined the Chinese Communist Party and worked in accordance with the dual mission, that is, the independence of Korea at the same time as the independence of China, and they never gave up the independence of Korea. However, it is not true that it acted as an independent unit or that it made independent organization and policy decisions in the course of its activities. This is the so-called distortion of history.

C. Yanbian Koreans vs. Kim Il-sung

Kim Il-sung was not a representative of the Korean communists, but a Chinese communist

[340] Xin Jubai, ⍰⍰History of National Movements in China in the 1920s~30s, p. 165.

He was a foreigner who had been educated and trained by the Chinese as a member of the chair and had risen through the ranks under the leadership of the Chinese Communists in Manchuria.The [341] most accurate way to say that Kim Il-sung was a Yanbian Korean. In 1920, when Kim Il-sung was eight years old, he moved to Manchuria with his father and mother. At that time, most of the Koreans in Manchuria attended Korean schools, but only a few, such as Kim Il-sung, attended Chinese schools. The area where Kim Il-sung was active is the Northeast Province, Manchuria or present-day Yanbian.

> At that time, the people living in Yanbian, regardless of age or gender, participated in the anti-Japanese movement.

participated. Ju Bo-jung, who was the general commander of the 2nd Route Army of the Anti-Japanese Army, said, "In the rural villages of the Korean people, all the people, whether they were adults or young men, came out against the Japanese[342] movement. Whenever they organized various anti-Japanese groups or armed self-defense forces, they would take the lead in pushing other nations to the anti-Japanese salvation country," he said, assessing the revolutionary enthusiasm of the Koreans.394

> The Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, in which the Chinese and Koreans were allied troops, was at its peak

[341] Seo Dae-sook, A Study on the History of the Korean Communist Movement, p. 267.
[342] Speech by Han Bo-jung at the Jilin Provincial Ethnic Work Conference in December of this year, "The Footsteps of the Korean Nation in China 5," (Jilin: People's Publishing House, 1992), p. 705.

There were up to 11 counties in all. Among them, the predecessor of six counties was established by Chosonjok governors, and the vast majority of the 2nd Army of the Anti-Japanese Coalition Army and more than half of the 1st, 3rd, and 7th armies were ethnic Koreans.[343] In November 1931, a resolution of the Manchurian Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China stated that the number of Party members had increased from 100 to 2,000 as the Korean Communists joined the CCP, and that the number of Party organizations had increased from 12 to 55, and that 85 percent of the Party members were comrades of the Korean ethnic group.[344]

Among the 11 armies of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, all of them were Korean warriors, and half of them were Korean fighters. In the nearly two years from early 1936 to 1937, the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army fought more than 1,000 battles with the Japanese army and the Wiman Army, and at its peak, it had grown to more than 45,000 soldiers. According to one statistic, the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army killed more than 183,700 enemies during the nearly 14-year anti-Japanese war.[345]

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[343] Jung Chul, The Vicissitudes and Prospects of Chinese Korean Society (Shenyang: Liaoning Provincial Publishing House, 1999), p. 15.

[344] "Resolution on the Question of Enlarged and Organizing the Manchurian Provincial Committee," Wang Lim, Discussing the Function and Historical Status of the Joseon People in the Northeast Anti-Japanese War; Reprinted in Mental Iron, op. cit., p. 14.

[345] Kim Kang-il and Heo Myung-chul, Chinese Koreans: Cultural Superiority and Development Strategy in Society} (Yanbian: Yanbian People's Publishing House, 2001), p. 64.

> According to the statistics of the Civil Affairs Bureau, there were 14,000 deaths in Yanbian, but 3,500 were active Communist Party activists during the Anti-Japanese War, that is, after the 918 Incident. Of the 3,500 people, 3,026 were Koreans and 398 were Korean women anti-Japanese enthusiasts. According to the number of Joseon people, there is one in 20 Joseon people in Yanbian District, accounting for 42% of the total number of Joseon people in Jilin Province.[346]

Kim Il-sung was not the only one who carried out the anti-Japanese movement in Yanbian. It is necessary to critically point out the infantile and monolithic thinking of Kim Il-sung in North Korean historical academia.

Immediately after the March 1st Movement in 1919, the Korean people in Manchuria waged a massive anti-Japanese struggle. In 1920, the independence army led by Hong Beom-do and Kim Chao-jin dealt a severe blow to the Japanese invaders at the Battle of Bong-o-dong and Cheongsan-ri. These are events of great significance in the history of the Korean nation's anti-Japanese struggle.

> In Manchuria, after the 1920 uprising, the nationalist movement along the lines of communism.

The center of gravity has shifted. In addition, until the establishment of the CCP's Manchurian Provincial Committee in the late 1920s, the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal movement in the Northeast region was

[346] Interview with Prof. Hongbin Choi, (April 2004).

dominated by the Communists. The Korean Communists spread Marxism in the Northeast, and the Communist Party of Korea, established in 1925, established the General Directorate of the Communist Party of Korea in 1926 and established the Party organizations in the East, South, and North Manchuria. The Chinese Communist Party established the Provisional Manchurian Provincial Committee in 1927 and formally established it the following year, but it was poorly organized and did not have many members. After the establishment of the principle of one country, one party at the Sixth Congress of the Communist International Congress in December 1928, a large number of members of the Korean Communist Party joined the Chinese Communist Party.[347]

> The Chosonjok played a major role in China's anti-Japanese war. September 18, 1931

After the incident, Northeast became a colony of Japan, and hundreds of thousands of Koreans living there had to suffer more severe damage from the Japanese imperialists.

3. Sintering

If we summarize some of the factors that contributed to the mythologization of Kim Il-sung, they are all negative. First, Kim

[347] Jung Chul, ⍰The Transition and Prospects of Chinese Korean Society, p. 13~14.

Sung-ju borrowed the name of the legendary Kim Il-sung. Kim Sung-ju was one of the many anti-Japanese revolutionaries who used the name Kim Il-sung, which has been passed down orally as a legendary myth[348]. At that time, all the anti-Japanese revolutionaries were being pursued by the Japanese police or officials, so most of them used several pseudonyms, but it is said that the anti-Japanese revolutionaries used the name Kim Il-sung a lot.[349] Kim Sung-ju first used the pseudonym Kim Il-sung in 1928 when he was arrested for participating in a large-scale protest movement by the Jilin people against the construction of the Gil-hoe railway in Yanji. And when Kim Sung-ju joined the Chinese Communist Party in October 1931, he registered under the name "Kim Il-sung." There is no doubt that today's Kim Il-sung has benefited from receiving a portion of the honor that should have gone to other revolutionaries.[350]

Second, the Minsaengdan incident, a tragedy for the Korean nation, served as an opportunity for Kim Il-sung to make a career in the world. More than 500 leaders of the anti-Japanese struggle were driven to the Minsaengdan and executed, but Kim Il-sung was almost the only one who survived and was able to emerge as the leader of the anti-Japanese coalition after the Minsaengdan case was closed. Third, Kim Il-sung was

[348] For a detailed analysis of the cases of many people who used the name Kim Il-sung, see Seo Dae-sook, 『History of the Korean Communist Movement 』, pp. 236～239.

[349] Testimony of Kwon Lip (Professor of History, Yanbian University), (March 2004).

[350] Seo Dae-sook, 『History of the Korean Communist Movement』p. 239.

appointed as the president of the third division when the new division established the three divisions of the second army in accordance with the new policy decided at the Seventh Communist International Conference, and he was instructed to operate in the Changbaek county area, which is the border area between the DPRK and China, and participated in the Battle of Bocheonbo, the first operation to be launched in Korea as part of the new policy strategy, which was an opportunity to make his name known in the domestic media. The Japanese police exaggerated the Battle of Bocheonbo in order to arrest the anti-Japanese militants in Japan, and Kim Il-sung's name became famous. He is a very lucky person in that regard. Considering that many anti-Japanese militants were dying in the country at the time, Kim Il-sung was a lucky man in that he was ordered to work at the Mt. Paektu area.

Fourth, almost all of the other leaders of the armed struggle who were active in the fields of Manchuria were killed in the air attack by the Japanese army, but Kim Il-sung was able to survive because he waged guerrilla warfare in the forest of Mount Paektu. Kim Il-sung survived because he was hiding in the forests of Mt. Paektu, and he survived because he fled to the Soviet Union after October 1940. While most of the leaders of the anti-Japanese coalition forces were killed, Kim Il-sung was able to survive. There are also many aspects in which he was able to take the credit of the deceased armed struggle leaders because he was alive and not dead. Fifth, the Soviet Union's 88th Brigade became a rallying point for the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, and the

88th Brigade became a rallying point for Kim Il-sung of the 1st Route Army, Choe Yong-gun of the 2nd Route Army, and Kim Chaek of the 3rd Route Army. Originally, Kim Il-sung, Choe Yong-gun, and Kim Chae-chung were not linked, but during their five-year stay in the Soviet Union, they all merged into the Manchurian faction.

Sixth, because Kim Il-sung had a close relationship with the Soviet military leaders at the 88th podium, he was appointed supreme leader by the Soviet Union when the Soviet military established the North Korean regime in 1945. The Soviet Union used the anti-Japanese armed struggle as a basis for justifying the North Korean regime and highlighted Kim Il-sung as a hero for his participation in the anti-Japanese armed struggle. With the help of the Soviet military government, he was established as North Korea's top leader, and since then, he has distorted previous history into his own.

Seventh, because Kim Il-sung became the supreme leader of North Korea, he played North Korea.

Historians have distorted the history of our nation's independence movement and the anti-Japanese armed struggle as belonging to Kim Il-sung alone. Kim Il-sung's stature appears to be great because only Kim Il-sung came to power as the supreme leader and idolized his achievements, but in fact, during the era of the anti-Japanese independence movement, most people opposed Japan, and the majority of people joined the independence movement. The heartless people are the former artillery commander in China's Eighth Route Army, and Kim Il-sung is a high-ranking figure who cannot be matched. Kim Il-sung's

power described the history of the anti-Japanese struggle as the history of Kim Il-sung, and monopolized the achievements of history. After Kim Il-sung purged the coastal faction in 1956, he erased the history of the coastal faction itself, highlighting Kim Il-sung's Manchurian faction as the only force in the anti-Japanese armed struggle. Furthermore, Kim Il-sung's ancestry was highlighted as the only anti-Japanese tradition.

Chapter

Conclusio

This study examines how North Korean historiography reveals the facts of Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against Japan.

It focused on whether the distortion was made and how the distorted facts were used in North Korea's domestic politics. In order to analyze the actual situation of North Korea's distortion of Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against Kim Il-sung, we have reconstructed the reality of Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against Japan based on the results of existing research by our academic circles, Chinese literature, testimonies of participants in the anti-Japanese struggle in China, Japanese official documents, and Soviet documents. This study was designed to criticize the distorted facts of North Korea, but it also sought to correct the distorted perception of Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against Japan in our academic circles and our society.

As we have seen, Kim Il-sung's participation in the anti-Japanese armed struggle

It's true. However, it turned out that North Korea's claims and historical narratives about Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against Japan are too distorted. There is not a single line in North Korea's history book that has not been distorted. The factual descriptions are also distorted in a way that embellishes them.

Because the facts are distorted so much like this, in South Korea, oh

Rather, it may have been argued that Kim Il-sung is a total fake. The types of distortions of North Korean historiography about Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against Japan can be summarized in four

main categories. First, North Korea describes the activities of the Chinese Communist Party-led Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army as the activities of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army founded by Kim Il-sung. The decisions and directives of the Chinese Communist Party and military cadres were replaced by the decisions and directives of Kim Il Sung. In the 30s, the anti-Japanese struggle in Manchuria was carried out under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party's Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, and it was distorted to pretend that Kim Il-sung had an independent army and led it independently. There are many parts that distort why he said that he was the main actor when Kim Il-sung did not make it the main body, and that Kim Il-sung decided when it was not Kim Il-sung's decision. At that time, the anti-Japanese armed struggle was planned and ordered by the Chinese Communist Party, but it was distorted as if Kim Il-sung had led and decided it alone. At that time, Kim Il-sung was a member of the Chinese Communist Party and a member of a unit of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army, which operated strictly under the command of the Chinese Communist Party. At the end of his life, he was the commander of the 6th Company of the 2nd Army, but the leader of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army was the Communist Party of China, the program was the program of the CCP, and every move of Kim Il-sung's troops was ordered by the Chinese Communist Party.

North Korea says Kim Il-sung is the pioneer and leader of the anti-Japanese armed struggle.

This is a gross distortion of the facts. Can it be said that in the face of Japanese aggression, China allowed Kim Il-sung, a Korean, to lead the armed struggle against Japan in the northeastern provinces? At that time, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee sent Zhu Bozhong to the northeast to pioneer the anti-Japanese armed struggle, and he was actually the one who led the anti-Japanese armed struggle until he fled to Khabarovsk in the Soviet Union in 1940. Yang Zhengwu was the commander of tens of thousands of men. These are the people who actually pioneered the anti-Japanese armed struggle. Kim Il-sung started as a soldier and became a lieutenant, a general manager, and a boss. Choi Jin-hyuk, director of the Institute of Party History, who wrote "With the Century," responded to the criticism of Yanbian University historians for the distortion of history, saying, "Sir, why don't you know? Our nation must establish a Juche historical system."[351]

Second, he manipulated non-existent history into something real. It distorted the existence of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army, which did not exist historically. Kim Il-sung is propagandized as having created and commanded the Korean People's Revolutionary Army to liberate the country. By the way, there was never a unit called the Korean People's Revolutionary Army. Before

[351] Interview with Imoh Nam (Professor, Yanbian University), (February 2004).

the name of the Chinese Communist Party's Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army was changed, it was called the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army, but North Korea imitated this name and distorted it into the Korean People's Revolutionary Army. It is an organization that has never existed in history. It distorted the entire history of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army and distorted it to be the Korean People's Revolutionary Army and commanded by Kim Il-sung. North Korea claims that Kim Il Sung founded the Korean People's Revolutionary Army in March 1934 and took over as its commander, which is a complete distortion. A complete document of the history of March 1934 is available in China. According to Chinese documents, on December 3, 1933, a directive from the Manchurian Provincial Committee instructed the Yanbian People's Guerrilla Corps to be reorganized into the 1st Independent Command of the 2nd Army of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army, and to establish the 2nd Independent Command after the conditions were established. In accordance with this document, the CCP Special Committee held a meeting in March 1934 at the Ridge Territory of Samdo Bay and established the 1st Independent Command, appointed Zhu Jin as president and Wang Deotai as Zhengyu, and organized the Yanji County Guerrilla Corps as the 1st, the Wangcheng County Forest Corps as the 2nd,

and the Huarong Guerrilla Corps as the 3rd. Kim Il-sung's Sosa Detachment was not included here.[352]

In addition, North Korean historiography claims that Kim Il-sung was 14 years old in October 1926, when he was 14 years old. It is claimed that he built an alliance and presented a complete program in the Korean revolution. It is claimed that Kim Il-sung founded the Juche idea in June 1930, when he was 18 years old, when he delivered a speech titled "The Course of the Korean Revolution," which was a historical decision. They are not in Chinese literature and are not possible in view of the situation at the time. Third, North Korean historiography conceals real history as non-existent. The fact that he fled to the Khabarovsk region of Russia in November 1940 after the Japanese counterattack in Manchuria and was assigned to the Soviet Far East Army is hidden from the history of North Korea. On September 19, 1945, just before Kim Il-sung arrived in Moscow, he was summoned to Moscow to meet with Stalin and was crowned the supreme leader of North Korea, but North Korean history records conceal this. Kim Il-sung not only denied any connection with the Chinese Communist Party until 1940, but also denied that he had joined the 88th Brigade of the Soviet Red Army since 1941. This is to conceal the fact that North

[352] Testimony of Nam Im-oh (Research expert on Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese armed struggle).

Korea is a satellite state of the Soviet Union and to assert the image of Juche.

Fourth, they embellished or exaggerated the facts. Exaggerated assessments of the Battle of Bocheonbo and Kim Jong-il's birth on Mt. Paektu are distortions to exaggerate or glorify the facts.

During the Japanese period, our people carried out the anti-Japanese movement in a wide range of areas such as northeast China (Manchuria), North China (province), the Americas, and Korea, and from 1905, before Kim Il-sung was born, until just before liberation after Kim Il-sung fled to the Soviet Union, and carried out the anti-Japanese movement continuously from 1905, before Kim Il-sung was born, until just before liberation, and many people carried out the anti-Japanese movement at the cost of their lives. The North Korean librarian distorted the universal history of the Korean people at that time into the history of the uniqueness of Kim Il-sung. Even in Manchuria, where Kim Il-sung was active, the number of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Coalition Army reached 40,000, but most of its members were oxidized, leaving only about 1,000 by 1940.

> Kim Il-sung was a lucky man during the anti-Japanese armed struggle. Jungwoo Yang, Wei

While most of the highest-ranking commanders and leaders, such as Chung Min, Wang Deok-tae, and Cho Sang-ji, were killed, Kim Il-sung survived. While Kim Il-sung was executed by about 500 Korean anti-Japanese fighters, Kim Il-sung was able to survive and

be appointed as the president of the 2nd Army and the 3rd Company when they were newly established, because he spoke Chinese well, got along well with the Chinese, and acted as an interpreter in the trial of the Minsaengdan case.

Most of the fighters of the anti-Japanese crest struggle fought in the fields of Manchuria before the Japanese

While he was killed by a punitive fighter strafing, Kim Il-sung may have been able to survive to the end because he was stationed in the forest of Mt. Paektu.

In accordance with the decision of the Communist International, one unit was deployed to the Paektusan area on the border with Korea, and Kim Il-sung was selected as the commander of the unit, and according to that purpose, he participated in the Battle of Bocheonbo, which was the first domestic vacuum operation, and it was reported in the domestic media at the time, and this became an opportunity for the name to become known in the country.

Kim Il-sung escaped to the Soviet Union in October 1940 and was able to maintain his life.

In addition, he became friends with Soviet military officials and was able to become the supreme leader of North Korea under the Soviet military government after liberation. Kim Il-sung also became the supreme leader of North Korea, so he was able to write the history of the anti-Japanese armed struggle as his own history.

The Impact of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle on the North Korean System: Ideologizing Overrule

Kim Il-sung's experience of armed struggle against Japan gave Kim Il-sung the good fortune to grow into the supreme leader of North Korea, but it had a very unfortunate outcome for the North Korean people and the entire Korean people. Kim Il-sung became the supreme leader of North Korea through his experience in the anti-Japanese armed struggle, and in order to expand and strengthen his cause, he developed the anti-Japanese armed struggle as the ruling ideology.

Kim Il-sung's ruling ideology of the anti-Japanese armed struggle The greatest national tragedy is that the anti-Japanese armed struggle was used as a pretext for provoking the 25 June War. In order to enhance the legitimacy of his power, Kim Il-sung defined the Rhee Seung-man regime in South Korea as a pro-Japanese force and began to compete with the system. Kim Il-sung called the June 25 War a war of national liberation, which was meant to liberate South Korea from pro-Japanese forces. It was the ideological foundation that pushed the North Korean people to war. Under the pretext of exterminating the remnants of Japan and liberating the South Korean people from Japan, they mobilized the North Korean people to the war and persuaded the North Korean people, China, and the Soviet Union to start the 25 June War. His experience in the anti-Japanese struggle was used as a pretext for the provocation of war by the national anthem.

Second, using Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against Japan as a ruling ideology

To this end, North Korea continued to mobilize hostility toward Japan. The state ideology of the anti-Japanese armed struggle pursued a hostile policy with Japan as its top priority, and continued its hostile policy with Japan even after the end of colonial rule and the end of the war. In addition, because of its hostile policy with Japan, it was able to maintain the validity of the anti-Japanese armed struggle as a ruling ideology. While South Korea established diplomatic relations with Japan, imported machinery and raw materials from Japan, and exported them to the United States, realizing high economic growth through the international division of labor, North Korea has reaped the benefits of South Korea's rapid growth. North Korea still maintains its anti-Japanese and anti-American regime and risks economic isolation. Third, the history of the anti-Japanese armed struggle has been overly ideologized into a ruling ideology, and since the anti-Japanese armed struggle contains nationalist and anti-foreign sentiments, it has been theorized as the Juche ideology. In North Korea, there is no Juche idea without anti-Japanese martial arts, and there is no anti-Japanese martial arts without Juche ideas. In North Korea, history and ideology complemented each other, and the anti-Japanese armed struggle developed into an ideology of over-rule. The ideology of the anti-Japanese armed struggle has become so absolutized that the ideology of governance as a means has gone beyond the level of appropriateness to the level of absolute value that constrains the direction of policy. Because they distorted the

history of the anti-Japanese movement and mythologized it as a means of governance, they strengthened information control both internally and externally, fearing that the myth of falsehood would be exposed, which led to the rigidity and closure of the system and society.

In the end, North Korea's armed struggle against Japan saved the power of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.

Inflicted suffering on the North Korean people. The ruling ideology of the anti-Japanese armed struggle has led North Korea to pursue an isolated foreign policy, and its economy is suffering because of its isolated foreign relations.

Fearing that the distorted myth would be shattered because of the distorted myth of the anti-Japanese martial arts, the DPRK continued to control information and control of external people-to-people exchanges, and in order not to damage the logic of the anti-Japanese martial arts, it gave up diplomatic relations with Japan and risked external economic isolation. The ideology of the state that justifies the regime can be seen as how important it was to the people of the country.

The Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle and Military-First Politics

North Korea's official publications continue the tradition of military-first armed struggle against Japan

It can be said that military-first politics is clearly related to the anti-Japanese armed struggle.[353] Such a statement may be a search for historical clarification of military-first politics, but it is true that the tradition of the anti-Japanese armed struggle has a strong influence on the origins of North Korea's power elite, the political climate, and the specifics of military-first politics. Anti-Japanese Mutu was revived as military-first politics after the death of Kim Il-sung. The tradition of the anti-Japanese armed struggle is being recycled again in military-first politics.

Discuss the relationship between the anti-Japanese armed struggle and military-first politics in several ways.

Here's what you can see. First, the anti-Japanese armed struggle is basically an anti-Japanese struggle, an anti-foreign power, an anti-imperialist struggle, and so it attaches great importance to military power and military corps. The North Korean system, which was formed as a result of the anti-Japanese armed struggle, had strong militaristic tendencies to the extent that it was called a guerrilla state.

In the same way, military-first politics is anti-American.

It is anti-foreign and anti-imperialist. North Korea, which continues its confrontational relationship with the United States centered on the nuclear issue, is inciting anti-Americanism under the slogan of military-first politics and carrying out a series of military

[353] Kim In-ok, □General Kim Jong-il's Theory of Military-First Politics□F.

demonstrations such as missile launches and nuclear tests under the pretext of military-first politics. It also includes a policy of further strengthening military power and giving priority to military units over other social groups.

Second, if the anti-Japanese armed struggle is the history of Kim Il-sung, then the military-first politics is Kim Jong-il's

It's history. Just as Kim Il-sung used the experience of the anti-Japanese armed struggle as a justification for power throughout his life, Kim Jong-il seems to be making the history of military-first politics and thus creating the legitimacy of his own power.

Third, the anti-Japanese armed struggle has taken the arduous march as a historical tradition.

As you can see, military-first politics also has a hard march as a prerequisite. Just as it is inevitable to make a difficult march in the process of fighting against foreign forces, economic difficulties are included as a necessary condition in the process of military-first politics. Just as the anti-Japanese armed struggle in the past was a history of a difficult march, this military-first politics is a politics of repeating the arduous march. If the anti-Japanese armed struggle in the past was a history of an inevitable arduous march against foreign aggression, now it is deliberately making a difficult march by creating an imaginary enemy.

In this sense, military-first politics is not future-oriented politics, but past-oriented

It is an enemy governance strategy. It can be seen that North Korea is a country that needs to clear up its past. It is a country that needs to adapt to the rapidly changing international society with a future-oriented vision.

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